Jon S., Gary F., Gary R., list,
This branch of the thread started when Gary R. spoke of "applied
science" in a context where he (and Peirce) would usually say "practical
science" or "the arts" — _/techne/_, know-how, at least when _/techne/_
means something more than sheer skill, dexterity, proficiency,
competency, technique, finesse, etc.
I doubt that Peirce would regard practical science as _/merely/_ an
application of discovery science, any more than he regarded physics or
phaneroscopy as _/merely/_ applications of mathematics. All the same, he
classified discovery science as prior to practical science in the order
of being or abstractness — practical science takes (theoretical)
principles from discovery science, not vice versa. On the other hand,
discovery science applies know-how, _/techne/_, for technical purposes.
Perhaps in the order of familiarity (as opposed to the order of being or
abstactness) know-how precedes discovery science. Some scientists have
certainly like to think of themselves as artisans or engineers of a sort
— Feynman had a reputation for that. Experimental physicists, chemists,
etc., combine something at least like engineering with theoretical
pursuits, even if they're usually not professional engineers.
One interesting thing to note is that Aristotle associated _/techne/_
not with _/prãxis/_ (doing or practice) per se, but with _/poíêsis/_
(making or production), because of the way in which the idea of making
or production points to an end in view. E.g., medicine is in order to
produce health. Peirce likely had more than one reason for speaking of
practical science rather than of productive science. (The most obvious
is the distinction traditionally framed as that between _/theory/_ and
_/practice/_.)
Anyway, if for Peirce discovery science precedes practical science in
the order of being/abstractness, then why in the order of
being/abstractness for Peirce does ethics — philosophical study of
rightness, good action — precede logic — philosophical study of truth,
good representation? The idea is that truth is a kind of rightness (and
rightness a kind of goodness). Truth is a mere species, rightness is its
genus, goodness is the most general of all, and the more general is
prior in being/abstractness. If that's the way to look at it, then why
doesn't practical science precede theoretical (review and discovery)
science? Yet one can see how from the Comtean perspective adopted by
Peirce discovery science precedes practical science, since theoretical
principles are applied from discovery science into practical science,
not vice versa. Discovery science takes technical principles from
practical science insofar as discovery sciences employs know-how,
engineering, technology, which are not mere applications of theoretical
principles yet often depend on them. The Comtean perspective — that of
the order of being or abstractness (traditionally called the _/ordo
essendi/_) — seems to get into some sort of complication here. Somehow I
hadn't really noticed these questions before, and an answer in line with
Peirce's overall views doesn't occur to me, at least at the present
time. For my own part, I already would do the classification and
ordering of the normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, logic)
differently, but that's a topic from the past and maybe for the future
and maybe not.
I think it's closer to the truth to say that engineering is an
application of science than to say vice versa in the _/usual/_
philosophical context of the word 'application', but it's wrong to say
or let it seem implied that the application is _/mere/_; and with a
broader sense of the word 'application', science is an application (but
no mere application) of _/techne/_ (such as engineering). There is
always to specify the sense of the ordering (_/ordo essendi/_? _/ordo
cognoscendi/_? or whatever else). Furthermore (and as Peirce insisted),
none of this classificational stuff should be confused with
**genealogy** of knowledge; theoretical sciences may arise from
_/techne/_. If I remember correctly what E.T. Bell said somewhere, maths
of optimization and (multi-)constraint satisfaction (longer known as
linear & nonlinear programming) began as an active field with practical
problems in WWI. Probability theory of course began with questions about
actual games with cards and coins (and still considers them; the noted
magician Persi Diaconis explored probability theory well enough to make
that his profession instead). Information theory grew (or entered a
stage of major growth) from practical physical communication problems.
Anyway, I like to take a double-decker approach to defining broadest
branches of knowledge. (I got that idea from the Austrian economists'
definition of the economic sphere as that of decision-making with regard
to means.)
_/Techne/_, know-how, knowing (or inquiring, etc.) by what means to do
things.
Theoretical science (& math), knowing (or inquiring, etc.) on what bases
to know things.
_/Techne/_ can exist without applying explicit detailed theoretical science.
When _/techne/_ gets particularly scientific, it becomes more noticeably
triple-decker (at least):
Knowing on what bases to know by what means to do things.
Things can get rather multiple-decker and mixed-looking. Viewed at the
coarsest-grained level at which they are distinct at all, _/techne/_ and
theoretical science can't be the same, and can't be one of them merely
the application of the other. On the other hand, they can become quite
involved with each other, and may become hard to distinguish in practice
sometimes. I remember reading Asimov arguing decades ago (though I've
never agreed) that science and technology had become so mixed together
that the distinction was no longer worthwhile.
Best, Ben
On 5/19/2016 9:12 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
[JAS:] Gary F., List:
[GF:] Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a
stretch for me ... It would be like claiming that mathematics is a
discipline of physics. Only more so. ☺
[JAS:] Well, I acknowledged that it is a provocative notion. The point
is that science is pursued with the same basic
motivation--transforming dissatisfaction into satisfaction--as
engineering and any other human endeavor.
[GF:] Engineering, as I understand it, always involves some
technology, some manipulation of the physical world for some
conscious purpose other than discovery of its nature.
[JAS:] Why should discovering the nature of the physical world be
privileged over all other conscious purposes?
[GF:] The conception or selection of that purpose, of the end to
which the engineering project is the means, is the job of the
normative sciences, which are themselves only part of science in the
Peircean sense.
[JAS:] This reflects the status of engineering as almost purely
instrumental--clients and managers dictate what engineers do, rather
than engineers themselves. My writings on engineering ethics attempt
to explore whether and how engineers might someday escape this "social
captivity," as Steven L. Goldman has called it.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On 5/19/2016 7:57 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Jon A.S.,
Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a stretch
for me. Engineering, as I understand it, always involves some
technology, some manipulation of the physical world for some
conscious purpose other than discovery of its nature. The conception
or selection of that purpose, of the end to which the engineering
project is the means, is the job of the normative sciences, which are
themselves only part of science in the Peircean sense.
It would be like claiming that mathematics is a discipline of
physics. Only more so. ☺
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 17-May-16 21:27
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Gary R., List:
GR: As to the most recent discussion of abduction as it might
relate not only to science but to the arts, Jon, Gary F, and I have
momentarily at least moved the discussion rather far from logic as
semeiotic, even into an entirely different branch of science,
*applied science*, and perhaps even beyond that to how the findings
of science might relate to the fine arts.
Engineering is not explicitly mentioned here, but I get a little
agitated by the common characterization of it as "applied science."
In fact, my draft concluding article on "The Logic of Ingenuity"
suggests--somewhat provocatively--that it might be more accurate to
describe science as a discipline of engineering. This stems from
what I said earlier, prompted by Peirce's words in "The Fixation of
Belief"--dissatisfaction and satisfaction are even more fundamental
than doubt and belief as the motivation and goal of not just
inquiry, but human endeavors of any kind. In other words, although I
started out thinking of ingenuity as an adaptation of inquiry, I now
wonder if perhaps it is really the other way around.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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