Gary F, A perceptual judgment must take the form of a dicisign, so I would say the identification that "that right there is smoke" would be a perceptual judgment, but smoke itself is not a perceptual judgment, but would have to be the percept (supposing the percept has been rightly judged as smoke). Supposing that the percept has been rightly identified as smoke, then it would serve as a sign of fire, which would be another percept, that could be judged in a perceptual judgment as "that right there is fire". That's the way I think of how percept and perceptual judgment are related.
-- Franklin ---------------------------------------- On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 11:35 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Franklin, > > > > Yes, this excerpt from Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for > Pragmaticism” demonstrates that according to the purpose of the analysis, a > percept can be considered either as an object or a sign. (And of course > signs can be objects of other signs, otherwise we could say nothing about > semiosis!) Your example does show that maybe it’s not *that* “hard to say > how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept” — although I could > argue that smoke is not a percept but a perceptual judgment. But personally > I’m going to leave for later (or for others) the consideration of > perception in terms of triadic relations. At least until I have a better > handle on NDTR and its classification of signs, and how that relates to the > phenomenological categories. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 9-Dec-15 18:00 > > > > Gary F, Jeff, Jon S, > > > > Given Gary's comments in this last post, I think it would be worthwhile to > quote the passage that is pertinent to some of what Jeff has been > discussing, and which I discussed with Jeff in our previous discussion. > From Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers: > > > 539. The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last > analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with > Pragmaticism, which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought > proper is Conduct. Nothing is more indispensable to a sound epistemology > than a crystal-clear discrimination between the Object and the Interpretant > of knowledge; very much as nothing is more indispensable to sound notions > of geography than a crystal-clear discrimination between north latitude and > south latitude; and the one discrimination is not more rudimentary than the > other. That we are conscious of our Percepts is a theory that seems to me > to be beyond dispute; but it is not a fact of Immediate Perception. A fact > of Immediate Perception is not a Percept, nor any part of a Percept; a > Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate Perception or rather the > Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the Immediate Interpretant, is a > Pheme that is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of the Percept, and of > which the Percept is the Dynamical Object, and is with some considerable > difficulty (as the history of psychology shows), distinguished from the > Immediate Object, though the distinction is highly significant.†1 But not > to interrupt our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the > Immediate Object of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought > makes up for that lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late > Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a > Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive thought as > determining the original Immediate Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I > must be understood as talking not psychology, but the logic of mental > operations. Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of Universes > resulting from various adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They are, > however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts. > > > > Notice that the percept, in one case, is identified by Peirce as a Seme > and that does in fact make it a sign. Of course, it is also discussed as > immediate object, and dynamical object, so one needs to be careful as to > how one interprets this passage when trying to figure out what is going on > with the percept, and how it is understood differently depending upon what > its role is in the triadic relation. In any case, it would appear that the > percept, according to Peirce, can be a sign and classified as a seme > (a.k.a., rheme), and can have its own immediate object, and have > interpretants. > > > > For my part, I would suppose that there can be phenomena which we directly > experience (directly perceive), which can nevertheless serves as signs of > other perceptual phenomena. I directly perceive smoke. The smoke, while > perceived in itself, can also be a sign of fire, which can also be directly > perceived. Perhaps I have failed to understand what Gary meant when he said > that "it's hard to say how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept"? > > > > -- Franklin > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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