Jerry - I'm not sure of your point. Perception is not = passion/emotion. Perception is indeed the basis of information/knowledge; that's basic to Peirce [and Aristotle]. The 'input data' via the senses is analyzed by reason. Reason is an act of logic.
Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jerry Rhee To: Jon Alan Schmidt Cc: [email protected] Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:09 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? Edwina, Your statement, “I don't think introducing passion/emotion into the logical format is relevant” is precisely the point. It’s typically the case that when the structure of the argument needs modifying, the reason given is that you can’t change it because…the past. Regardless, the argument is whether or not CP 5.189 is or is not modus ponens. Your argument is clear with respect to modus ponens and valid/invalid but you simply ignore away the points being made in CP 5.189. You don’t even recognize Peirce’s argument. It’s out of your consideration. It’s not in your vision. You don’t see it. You don’t recognize it. That is, you don’t give good justifications for why it ought to be considered modus ponens when I show you the inconsistency with a one to one correspondence. For instance, with regards whether passion/emotion ought to be considered in CP 5.189, this form of abduction is actually given in context of “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction” in EP2, where Houser states in his introduction: “This lecture was added so that Peirce could extend his remarks about the relation of pragmatism to abduction. He elaborates in particular on three key points raised in the sixth lecture: (1) that nothing is in the intellect that is not first in the senses, (2) that perceptual judgment contain general elements, and (3) that abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them. Pragmatism follows from these propositions. Peirce reiterates that the function of pragmatism is to help us identify unclear ideas and comprehend difficult ones. It is in this lecture that Peirce delivers his famous dictum: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both of those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” CP 5.189 is a reminder of some difficulties faced by philosophers with regards making assertions that are intended to ennoble weakening structures that are coeval with possibility of doing real harm. "And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?" Best, Jerry R On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: Jerry R., List: JR: "Why even talk about surprise and suspect if instead we can have beans and bags…or p’s and q’s?" As I have said over and over, surprise and suspect are the WHY of reasoning--eliminating the irritation of doubt through the fixation of belief--while beans and bags or p's and q's serve to illustrate the HOW of reasoning--forms of inference that produce certain (deduction), probable (induction), or plausible (abduction) conclusions from true premisses. This distinction is important to maintain. JR: "I may have read wrongly but I recall Ben saying that it is a syllogism and Edwina saying that it is modus ponens." Ben U. quoted Peirce calling hypothesis "minor indirect probable syllogism." He later stated, "I'd say that CP 5.189 is a 'syllogism' in a broad sense admitted by Peirce, though the broad senses are not usual senses nowadays. Usually people mean a deductive categorical syllogism, in Barbara and the rest." He subsequently added, "I think that the point that is tripping Jerry R. up is that CP 5.189, as well as modus ponens and affirming the consequent, are schemata of _propositional_ logic, while the jugglings of Barbara are schemata of term logic, and it is terms that are subject, middle, or predicate." Edwina just clarified what she said previously--CP 5.189 presents a deductively INVALID form of modus ponens, which is widely known as the FALLACY of affirming the consequent. In her latest example, the conclusion that it has rained is not certain, as it would be in a deductively valid argument. Instead, it is (at best) merely plausible; hence, the argument is an example of abduction--the proposition that it has rained is a hypothesis proposed to explain why the car is wet. JR: "Besides, affirming the consequent is fine if two things are the same, isn't it?" Again, affirming the consequent is a FALLACY in deductive logic. From "if p then q" and q, p does not follow necessarily. I do not know what you mean here by "if two things are the same." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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