At 09:08 AM 11/7/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
I am not sure. Much of the yet unresolved discussion of QM have to do with deciding which ontological commitments come with the Schrödinger equation. As far as I have understood, there is no scientific agreement about this. . .
HP: That is true, and you mention several "unnatural" epistemologies; but there is general agreement that QM cannot be interpreted by Peircean Realism. In fact, most teachers of QM struggle with the intuitively realist perspectives of introductory students. In teaching QM, Realism blocks the path of inquiry.
FS: . . .(unlike basic knowledge about iron and cakes etc.)
HP: This assumption appears to beg the general question. Is there agreement about how "basic knowledge" relates to reality?
FS: But this [QM ambiguity] is not generalizable to the idea that all scientific knowledge is subject to the same ambiguity.
HP: I'm not sure what you are implying. Are you agreeing with me that different types of knowledge benefit from different epistemologies? Or do you only mean that ambiguities in classical models are different ambiguities from those in QM? (I assume you don't mean there are no ambiguities or that Peirce has spoken, the case is closed.)
Howard
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