Ben U., List: These are great comments, and I need to take more time than I have at the moment to digest and respond to them. Just a few quick hits for now.
- Suggesting that science is a discipline of engineering is mainly intended to prompt reevaluation of the widespread notion that engineering is (merely) applied science. Engineering certainly employs the findings of science, but only as one of many tools at its disposal. - The thesis that I have been advocating for some time and am more confident in defending is that, just as science is widely perceived as an especially systematic way of *knowing*, likewise engineering could be conceived as an especially systematic way of *willing* ( https://www.academia.edu/11554299/Engineering_as_Willing). - I see engineering as more *praxis* than *poiesis*; and my ethics writings (e.g., https://www.academia.edu/11554292/Changing_the_Paradigm_for_Engineering_Ethics) and presentations (e.g., http://www.nspe.org/resources/annual-meeting/decline-engineering-judgment) specifically highlight the dominance of technical rationality (*techne*) in modern societies, to the detriment of practical judgment (*phronesis* ). - I have been wondering lately whether there is a one-to-one correspondence between these, along with theoretical knowledge ( *episteme*), and Peirce's categories; or at least the three inference forms--perhaps matching *phronesis* with abduction, *techne* with deduction, and *episteme* with induction? - Peirce viewed mathematics not only as the most abstract science of discovery, but also as the *practice *of necessary reasoning vs. deductive logic as the (normative) *science *of necessary reasoning. Could there be a similar dichotomy in how we think about engineering/ingenuity vs. science/inquiry? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, May 19, 2016 at 1:16 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S., Gary F., Gary R., list, > > This branch of the thread started when Gary R. spoke of "applied science" > in a context where he (and Peirce) would usually say "practical science" or > "the arts" — _*techne*_, know-how, at least when _*techne*_ means > something more than sheer skill, dexterity, proficiency, competency, > technique, finesse, etc. > > I doubt that Peirce would regard practical science as _*merely*_ an > application of discovery science, any more than he regarded physics or > phaneroscopy as _*merely*_ applications of mathematics. All the same, he > classified discovery science as prior to practical science in the order of > being or abstractness — practical science takes (theoretical) principles > from discovery science, not vice versa. On the other hand, discovery > science applies know-how, _*techne*_, for technical purposes. Perhaps in > the order of familiarity (as opposed to the order of being or abstactness) > know-how precedes discovery science. Some scientists have certainly like to > think of themselves as artisans or engineers of a sort — Feynman had a > reputation for that. Experimental physicists, chemists, etc., combine > something at least like engineering with theoretical pursuits, even if > they're usually not professional engineers. > > One interesting thing to note is that Aristotle associated _*techne*_ not > with _*prãxis*_ (doing or practice) per se, but with _*poíêsis*_ (making > or production), because of the way in which the idea of making or > production points to an end in view. E.g., medicine is in order to produce > health. Peirce likely had more than one reason for speaking of practical > science rather than of productive science. (The most obvious is the > distinction traditionally framed as that between _*theory*_ and _ > *practice*_.) > > Anyway, if for Peirce discovery science precedes practical science in the > order of being/abstractness, then why in the order of being/abstractness > for Peirce does ethics — philosophical study of rightness, good action — > precede logic — philosophical study of truth, good representation? The idea > is that truth is a kind of rightness (and rightness a kind of goodness). > Truth is a mere species, rightness is its genus, goodness is the most > general of all, and the more general is prior in being/abstractness. If > that's the way to look at it, then why doesn't practical science precede > theoretical (review and discovery) science? Yet one can see how from the > Comtean perspective adopted by Peirce discovery science precedes practical > science, since theoretical principles are applied from discovery science > into practical science, not vice versa. Discovery science takes technical > principles from practical science insofar as discovery sciences employs > know-how, engineering, technology, which are not mere applications of > theoretical principles yet often depend on them. The Comtean perspective — > that of the order of being or abstractness (traditionally called the _*ordo > essendi*_) — seems to get into some sort of complication here. Somehow I > hadn't really noticed these questions before, and an answer in line with > Peirce's overall views doesn't occur to me, at least at the present time. > For my own part, I already would do the classification and ordering of the > normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, logic) differently, but that's a > topic from the past and maybe for the future and maybe not. > > I think it's closer to the truth to say that engineering is an application > of science than to say vice versa in the _*usual*_ philosophical context > of the word 'application', but it's wrong to say or let it seem implied > that the application is _*mere*_; and with a broader sense of the word > 'application', science is an application (but no mere application) of _ > *techne*_ (such as engineering). There is always to specify the sense of > the ordering (_*ordo essendi*_? _*ordo cognoscendi*_? or whatever else). > Furthermore (and as Peirce insisted), none of this classificational stuff > should be confused with **genealogy** of knowledge; theoretical sciences > may arise from _*techne*_. If I remember correctly what E.T. Bell said > somewhere, maths of optimization and (multi-)constraint satisfaction > (longer known as linear & nonlinear programming) began as an active field > with practical problems in WWI. Probability theory of course began with > questions about actual games with cards and coins (and still considers > them; the noted magician Persi Diaconis explored probability theory well > enough to make that his profession instead). Information theory grew (or > entered a stage of major growth) from practical physical communication > problems. > > Anyway, I like to take a double-decker approach to defining broadest > branches of knowledge. (I got that idea from the Austrian economists' > definition of the economic sphere as that of decision-making with regard to > means.) > > _*Techne*_, know-how, knowing (or inquiring, etc.) by what means to do > things. > Theoretical science (& math), knowing (or inquiring, etc.) on what bases > to know things. > > _*Techne*_ can exist without applying explicit detailed theoretical > science. > > When _*techne*_ gets particularly scientific, it becomes more noticeably > triple-decker (at least): > Knowing on what bases to know by what means to do things. > > Things can get rather multiple-decker and mixed-looking. Viewed at the > coarsest-grained level at which they are distinct at all, _*techne*_ and > theoretical science can't be the same, and can't be one of them merely the > application of the other. On the other hand, they can become quite involved > with each other, and may become hard to distinguish in practice sometimes. > I remember reading Asimov arguing decades ago (though I've never agreed) > that science and technology had become so mixed together that the > distinction was no longer worthwhile. > > Best, Ben >
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