Gary F., List: GF: My responses to your four questions and the rest of your post are inserted into it below.
Thanks, I appreciate the feedback. GF: It could be those, but it’s also possible that the reference is not that specific; Peirce might even be referring to Pragmatism, or to his theory of “logic as semeiotic” in the broad sense. Yes, and I found some additional clues in the manuscript drafts (R 841-844). That post may have gotten lost in the recent digressions, so I am thinking about re-sending it. GF: I think there is a logical connection between the hypothesis of God’s reality (as laid out in the NA) and the doctrine of “the light of nature,” or “*il lume naturale*” ... This is consistent with both the published version of the article and several of its drafts. GF: If you accept that the “light of nature” hypothesis is an essential part of “this theory of thinking,” an obvious consequence would be that our guesses about how nature works turn out to be confirmed, or at least useful, much more often than would be the case if there were no connection at all between the processes of nature and of reasoning. Indeed, Peirce drafted multiple versions of a detailed probabilistic argument for this. GF: But *roughly*, I think it would mean that adopting either of them as a belief and living accordingly would have experiential consequences that would never arouse a “living doubt” of either one in the mind of an honest inquirer. This strikes me as a very interesting way of thinking about it. GF: Now, Peirce in the NA offers no evidence or argument that Ens necessarium, or the Real creator of all three Universes of Experience, is in fact benign; and elsewhere (CP 1.143 for instance) he implies that we have no reason to think Him benign. In R 843, he states that the NA pertains to "the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being *not *'immanent in' the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them, without exception." GF: If the former, this use of the term “God” would make Peirce a pantheist or panentheist ... Pantheism and panentheism both seem to be ruled out by Peirce's explicit *denial *in at least two drafts, including the one quoted above, that God--as he defines the term--is "immanent in Nature." GF: The conclusion would be better stated as: *there is reason to suspect that human minds and nature come from the same source*. Or that *human mind is part of nature*. This is a fair point, and Peirce evidently anticipated it, or at least something like it. CP 6.491 includes his description of the objection that "man's power of guessing at the truth" could simply be--like the instincts of animals to which he compared it--"entirely explained by the action of natural selection," and thus inapplicable to metaphysical matters like the Reality of God. However, for some reason the editors left out Peirce's response that immediately follows in R 844. CSP: This opens an interesting question of logic to which I have devoted much study, with the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this objection could not be given here nor in any piece to be read at one sitting. My reply would show that whatever general conduct of a race would fit or disfit its individuals to the life to come, may be expected also to adapt or maladapt the race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and further to show, through its pragmaticistic interpretation, that the belief in the Ens necessarium would according as it were true or false, fit or disfit individuals to eternal life hereafter. And consequently, natural selection naturally will act here on earth to the cultivation of this belief, if it be true, and to its suppression if it be false, just as it acts in respect to ordinary morality. Peirce appears to be suggesting here that the persistence of humanity's instinctive belief in God is evidence that it is true. GF: I think Hull may be more on the right track in her emphasis on diagrammatic thinking. Again, I find that notion very attractive; but the article is long and complex, and I probably need to read it again (and again) to ensure that I have understood it properly. Regards, Jon On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, > > > > My responses to your four questions and the rest of your post are inserted > into it below. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 8-Sep-16 21:40 > List: > > Returning to the four questions in my post that started this thread … > > 1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the > nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their > "logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or > something else? > > [gf]: It could be those, but it’s also possible that the reference is not > that specific; Peirce might even be referring to Pragmatism, or to his > theory of “logic as semeiotic” in the broad sense. Anyway I wouldn’t argue > against your suggestion. > > 1. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with > "the hypothesis of God's reality"? > > [gf]: I doubt that the connection here would fit under the rubric of > “Exact Logic” as Peirce defined it, but I think there is a logical > connection between the hypothesis of God’s reality (as laid out in the NA) > and the doctrine of “the light of nature,” or “*il lume naturale*” — that > ‘every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that > there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous’ > (EP2:193). Given that “something in nature” is as vague a term as “God” is, > I think it’s fair to say that these two hypotheses are vaguely equivalent, > although (as Peirce says) the “experiential consequences” of God’s reality > are much more difficult to trace out than those of the other hypothesis. > > 1. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of > thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively > trace and inductively test? > > [gf]: If you accept that the “light of nature” hypothesis is an essential > part of “this theory of thinking,” an obvious consequence would be that our > guesses about how nature works turn out to be confirmed, or at least > useful, much more often than would be the case if there were no connection > at all between the processes of nature and of reasoning. Peirce > consistently says that the testimony of experience obviously bears this > out, and I agree with him on that point. > > 1. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the > nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would > thereby also be "proved"? > > [gf:] I can’t say *exactly* what it would mean (or indeed what a “proof > of pragmatism” would mean, despite the efforts Peirce devoted to that). But > *roughly*, I think it would mean that adopting either of them as a belief > and living accordingly would have experiential consequences that would > never arouse a “living doubt” of either one in the mind of an honest > inquirer. > > … here are a few places in the secondary literature where I found > potential hints of answers. > > [gf:] I haven’t read any of these in full, so I can only comment on the > excerpts you provide. > > First, Dennis Rohatyn's 1982 *Transactions* article, "Resurrecting > Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/ > 40319950), takes the interesting approach of reformulating CP > 6.490--which, again, is quite fascinating in its own right, and probably > worth discussing in a separate thread on Peirce's cosmology--as an > Argumentation with nine distinct steps. He then raises five specific > objections, and replies to each one of them on behalf of Peirce. He > responds to the first objection, that Peirce begs the question by assuming > the Reality of an atemporal being from the outset, as follows. > > DR: The assumption of an atemporal being is just part of the hypothesis > being examined. No retroduction is devoid of assumptions; the test of an > assumption's adequacy is how well it squares with, or enables us to > predict, the facts. The assumption, consequently, does not beg the > question; it is instead confirmed (or refuted) by experience … the argument > in general seeks to establish at least the compatibility of the hypothesis > with known (and sometimes, previously unaccounted-for) facts. That it > ought to do more, is one thing; but it does not do less, and it is no more > circular than the scientific explanation of any phenomena whatsoever. > > Similarly, Rohatyn responds to the second objection, that Peirce > illegitimately relies on an analogy between the known and the unknown, by > stating that "if [this objection] is sound it invalidates every type of > scientific reasoning and inference. Analogies are of course not the only > form of reasoning, but if they may be used elsewhere in science, why not > here?" Finally, after addressing the other three objections, he concludes > that Peirce's argument is not "an elucidation of the concept of God so much > as an attempt to extract from that concept consequences that are at least > congruent with the known facts of temporal existence and change." > > [gf:] Rohatyn’s reasoning seems sound to me, but I’m not sure about that > last sentence. I think it may be true in reference to the concept of God *as > defined by Peirce (ens necessarium)*, but the NA also, by its very nature > as an *argument* which is not an *argumentation*, turns at least > partially upon a “vernacular” concept of God. For instance, near the > beginning Peirce says that “If God Really be, and be benign, then, in view > of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, would be > a good outweighing all others, we should naturally expect that there would > be some Argument for His Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high > and low alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the > matter” (EP2:435). That God is *benign* is part of the vernacular concept > of Him (and that use of the personal pronoun also carries, by implication, > the vernacular notion of God as a Person.) Now, Peirce in the NA offers no > evidence or argument that *Ens necessarium*, or the Real creator of all > three Universes of Experience, is in fact benign; and elsewhere (CP 1.143 > for instance) he implies that we have no reason to think Him benign. This > to me suggests that at least some of the force of the NA is “extracted” not > from the concept of God as defined by Peirce but from the vernacular > concept. Peirce does distinguish between the two concepts, right at the > beginning, but as far as I can see he does not make it very clear which one > of them is supposed to be *instinctive* and therefore at the root of the > NA. > > Second, Jaime Nubiola's 2004 *Semiotiche* article, "*Il Lume Naturale*: > Abduction and God" (http://www.unav.es/users/LumeNaturale.html), aims "to > highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole > scientific enterprise." He states, "The central question … is precisely > why we abduce correctly and easily in a relative few number of attempts? > Why this instinct of guessing right is so efficient?" He characterizes > this as a "surprising fact," and presents his answer to these questions in > the format of CP 5.189 accordingly. > > JN: The efficiency of the scientist (guessing right between innumerable > hypotheses) is a really surprising fact. > > If God were the creator of human cognitive abilities and of nature this > efficiency would be a matter of course. > > Hence, there is reason to suspect that God is the creator of human minds > and nature. > > Nubiola concludes that "the surprising efficiency of our scientific > enterprise … would be totally improbable by mere chance: it requires God's > creation as the common source of knower and known." > > [gf:] I take this as a version of the “light of nature” doctrine I > mentioned above; but again, it leaves open the question of whether we are > referring to God as *ens necessarium* or to the vernacular concept. If > the former, this use of the term “God” would make Peirce a pantheist or > panentheist, but would not commit him to the belief that the creator is > benign. It would also not commit him to the habit of regarding the creator > as “vaguely like a man” (CP 5.536), which does seem to be involved in > Peirce’s NA, and which he takes to be an instinctive belief. On that point > I disagree with Peirce; and I think this deflates the argument as > summarized by Nubiola, as it renders the term “God” quite dispensable from > it. The conclusion would be better stated as: *there is reason to suspect > that human minds and nature come from the same source.* Or that *human > mind is part of nature*. > > Finally, Kathleen Hull's 2005 *Transactions* article, "The Inner Chambers > of His Mind: Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God as Related to > Mathematical Experience" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321042), is even > more speculative, by her own admission. She poses essentially the same > question that I did, "What theory about the nature of thinking is Peirce > attempting to prove here?" Her proposed answer is that "the method for > arriving at the God-hypothesis is fundamentally tied to a general theory > about the use of diagrams in our reasoning." > > KH: Beginning with a diagram of the three universes, if we playfully > allow our ideas to connect themselves into a continuing series of classes > or sets, and alter our diagrams in response to those connections, what > naturally will come to mind is the idea of God. What we perceive are the > diagrams. The diagram of the relationship among the categories (such as > the nesting of one class within another) is an iconic sign of the > relationship … What we directly perceive, then, is not God as a person, but > instead, God as a hypothesized form of relation as diagram. On this model, > God is not a being qua being that we directly perceive; but God is the > result of an abductive inference emerging from the mind's exploration of > the interrelations of the three categories or universes. > > Hull concludes, "Peirce's reconceptualized model of mathematical > reasoning, in which the thinker is an active agent, an active participant > in the unfolding of necessary reasoning by way of diagrams in the inner > world, may be one means of leading the mind to reach an understanding of > God." > > Although Hull's interpretation is certainly attractive to me, given the > central role of diagrammatic reasoning in my "logic of ingenuity" thesis, > Rohatyn and especially Nubiola strike me as being more on the right track. > What do you think? > > [gf:] I think all three are on the right track (it’s a pretty wide > track!), but with the reservations expressed above regarding Rohatyn and > Nubiola; and I think Hull may be *more* on the right track in her > emphasis on diagrammatic thinking. But I wouldn’t commit myself to that > without at least reading the whole article first. > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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