Jeff, list;
Thanks for that probably very correct detailing of Peirce’s ideas. You mistake my intention in saying that I don’t find a lifelong effort to develop a classification of signs to be not a remarkably fruitful area of inquiry. The reason for my quoting Kristi is to bring attention to what you just did. Even though it may be very correct, it doesn’t even matter for the problem of liberal education, which can be said to be liberation from vulgarity. People won’t even bother to read it* and there are other inquiries from which we can develop better our own skills at calculation; for example, by actually doing science or writing and engaging in the process of solving real world problems. ** This fact naturally brought along an entire situation sufficient to discourage me from troubling a printer to set up what no man would read. What little I could print had to be brief and fragmentary. I must select subjects concerning which what I had to say would be intelligible without previous studies.|62|* *http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm>* *___________* Here’s another problem: You said, *“*His aim is to see what kind of *logic* might hold when we move from the relatively straightforward and clear case of the level of necessities (3 above) to the levels of actualities and possibilities.” Here is Peirce’s entry in Baldwin’s dictionary under the term, “logic”. http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Baldwin/Dictionary/defs/L4defs.htm “Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes concerning its first principles, although it is probably about to do so. *Nearly a hundred definitions of it have been given*. It will, however, generally be conceded that its central problem is the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good into another, these divisions being defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the arguments are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by recognizable marks into those which have different orders of validity, and has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments.” How can a *66-fold classification* ever promote a coming to agreement on “an adequate account of the laws that govern synthetic forms of inference”? when we argue over terms such as “logic” and “determination” without a perfect foundation? Best, Jerry Rhee On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 5:41 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello, > > > Unlike Jerry R. and Kristi, I find Peirce's lifelong efforts to develop a > classification of signs to be a remarkably fruitful area of inquiry. In > any area of inquiry (e.g., chemistry, biology, psychology) it will be quite > difficult to provide any sort of adequate account of the laws governing the > phenomena in the absence of a sufficiently developed natural classification > of the different kinds of things that constitute the objects of inquiry. > What is true for each of the special sciences is especially true when it > comes to the normative science of logic as semiotic. Prior to Peirce's > groundbreaking work in logic, we really didn't have an adequate account > of the laws that govern synthetic forms of inference--or of the > inter-relationships between synthetic inference patterns and the > different forms of deductive inference. > > > The division between the main areas of study in the theory of > semiotics is, on Peirce's account, based on the following: > > > Logic is the science of the general necessary laws of Signs and > especially > > of Symbols. As such, it has three departments. Obsistent logic, logic in > the narrow sense, or Critical Logic, is the theory of the general > conditions of the reference of Symbols and other Signs to their professed > Objects, that is, it is the theory of the conditions of truth. > Originalian logic, or Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general > conditions of symbols and other signs having the significant character. It > is this department of general logic with which we are, at this moment, > occupying ourselves. Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative > Rhetoric, is substantially what goes by the name of methodology, or > better, of methodeutic. It is the doctrine of the general conditions of > the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they > aim to determine. . . ." (CP, 2.93) > > > So, for the sake of clarity, let's note that each of the three main areas > of semiotics is focused on a different set of questions: > > > 1. Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general conditions > of symbols and other signs having the significant character. > > 2. Critical Logic is the theory of the general conditions of the > reference of Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, > it is the theory of the conditions of truth. > > 3. Speculative Rhetoric is the doctrine of the general conditions of the > reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim > to determine. > > > For the sake of providing a more adequate account of the laws governing > abductive, inductive and deductive patterns of inference, Peirce thought > that he needed a considerably richer classification of the different kinds > of signs that function as the parts of those different patterns of > inference. A cursory look at the different theories of logic that have > dominated the philosophical discussion in the 20th century strongly > confirms, I believe, the need for a more robust classification of signs > based on the nature of the signs, objects and interpretants that function > in different sorts of inference patterns--and the different sorts of > relations that hold between those signs, objects and interpretants. > > > Jerry C. has asked a set of questions about the relations that hold > between Peirce's division between icon, index and symbol, and his account > of the proposition. He finds it puzzling that Parker suggests there is a > different sort of logic that holds for the icon, and another that holds for > indices and another that holds for symbols--and he doesn't see how these > three sorts of "logics" might be mapped onto the interpretation of the > proposition that Stjernfelt provides in Natural Propositions. > > > Let us recall that, on the one hand, the division between icon, index and > symbol is based on the relations between signs and the dynamical objects. > On the other hand, the division between rheme, dicisign and argument is > based on the relations between signs and their normal interpretants. > Peirce makes it clear in a number of places (e.g., Nomenclature and > Division of Triadic Relations) that the tri-fold divisions in the > classification of signs is grounded on the differences between signs, > objects and interpretants (or the things to which they refer) having the > character of possibilities, actualities or necessities. > > > So, to simplify matters, let's consider the 10-fold classification of > signs that Peirce provides in the essay mentioned above, and let's focus on > the most straightforward cases where the three correlates in the > sign relations are all possibilities, and where they are all actualities, > and where they are all necessities. In these three simplest cases, we have > the following division: > > > 1. The three correlates are all possibilities: qualisign, icon, rheme > > 2. The three correlates are all actualities: sinsign, index, dicisign > > 3. The three correlates are all necessities: legisign, symbol, argument > > > One of the really helpful things that Peirce suggests is that we can think > of these three sorts of cases (1, 2, 3) as being three > "strata," (i.e., layers or levels) of relations. (CP 2.94) > > > This doesn't provide any kind of full answer to the question that Jerry C. > has raised, but I think that a fuller answer can be fleshed out by > considering more of the relations that Peirce works out in the larger > 66-fold classification of signs. If we keep the idea of the three strata > as a kind of guiding figure, then we can consider the different sorts of > assurance that are provided in various sorts of inferences. Some > inferences are self-controlled arguments, and the assurance in the triadic > relation is a matter of form. Other inferences lack such self-control, and > the assurance in the triadic relation is a matter of experience. Yet other > inferences are still less self-controlled, and the assurance in the triadic > relation is a matter of instinct. If we line this division between the > types of assurance up with the 3 strata in the relations between signs, > objects and interpretants, then we'll see that assurance of instinct > belongs on the level of possibility, the assurance of experience belongs on > the level of actuality, and the assurance of form belongs on the level of > necessity. > > > So, the more direct answer to Jerry's C. questions is that Kelly Parker's > remarks about the "logic of icons," "logic of indices" and "logic of > symbols" is better (because it is more complete) thought of as three levels > of sign relations, where the iconic sort of relation that holds between > sign and object is assured--in its relationships to the normal > interpretant--by a matter of instinct, whereas the indexical sort of > relation is assured by a matter of experience, and whereas the symbol sort > of relation is assured by a matter of form. > > > This, I think, gets a the heart of Peirce's aim in providing a more > general theory of what is really necessary for different sorts of signs to > function in valid inference patterns. His aim is to see what kind of logic > might hold when we move from the relatively straightforward and clear case > of the level of necessities (3 above) to the levels of actualities and > possibilities. The tricky part comes in when we need to consider all the > relations (e.g., of determination, or of representation) that hold between > the three levels. > > > Hope that helps. > > > --Jeff > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, June 17, 2016 1:38 PM > *To:* Jerry LR Chandler > *Cc:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of > CSP's categories of Logic > > Sounds good Jerry C. > > I will simply leave you with: > > *"I have never found divisions of signs (trichotomies) of much use. And I > cannot see how they could work with proposisional functions. So I cannot be > of help in your questions.* > *Kirsti"* > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 3:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jerry R: >> >> Thank you for your thoughts. >> >> We seem to operate on different wave lengths. >> >> The purpose of poising a specific question was to seek specific >> suggestions. >> >> As I understand your approach, you appear to have a well-honed set of >> philosophical generalities which are, for your purposes, applicable >> universally. >> >> So, I suggest we not waste list-reader’s time and close out this thread. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> >> On Jun 17, 2016, at 3:22 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Jerry C, list: >> >> >> The propositional functions are embedded but you have to recognize the >> beauty to induce the labor. >> >> >> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, >> number and *calculation*: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily >> partake of them? Yes.” ~Republic >> >> >> “This difficulty is to some extent overcome by the fact that one virtue >> is the highest, and that virtue is called knowledge or science… by >> conceiving of knowledge as the *calculation* of pleasures. We all seek >> only pleasure, that is the assumption. We want a maximum of pleasure >> without any moral conversion, merely by greater shrewdness and calculation, >> i.e., by greater intelligence, by science, a calculus of pleasures. This >> is the theme of the *Protagoras*.” >> >> ~Leo Strauss on Plato’s Symposium >> >> >> one, two, three…love of honor, love of goodness, love of truth…logic of >> icon, logic of index, logic of symbol… >> >> >> Hth, >> >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jerry R: >>> >>> >>> On Jun 16, 2016, at 11:47 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Does this qualify? >>> >>> C = phi spiral and not M51, poet, >>> promise >>> A = FEM model and not Netlogo, scientist, >>> performance >>> B = Structural optimization of corneal stroma, philosopher, truth >>> >>> >>> Your attempts to decipher the meaning of this critical logic term by >>> throwing conjectures at it are a most unusual approach, to say the least. >>> >>> May I suggest you take a day or two and study the origin and meaning of >>> the term “propositional function”? Such a study could add substantially to >>> your understanding of your own work. >>> >>> Cheers >>> Jerry C. >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 11:44 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Jerry R: >>>> >>>> On Jun 16, 2016, at 1:57 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> I've never read FS but if the question is *what is it that is being >>>> interpreted by two different interpreters for that which is claimed to be >>>> different but assumed to belong to the same whol*e, then you ought to >>>> consider the following from Strauss, Bloom and Benardete: >>>> >>>> >>>> Thank you for considering the query. >>>> >>>> But, that is not my question. >>>> >>>> I seek a premise, a propositional function. >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> Jerry >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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