Peirce List, Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point Matt has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in the process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of continuity of knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that work at the time, but I was already working with biologists on an information dynamics approach to self-organization in evolution, and I set it aside. My co-author on the paper is a former student of mine who is one of the few to maintain and interest in the issues, though he is making his name more in the cognitive science of religion and superstition these days.
* Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience<http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont/pdf/Save%20distinctions.pdf> (2004, with Konrad Talmont-Kaminski) The title is a sideways reference to “saving the phenomena” as used by Bas van Fraassen, who seems to have got it from Duhem. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 10:03 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations Franklin, Peircers, Here a distinction that I find helpful: EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good one. * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level generalization). Matt On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com<mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary F, Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is considered as a singular phenomenon? I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign. Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign? -- Franklin ------------------------------------------ On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Franklin, Jeff, Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive X as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject (that) with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like all predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke as a sign), then you have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not). I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue the thread without me for awhile ... ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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