*Socrates:** Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he arranged his topics in this order?*
*Phaedrus:** You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so accurately.* *Socrates:** But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.* *Phaedrus:** Certainly.* *Socrates:** See then whether this is the case with your friend's discourse, or not.* ~Phaedrus, (264b-c) *Peirce:* *Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis,- which is just what abduction is,- was subject to certain conditions…* *The form of inference therefore is this:* *The surprising fact, C, is observed;* *But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.* *Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.* *…Namely, in the first place, it may be said that even if this be the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction **ought to conform* *…* *If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.* *Peter Lipton:* *In short, should Inference to the Best Explanation be construed as inference to the likeliest explanation, or as inference to the loveliest explanation?”* *Peirce:* *I can hardly be supposed to have selected the unusual word “uberty” instead of “fruitfulness” merely because it is spelled with half as many letters. Observations may be as fruitful as you will, but they cannot be said to be gravid with young truth in the sense in which reasoning may be, not because of the nature of the subject it considers, but because of the manner in which it is supported by the ratiocinative instinct.* Best, Jerry Rhee On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 7:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Clark, List: > > Jerry R. was referring (again) to CP 5.189. > > *The *surprising fact, C, is observed. > > *But *if A were true, C would be a matter of course. > > *Hence, *there is reason to suspect that A is true. > > > However, I confess that I am not quite sure what he was getting at in his > earlier message. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 7:20 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On May 18, 2016, at 4:46 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> That's yet another reason to start at *the* and not *but* or *hence*... >> >> Not quite sure what you mean by that. >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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