Franklin, Peircers, Here a distinction that I find helpful:
EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good one. * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level generalization). Matt On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, > > Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is > considered as a singular phenomenon? > > I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is a > dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign. Is > it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign? > > -- Franklin > > ------------------------------------------ > >> On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> Franklin, Jeff, >> >> >> >> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive >> X as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment, >> “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject >> (that) with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like all predicates is a >> general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence of fire from the >> smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke as a sign), then you have an argument >> (whether it is expressed verbally or not). >> >> >> >> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue >> the thread without me for awhile ... >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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