Dear Edwina, and Evgenii,
I was thinking a bit more. I just realized that when you say that my
"approach 'might' have strong correlation with the Peircean approach" or
"may not have", you probably meant the entire philosophy of Peirce. But
I was limited to logical abduction. It was not my ambition, not in
wildest dreams, to account for anything beyond that.
So, here is my reply with this new insight:
On 29/03/15 14:42, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Danko - I think, cautiously, that your approach 'might' have strong
correlations with the Peircean approach, but, but..with some necessary
clarification before I'd change that 'might have' to 'does have'.
First - what do YOU mean by 'mind'? If you mean only the human mind,
then, this would immediately deviate from the Peircean meaning of
'mind' - which is far broader.
While developing the theory of practopoiesis, I only meant human and
animal minds, and I also included artificial intelligence. I had not
considered any possibility of other understanding of mind that extends
to the organizing force of the entire universe.
If, by some miracle, my theory happens to apply (or not apply) to those
extensions, this would be just a coincidence, as I definitely did not
plan something like this.
Danko
--
Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić
Web:
http://www.danko-nikolic.com
Mail address 1:
Department of Neurophysiology
Max Planck Institut for Brain Research
Deutschordenstr. 46
60528 Frankfurt am Main
GERMANY
Mail address 2:
Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies
Wolfgang Goethe University
Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1
60433 Frankfurt am Main
GERMANY
----------------------------
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Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327
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