List:
Returning to the four questions in my post that started this thread … 1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their "logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or something else? 2. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with "the hypothesis of God's reality"? 3. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively trace and inductively test? 4. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would thereby also be "proved"? … here are a few places in the secondary literature where I found potential hints of answers. First, Dennis Rohatyn's 1982 *Transactions* article, "Resurrecting Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319950), takes the interesting approach of reformulating CP 6.490--which, again, is quite fascinating in its own right, and probably worth discussing in a separate thread on Peirce's cosmology--as an Argumentation with nine distinct steps. He then raises five specific objections, and replies to each one of them on behalf of Peirce. He responds to the first objection, that Peirce begs the question by assuming the Reality of an atemporal being from the outset, as follows. DR: The assumption of an atemporal being is just part of the hypothesis being examined. No retroduction is devoid of assumptions; the test of an assumption's adequacy is how well it squares with, or enables us to predict, the facts. The assumption, consequently, does not beg the question; it is instead confirmed (or refuted) by experience … the argument in general seeks to establish at least the compatibility of the hypothesis with known (and sometimes, previously unaccounted-for) facts. That it ought to do more, is one thing; but it does not do less, and it is no more circular than the scientific explanation of any phenomena whatsoever. Similarly, Rohatyn responds to the second objection, that Peirce illegitimately relies on an analogy between the known and the unknown, by stating that "if [this objection] is sound it invalidates every type of scientific reasoning and inference. Analogies are of course not the only form of reasoning, but if they may be used elsewhere in science, why not here?" Finally, after addressing the other three objections, he concludes that Peirce's argument is not "an elucidation of the concept of God so much as an attempt to extract from that concept consequences that are at least congruent with the known facts of temporal existence and change." Second, Jaime Nubiola's 2004 *Semiotiche* article, "*Il Lume Naturale*: Abduction and God" (http://www.unav.es/users/LumeNaturale.html), aims "to highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole scientific enterprise." He states, "The central question … is precisely why we abduce correctly and easily in a relative few number of attempts? Why this instinct of guessing right is so efficient?" He characterizes this as a "surprising fact," and presents his answer to these questions in the format of CP 5.189 accordingly. JN: The efficiency of the scientist (guessing right between innumerable hypotheses) is a really surprising fact. If God were the creator of human cognitive abilities and of nature this efficiency would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that God is the creator of human minds and nature. Nubiola concludes that "the surprising efficiency of our scientific enterprise … would be totally improbable by mere chance: it requires God's creation as the common source of knower and known." Finally, Kathleen Hull's 2005 *Transactions* article, "The Inner Chambers of His Mind: Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God as Related to Mathematical Experience" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321042), is even more speculative, by her own admission. She poses essentially the same question that I did, "What theory about the nature of thinking is Peirce attempting to prove here?" Her proposed answer is that "the method for arriving at the God-hypothesis is fundamentally tied to a general theory about the use of diagrams in our reasoning." KH: Beginning with a diagram of the three universes, if we playfully allow our ideas to connect themselves into a continuing series of classes or sets, and alter our diagrams in response to those connections, what naturally will come to mind is the idea of God. What we perceive are the diagrams. The diagram of the relationship among the categories (such as the nesting of one class within another) is an iconic sign of the relationship … What we directly perceive, then, is not God as a person, but instead, God as a hypothesized form of relation as diagram. On this model, God is not a being qua being that we directly perceive; but God is the result of an abductive inference emerging from the mind's exploration of the interrelations of the three categories or universes. Hull concludes, "Peirce's reconceptualized model of mathematical reasoning, in which the thinker is an active agent, an active participant in the unfolding of necessary reasoning by way of diagrams in the inner world, may be one means of leading the mind to reach an understanding of God." Although Hull's interpretation is certainly attractive to me, given the central role of diagrammatic reasoning in my "logic of ingenuity" thesis, Rohatyn and especially Nubiola strike me as being more on the right track. What do you think? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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