Ben, list, I just quoted Peirce following the bean example:
Hypothesis is where we find some very curious circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition that it was the case of a general rule, and therefore adapt that suppo siti on. Here the emphasis is on "the supposition [that this is] the case of a general rule, " which is in large part the reason why I suggested in a message a few days ago, that Peirce thought that a "prepared scientific mind" is best capable of making that supposition, that is, generating a correct hypothesis. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 3:50 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, > > Well, yes, abductive inference, when formed like a categorical syllogism > by juggling Barbara as Peirce did repeatedly through the years, is > deductively invalid. > > Peirce did not hold that hypothesis (abductive inference) always involves > creating a new rule. > > Many of Peirce's examples of abductive inference involve merely the > extension of a known rule to cover a surprising case. The beans example is > classic, from 1878 in "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis". > > All the beans from this bag are white. > These beans are white. > ∴ these beans are from this bag. > > https://books.google.com/books?id=u8sWAQAAIAAJ&jtp=472#v=onepage&q&f=false > > Even in later years, Peirce did not hold that all abduction involves > creating a new rule. What it always involves is a new conception, new to > the case. > > [....] The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new > discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing > them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _*generalization* _. In > other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts > that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is > recognized as applicable to t he suggested hypothesis, so that the > phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite > likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a > new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. [....] > (From "Syllabus", 1903, EP 2:287 > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-syllabus-syllabus-course-lectures-lowell-institute-beginning-1903-nov-23-some > ) > > A question is, how to distinguish abduction of a new rule from induction? > Note his emphasis on the word "*generalization* ". Peirce through the > years uses the word "generalization" in special sense; he means a kind of > selective generalization. My guess is that the generalization that he > mentions above is the generalization of a hypothetical explanation to a > whole class of cases on the grounds that the explanation (e.g. some hidden > mechanism) happens to make sense only if it happens in a whole class of > cases. Say, somebody who has never heard of rainfall guessing from wet > grass that it happens whenever water falls there from the sky. > > In any case, since abduction does not always involve a new rule, we are > not forced to treat "all beans from that bag are black" as a hypothetical > new rule. Instead, it can be a case where, in Peirce's words, "a law > already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis". I > did mention the middle - beans from that bag - twice, albeit one of the > times I put it between parentheses. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/25/2016 2:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Ben: > Hmm. > > First, I agree with your description of the 5.189 as a 'modus ponens' and > also, the caution about a deductively invalid 'affirmation of the > consequent'. > > To repeat 5.189 > The surprising fact, C, is observed; > But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, > Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. > > 1) But - your attempt to turn it into a regular syllogism...I'm not sure. > The point of the hypothesis is to *create* a new rule, a universal. Your > new rule is 'all the beans from that bag are black'. But you have assumed > it as necessary rather than hypothetical. AND.. > > Your example has the middle term used only once. Has to be used twice. So- > your example doesn't work as a valid syllogism. > > 2) If I try to use the same terms, in the 5.189 format - it won't work > either: > > > The surprising fact, black beans, is observed. > But if it's a rule that ALL beans from these bags are black, then, these > beans being black would be a matter of course. > Therefore, there is reason to suspect that it's a rule that all beans from > these bags are black. > > Now, if I put this into a syllogistic format: > ALL beans from these bags are black. > Some [surprise!] beans are black > Therefore, some beans are from that bag. > > I've got three terms: > beans from these bags > some beans > black > > Format: PM/SM/SP > And it's invalid. Fallacies of the undistributed middle and undistributed > major. > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> > *To:* <[email protected]>[email protected] > *Sent:* Monday, April 25, 2016 2:17 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? > > Jerry R., > > I'd say that CP 5.189 is a "syllogism" in a broad sense admitted by > Peirce, though the broad senses are not usual senses nowadays. Usually > people mean a deductive categorical syllogism, in Barbara and the rest. > > To find the subject, middle, and predicate, one would have to rephrase > 5.189, whose form is akin to modus ponens and the deductively invalid > affirmation of the consequent. One has to put it at least *somewhat* into > the form of a categorical syllogism; the categorical syllogism is what has > three terms, subject, middle, and predicate, in its schemata. > > So here's 5.189's form half-morphed into the black beans example. > > These beans are (oddly) black. > But if these beans were from that bag, then it would be a matter of course > for them to be black (since all the beans from that bag are black). > Ergo (plausibly), these beans are from that bag. > > The subject is these beans. > The middle is beans from that bag. > The predicate is black. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/25/2016 1:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Thanks Ben, Kirsti and list... > > So, would you say that CP 5.189 qualifies as syllogism, i.e., is it > "hypothesis" based on what you know of what Peirce said on Aristotle? Why > or why not? > > What's the predicate, subject and middle term? > > Thanks, > Jerry R > > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 12:19 PM, < <[email protected]> > [email protected] > wrote: > > CSP was thoroughly familiar with Aristotle, both his syllogisms and their > context in those times. It may be good to remember that Aristotle's works, > along all others, were translated into Latin by the time we call the new > age. > > Translations always involve interpretation. Thus what has passed on into > modern logic & philosophy as 'Aristotelian syllogism' I find gravely > misunderstood. - Basics of Western math had changed, via Arab influence. > The birth of albegra (al-jabr) had taken place. > > Ben is putting the discussion into right tracts in introducing CSP's > entries on the topic. > > Kirsti > > Benjamin Udell kirjoitti 25.4.2016 19:16: > > ------------------------------ > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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