> On Aug 25, 2016, at 9:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE > objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they > lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. > > How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs" if it > is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? Are we using > "determine" in two different senses here?
I’m not sure this is easy to explain without getting into some of the odd features of the immediate object. We discussed those in late June in the thread “Copula and Being.” If you want I can revisit them. While I think the functional role of the immediate object is fairly easy to grasp. The exact nature of it tends to be a tad trickier IMO. The problem is that the immediate object is a kind of average understanding of the object. (Here just speaking of normal language use rather than more physical types of signs — I’m doing this just for clarity and to avoid confusing nuances) A few main quotes that might be useful: …philosophists are in the habit of distinguishing two objects of many signs, the immediate and the real. The former is an image, or notion, which the interpreter is supposed to have already formed in his mind before the sign is uttered. Thus, if a person, with a view to combatting an exaggerated admiration of ability, remarks that Richard III appears to have been an able ruler, it is a hundred to one that he never read any first hand testimony concerning Richard, and does not suppose that his interlocutor knows any more about the real Richard. He refers merely to the current notional Richard. (“Pragmatism” MS 318:16-7 — 1907) Every sign must plainly have an immediate object, however indefinite, in order to be a sign. In conversation, it will often be expressed, not in words, but by the environment of the interlocutors. (“Pragmatism” MS 318:24-5 — 1907) We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, - i.e., the Object as represented in the sign, - and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience. (“Letters to William James” EP 2.498 — 1909) If you’re familiar with Searle’s Speech Act theory the immediate object resembles his use of corporate meaning. Roughly the sense of things as understood within an interpretive community. There are some subtle nuances to this which we got into in that thread on the copula. I’m not sure they’re helpful in initial understanding of how the immediate object functions though. Again I think Peirce’s care here avoids many issues that pop up in other philosophers such as Davidson. Jeffrey answered your question in one fashion and provided a helpful quote I’ll repeat. "Two terms may be equal in their substantial breadth and depth, and differ in their essential breadth and depth. But two terms cannot have relations of substantial breadth and depth which are unknown in the state of information supposed, because in that state of information everything is known. In informed breadth and depth, two terms may be equal, and may have unknown relations. Any term, affirmative or negative, universal or particular, may have informed breadth or depth." (CP 2.416-7) Roughly I think we have to distinguish between sign use at a particular time or finite set of times from sign use when everything about the objects is understood. This later is akin to a God’s eye view (but not quite the same). A practical example can be found in common political discussions where most parties have no clue what they are talking about. How the signs function within that conversation will be different from how it functions when seen from people informed in the details of the issues. The immediate object is the kind of shared understanding of the objects discussed within that flawed conversation. The immediate object as understood by an informed community will be different even if the original dynamic object is the same for both groups. Because the immediate object in the confused group is so flawed, it’s more limited in how it affects the final interpretant.
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