Helmut, Lists,
Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like
ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the
notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general
following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on
this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers
on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my
web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I
don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example).
Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but
almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the
nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on
boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically
information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web
page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization,
individuation and identity [1], _Revue Internationale de Philosophie_
59 (2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A
dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex system [2]s
[2]. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds. _Complexity, Difference and
Identity: an Ethical Perspective_ [3]. 2010 Berlin: Springer.
Obviously, I don’t think that “self” is hard to grasp
scientifically, if you accept self-organization as a possibility.
Maturana does not, and thus leaves self (and thus his notion of
autopoiesis) rather lame.
I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for
a self, but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of
self-production.
Cheers,
John
FROM: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]]
SENT: May 25, 2015 5:53 PM
TO: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]; [email protected]
SUBJECT: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8676] Re: self-R
Jeff, Lists,
John Collier wrote, that memory is not the same as same body. So, is
self-organizing (as phenomenon) the same as memory as phenomenon?
There are metal alloys that have a memory. Also a computer has a
memory. So I like the self-organizing aspect, which you have mentioned
at the end of your post, better than the memory aspect. What makes
self-organizing observable, i.e., what is the phenomenon about it? I
think, it is in the first place something quite visible and touchable:
a membrane or skin, like any organism has got. But also an air bubble
in water has a sort of membrane. Now the distinction between systems
with and without a self, I think, lies in the question "why?", i.e.
causality: Why does an air bubble have a membrane? Because of surface
tension, that is caused by natural laws, i.e. efficient cause. And why
does a bacterium have a membrane? In order to have a boundary that
leads the molecules it needs in, and the molecules it doesnt need (and
which would disturb it) out. So here we have the reason of need, final
cause with its finis/end to fulfill (put an end to) the actual need of
the bacterium, and other needs that will be its own in the future. But
isnt all this a supposition? Maybe the observable phenomenon about
this is, that the membrane is kept up and repaired by determinate
actions of the bacterium, and not by natural laws alone. One problem
is, that anything that happens, not only happens obeying a final
cause, but efficient cause too. Otherwise it would not work. So one
can always say: It works because of efficient cause, and "needs"
(final cause) are just anthropocentric suppositions by the human
observer. In fact, neither the bacterium, nor the observer has or is a
self, there is no such thing as a self, it is all illusion and
recursive circulation. But if self and life conceptually is a circle,
it nevertheless exists and is a phenomenon. Is "self" hard to grasp
scientifically? It is, if the definition of science is based solely on
deduction and efficient causation. It is not, if you define science as
also conceptually appreciating induction and final causation (About
abduction and example causation not now).
Helmut
"Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]>
Helmut, Ben, Lists,
I agree with what you say here, Helmut: "Pitifully, this sort of
distinction is not a scientific one." What I mean in saying this is
that I don't believe that the distinctions you are making are
problematic for the practice of doing science. That is, scientists
don't start by reflecting on the kinds of worries you are expressing
about the nature of the real relations between observer, observation,
and phenomena observed. For the most part, they get the enterprise of
scientific inquiry off the ground by just making observations and then
trying to explain the phenomena that have been observed. For my part,
I think there is much to be gained by starting in philosophy in a
similarly naive way. Where the phenomena are well explained by the
theories that have been developed, then there is no need to have
doubts about those theories. It is the surprising phenomena that lead
us to doubt some part of the accepted theories--and then we have
reason to search for better explanations.
Based on what I have seen so far about the recent discussions of the
"self" that has been taking place on the list--I don't yet see a
clearly delineated set of phenomena that call out for explanation. As
such, those who are taking up these questions would do well to focus
their attention at this observational stage of the process before
jumping to big conclusions about which kinds of explanations are or
not sufficient to account for the phenomena they are trying to
explain.
Let me offer an example: one kind of phenomena that Peirce devotes
considerable attention to is the phenomena of how an individual person
is able to exert self-control over their thoughts. For his part,
Peirce does not think that the kinds of explanations offered by the
likes of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume or Mill are sufficient to account
for the phenomena associated with the exercise of logical self
control. As such, there are aspects of the phenomena of what a
person--such as a young child--realizes when he discovers that his
beliefs about something like the suitability of a stove for being
touched are in error. Peirce claims that the stages the child goes
through in learning about the logical conceptions of error and falsity
as well as the conceptions of self and other are entirely analogous to
the stages that the human species must have gone through as these
powers of rationality of thought and action evolved.
It isn't clear how this logical conception of the self is related to
the chemical or biological conception of a system that is auto (or
self) organizing. They seem to be very different conceptions that are
associated with very different kinds of phenomena we're trying to
explain.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Helmut Raulien [[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 1:37 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [biosemiotics:8672] Re: self-R
The difficult thing about a phenomenon is, that it is a phenomenon in
the observers mind. An observer who wants to distinguish a phenomenon
of his/her own mind from a phenomenon, that is a phenomenon of another
self, might ask: Have I asked to have this phenomenon? Or am I
observing something that can only be explained by some entity other
than me, having a phenomenon, because this special phenomenon is so
weird, that I never would have made it up. Pitifully, this sort of
distinction is not a scientific one. But it indicates, that a self can
only be detected by another self. Id say, a self is something with a
need. But assigning a need to something is always a supposition, and a
supposition is an action only a nother self can do. So, at least, what
remains is to say you have hit the nail on its head by saying
"preferably some that are surprising". A self is something surprising,
but surprise can only be felt by somebody who is surprised. So maybe
there is no way of getting a better grip, or is there?
Helmut
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]>
Ben, Lists,
I, too, find the thread puzzling. In order to get a better grip on
what the discussion is about, I wanted to ask a simple question: what
are the phenomena that need to be explained? We use the word 'self' to
talk about a wide range of things. As such, I was hoping that someone
might point to sample phenomena--preferably some that are surprising
in one respect or another--so that we could compare different
explanations in terms of their adequacy in accounting for the
phenomena.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Benjamin Udell [[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 5:52 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [biosemiotics:8665] Re: self-R
Kalevi, Howard, list,
I've been trying to understand this discussion thread's idea that the
individual self is founded in (self-)replication. Replication seems
for continuation of kind, species, lineage; it doesn't seem obvious
how, furthermore, the individual self is _founded_ there too, even if
the individual self is underpinned by that level. When I try to think
of it in my simplistic ways, it seems to me that the individual self
is founded at a 'higher' level. Let me resort for what it's worth to
an analogy.
In the analogous scientific practice, replication of results (even
one's own across various occasions), is not the same thing as the
checking, balancing, structurally supporting of results by various
lines of evidence, observation, etc., by various inquirers (or by
oneself qua various), converging from various directions, which seems
a process of buttressing and evolutionary (renovating, re-designing)
buildup of results.
While biological replication is needed for evolvable species and
lineages, the evolutionary process itself seems more analogous to that
'buttressing' process in scientific practice. Insofar as an
individual's learning process, even though it depends on a general
inherited capacity to learn, does not follow inherited pre-programmed
developmental paths, it is 'evolutionary' (in the sense that various
people including Stan Salthe use the word), and this makes each
individual an individualized self who is checked and balanced both
within the self's own experience and by other individuals and
experiences.
(Such seems even more so the case when the individual learns not just
by trial & error (struggle) in various directions, practice &
repetition, and emulation/replication of valued exemplars and results,
but by investigating and testing claims made by various people or
virtually made by various appearances, the testing our notions to
destruction rather than ourselves, as Popper would put it.)
Best, Ben
On 5/20/2015 2:07 AM, Kalevi Kull wrote:
Dear Howard,
let us try whether we can find more agreement here.
KK: yes, both construction and description, here von Neumann is
right, I agree - but the way how he defines self-reproduction is not
what we could apply in biology or biosemiotics.
HP: How does it not apply?
What I mean is this: von Neumann assumed that "self-reproducing
configuration must be capable of universal construction. This
criterion, indeed, eliminates the trivial cases, but it also has the
unfortunate consequence that it eliminates all naturally occurring
self-reproducing systems as well, since none of these have been shown
to be capable of universal construction." (Langton C. G. 1984.
Self-reproduction in Cellular Automata. Physica D 10: 135-144 - p.
137)
KK: Therefore, if You state that "An individual self is first defined
by self-replication", it would require a relevant definition of
self-replication. Do You have one?
HP: Yes. Von Neumann's logical conditions plus my physical conditions
Von Neumann's logical conditions (which include the existence of
universal constructor) are not necessary - these are not used in the
real living systems. That is the point.
Best
Kalevi
Links:
------
[1] http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/SOIIF.PDF
[2]
http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdf
[3]
http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-90-481-9186-4
