Gary F, Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is considered as a singular phenomenon?
I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign. Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign? -- Franklin ------------------------------------------ On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Franklin, Jeff, > > > > Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To > perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of > that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting > its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which like all > predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence > of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*), then you > have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not). > > > > I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue > the thread without me for awhile ... >
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