Franklin, List,
You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:
"Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
(121315-1)
is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."
"So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
introducing (1213`15-2)
the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
dicisign)."
"Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
(121315-3)
But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
type, to the subject, or percept."
These fit with my understanding [1] that
<Words denote and sentences assert or make judgement.
(121315-4)
In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the
vehicle of a sentence.>
Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):
"Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
(121315-5)
Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence.
"A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes
(121315-6)
the general as its predicate."
Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a sentence
which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words.
All the best.
Sung
Reference:
[1] Hjelmslev, L. (1961). *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*. The
University of Wisconcin Press, Madison, pp. 4.
On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom <
[email protected]> wrote:
> Matt, list,
>
> Matt wrote:
>
> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
>> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
>> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
>> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>
>
> Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is
> not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. So, as
> I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", introducing the
> general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
> dicisign). Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a
> type. But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate,
> or type, to the subject, or percept.
>
> Also, note what he says in "The Nature of Meaning", EP2 p.208:
> "Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgment, or
> proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a
> present percept, or sense-image, that judgment must involve generality in
> its predicate." This suggests that the type is a generalization inspired by
> the quality of the percept itself, and not simply introduced by the
> interpreting mind to make sense of the percept; the percept contributes
> something to the judgment that is made of it, besides its singularity as
> the subject of the judgment.
>
> Consider in connection with this idea the following excerpt from "The
> Seven Systems of Metaphysics", EP2, p.194: "Therefore, if you ask me what
> part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that
> the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose,
> working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must
> have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
> Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an
> argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being
> precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this
> huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses *for us*
> and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which
> *icons* Qualities are immediately presented."
>
> In a perceptual judgment, it is the quality of the percept which inspires
> the predicate of the judgment, and that predicate is the introduction of
> the general element in perception.
>
> As Peirce goes to great lengths to argue at the outcome of the series of
> lectures culminating in "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction": "The
> elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
> arrested as unauthorized by reason."
>
> -- Franklin
>
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Matt Faunce <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Franklin, Peircers,
>>
>> Here a distinction that I find helpful:
>>
>> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas
>> percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you
>> have a perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
>> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>>
>> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very
>> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x
>> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to
>> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For
>> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is
>> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark
>> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.'
>>
>> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of
>> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine
>> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If
>> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns.
>>
>> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good
>> one.
>>
>> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone
>> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark.
>> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems
>> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x',
>> 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level
>> generalization).
>>
>> Matt
>>
>>
>> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom <
>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> Gary F,
>>
>> Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is
>> considered as a singular phenomenon?
>>
>> I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment
>> is a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a
>> dicisign. Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a
>> dicisign?
>>
>> -- Franklin
>>
>> ------------------------------------------
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> Franklin, Jeff,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To
>>> perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression
>>> of that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition),
>>> uniting its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which
>>> like all predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the
>>> presence of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*),
>>> then you have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to
>>> continue the thread without me for awhile ...
>>>
>>
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--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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