John, list, I will become much less active for the next few months after today.
I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable though. It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible. If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly. In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both. I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed. The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false, and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it. I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality unique to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. Only this does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not mean the quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it is not precisely the same as those other qualities. -- Franklin --------------------------------------------- On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Jon, > > It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to > many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are > ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions > because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current > discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from > perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances > alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted > to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly, > however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence > directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using > the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self > and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have > experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation > (thirdness) as either "this" or "that". > > John > > John Collier > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] > > Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 19:21 > > To: John Collier; Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 > > Subject: Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > > > John, List, > > > > I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to mean > > preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation we come up with > > must leave the appearances invariant. > > > > I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean either > > save or solve. I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure. > > Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment: > > > > https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%C > > E%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0- > > %CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B > > 1-sozein-ta-phainomena/ > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote: > > > Peirce List, > > > > > > Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point > Matt > > has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in > the > > process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of > continuity of > > knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses > > and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that > work at > > the time, but I was already working with biologists on an information > > dynamics approach to self-organization in evolution, and I set it aside. > My co- > > author on the paper is a former student of mine who is one of the few to > > maintain and interest in the issues, though he is making his name more > in the > > cognitive science of religion and superstition these days. > > > > > > * Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically > > > significant content of > > experience<http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont/pdf/Save%20distinctions > > .pdf> (2004, with Konrad Talmont-Kaminski) The title is a sideways > reference > > to “saving the phenomena” as used by Bas van Fraassen, who seems to have > > got it from Duhem. > > > > > > John Collier > > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > > > > -- > > > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: > > http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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