Ben indicates an important point in this exchange. The difference between a 
terministic and a propositional approach.In  memoranda concerning the 
Aristotelean syllogism, volume one of the Selected Writings! (1866), Peirce 
discusses the reducibility of the syllogistic figure to the deductive scheme 
and discovers that this is only possible by utilizing a syllogism in the same 
form as the one that has to be reduced. Since I first read the 10 pages I 
always thought that it is this work that gave him confidence with regard to the 
categories. The last sentence reads: Hence, it is shown that every inference 
involves the principle of the first figure, but that the second and third 
figures contain other priciples, besides.

 

It is also in this period that he discusses the issues raised here by making a 
distinction between syllogisms (analytic) and inference (synthetic). The 
memoranda combines the terministic with the propositional approach (cast in 
Rule, Case, Result terms). Contraposition for example works with a 
transposition of terms, which is an immediate inference (Not in line with 
Questions concerning some faculties claimed for man). Peirce found that the 
difference between the three forms of reasoning and their relation can be cast 
by observing that Case, rule and result can be rearranged in order to give the 
differences between Ded. Ind. And hyp. And abd.

 

Auke

 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] 
Verzonden: maandag 25 april 2016 21:41
Aan: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?

 

Ben, Edwina, list,

 

While it is necessary to distinguish deductive from sythentic (inductive and 
abductive) reasoning, Peirce remarks (just preceeding the bean example) that it 
is possible to put all arguments into the form of Barbara (this, he says, "is 
capable of strict proof" (CP 2.619).

 

But he immediately notes (2.620) that while "all inference may be reduced in 
some way to Barbara, it does not follow that this is the most appropriate form 
in which to represent every kind of inference." Indeed, speaking specifically 
of inductive inference, Peirce, after noting that Barbara is really only 
appropriate to deductive reasoning--as "merely the application of general rules 
to particular issues"--that synthetic reasoning, being something more than that 
can, in truth, "never be reduced to this form" (2.620). 

 

It is at this point that he begins his experiment of inverting Barbara to 
arrive at the unique forms of inductive and abductive inference. And so he 
concludes, immediately following the bean example and his classifying all 
inference as either deductive (or analytic) or synthetic:

 

Induction is when we generalize from a number of cases of which something is 
true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class. Or, where we find 
a certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of the whole class. 

 

Hypothesis [abductive inference] is where we find some very curious 
circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition that it was the case 
of a general rule, and therefore adapt that supposition. Or, where we find that 
in certain respects two objects have a strong resemblance, and infer that they 
resemble one another strongly in other respects (2.624). 

 

The latter sounding a lot like analogy to me. I hope any of that helped.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 

 






 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690> 

 

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Edwina, your argument is with Peirce. It's Peirce who called induction "major 
indirect probable syllogism" and hypothesis "minor indirect probable 
syllogism." I'm just noting what's on the historical record and, for my part, I 
tend to trust his scholarship. I agree that syllogism in your sense is the 
usual one nowadays.

I think that the point that is tripping Jerry R. up is that CP 5.189, as well 
as modus ponens and affirming the consequent, are schemata of _propositional_ 
logic, while the jugglings of Barbara are schemata of term logic, and it is 
terms that are subject, middle, or predicate.

Best, Ben

On 4/25/2016 2:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

This means that 5.189 is NOT a syllogism.

 

  IF we follow 'sense 2' of the meaning of syllogism, then it is a three-term 
logical format, operative in the deductive mode only. Not the inductive, not 
the abductive. 

 

Certainly, the argument of 'what is a syllogism' has been argued for centuries, 
and yes, you can modify this basic format to include the IF-THEN argument 
[modus ponens] as, eg, the major premise - but, you must still use the 
syllogistic form of: Major Premise/Minor Premise/Conclusion.

 

The problem I have with calling 5.189 a syllogism, is that it is not deductive. 
And, of course, there are only two terms, A and C. And, in the two premises 
[major and minor] there is no universal, for the universal rule is 'being 
developed' within the second premise as a hypothetical!

 

It is not a disjunctive syllogism since there is no 'either-negative or' 
format. But is it a hypothetical syllogism - which uses the if-then form?  I 
prefer to see this as a propositional logic, ...which would be IF C facts, THEN 
A rule. There are C facts, and therefore, A rule. 

 

This is hypothetical not deductive or inductive.

 

Edwina

 

 

----- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> 
Sent: Monday, April 25, 2016 12:16 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?

Jon S., Jerry R., Edwina, Jim W., Ben N., list,

"Syllogism" has been used more broadly in the past. I checked the Century 
Dictionary's definition of syllogism, of which Peirce was in charge.

List of words beginning with "S" at PEP-UQÁM: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120209081844/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=S
 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120209081844/http:/www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=S>
 

Century Dictionary page 6123: 
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=07 
<http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=07&page=807&query=syllogism>
 &page=807&query=syllogism

The discussion of sense 1 is long, and includes not only modus ponens but also 
induction and hypothesis as kinds of syllogism -  calling induction "major 
indirect probable syllogism" and hypothesis "minor indirect probable 
syllogism". However, in later years, Peirce discusses hypothesis (abductive 
inference) in terms of plausibility rather than probability, and even his sense 
of "probable" in "major probable syllogism" really refers to what he later 
calls verisimilitude, the likeness of the conclusion to the premisses.

Sense 2 of "syllogism" in the Century Dictionary says, "Deductive or 
explicatory reasoning as opposed to induction and hypothesis: a use of the term 
which has been common since Aristotle."

"Statistical syllogism" is discussed in Wikipedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_syllogism

Best, Ben

On 4/24/2016 2:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:



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