Hi Edwina,
The thesis is that “men are moved to act by passion rather than by reason…The primary passions are fear of pain and hope of pleasure”. That is, that we act based on self-preservation. I see this exemplified in our current discussion but that’s beside the point. In response to your comment, I will reiterate a an earlier remark with respect to perceptual judgment and senses: “That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of sense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty…When the sensation beautiful is determined by previous cognitions, it always arises as a *predicate*; that is, we think that something is beautiful…Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in place of a complex predicate; in other words, it fulfills the function of an hypothesis. …The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances*…”I do not understand you,” is the phrase of an angry man*. The indescribable, the ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite the emotion; but nothing is so chilling as a scientific explanation. Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated predicate.” ~CP 5.291-292 “…Thus, the sensation, so far as it represents something, is determined, according to logical law, by previous cognitions; that is to say, these cognitions determine that there shall be a sensation….” Therefore, the surprise is not in everyone equally because previous cognitions are not the same in everyone. Yet, that's where the inquiry starts, according to CP 5.189. Relating this to our current situation: “That which is inconceivable to us today, may prove tomorrow to be conceivable and even probable; so that we never can be absolutely sure that a judgment is perceptual and not abductive;…An argument is nonetheless logical for being weak… No doubt, observations are more often bad than reasonings are; but that is a subject so entirely distinct and remote from that of fallacious reasoning that the two cannot conveniently be treated in the same essay.” Best, Jerry R On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 9:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jerry - I'm not sure of your point. > > Perception is not = passion/emotion. Perception is indeed the basis of > information/knowledge; that's basic to Peirce [and Aristotle]. The 'input > data' via the senses is analyzed by reason. Reason is an act of logic. > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> > *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:09 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? > > Edwina, > > > > Your statement, “I don't think introducing passion/emotion into the > logical format is relevant” is precisely the point. It’s typically the > case that when the structure of the argument needs modifying, the reason > given is that you can’t change it because…the past. > > > > Regardless, the argument is whether or not CP 5.189 is or is not modus > ponens. Your argument is clear with respect to modus ponens and > valid/invalid but you simply ignore away the points being made in CP 5.189. > You don’t even recognize Peirce’s argument. It’s out of your > consideration. It’s not in your vision. You don’t see it. You don’t > recognize it. That is, you don’t give good justifications for why it > ought to be considered modus ponens when I show you the inconsistency with > a one to one correspondence. > > > > For instance, with regards whether passion/emotion ought to be considered > in CP 5.189, this form of abduction is actually given in context of > “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction” in EP2, where Houser states in his > introduction: > > > > “This lecture was added so that Peirce could extend his remarks about the > relation of pragmatism to abduction. He elaborates in particular on > three key points raised in the sixth lecture: (1) *that nothing is in the > intellect that is not first in the senses*, (2) that perceptual judgment > contain general elements, and (3) that abductive inference shades into > perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them. > Pragmatism > follows from these propositions. Peirce reiterates that the function of > pragmatism is to help us identify unclear ideas and comprehend difficult > ones. It is in this lecture that Peirce delivers his famous dictum: > > > > “The elements of every concept *enter into logical thought at the gate of > perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action*; and > whatever cannot show its passports at both of those two gates is to be > arrested as unauthorized by reason.” > > > > CP 5.189 is a reminder of some difficulties faced by philosophers with > regards making assertions that are intended to ennoble weakening structures > that are coeval with possibility of doing real harm. > > > "And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, > Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?" > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Jerry R., List: >> >> JR: "Why even talk about surprise and suspect if instead we can have >> beans and bags…or p’s and q’s?" >> >> As I have said over and over, surprise and suspect are the WHY of >> reasoning--eliminating the irritation of doubt through the fixation of >> belief--while beans and bags or p's and q's serve to illustrate the HOW of >> reasoning--forms of inference that produce certain (deduction), probable >> (induction), or plausible (abduction) conclusions from true premisses. >> This distinction is important to maintain. >> >> JR: "I may have read wrongly but I recall Ben saying that it *is* a >> syllogism and Edwina saying that it *is* modus ponens." >> >> Ben U. quoted Peirce calling hypothesis "minor indirect probable >> syllogism." He later stated, "I'd say that CP 5.189 is a 'syllogism' in >> a broad sense admitted by Peirce, though the broad senses are not usual >> senses nowadays. Usually people mean a deductive categorical syllogism, in >> Barbara and the rest." He subsequently added, "I think that the point that >> is tripping Jerry R. up is that CP 5.189, as well as modus ponens and >> affirming the consequent, are schemata of _*propositional*_ logic, while >> the jugglings of Barbara are schemata of *term* logic, and it is terms >> that are subject, middle, or predicate." >> >> Edwina just clarified what she said previously--CP 5.189 presents a >> deductively INVALID form of modus ponens, which is widely known as the >> FALLACY of affirming the consequent. In her latest example, the conclusion >> that it has rained is not certain, as it would be in a deductively valid >> argument. Instead, it is (at best) merely plausible; hence, the argument >> is an example of abduction--the proposition that it has rained is a >> hypothesis proposed to explain why the car is wet. >> >> JR: "Besides, affirming the consequent is fine if two things are the >> same, isn't it?" >> >> Again, affirming the consequent is a FALLACY in deductive logic. From >> "if p then q" and q, p does not follow necessarily. I do not know what you >> mean here by "if two things are the same." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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