Helmust, list:

I don't think you know what it is you disagree with.

Best,
Jerry R

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jerry, list,
> On first glance I completely disagree. "First glance", because my
> contradiction may contain false suppositions about what your opinion might
> be like. Religion, I think, should always be connected with reason,
> otherwise it becomes dangerous. Dangerous as well is to look for
> reason-free niches (esoterics) to dwell in them. Nothing good ferments in
> them, and they have the tendency to increase. Also dangerous is the pursuit
> of perfection of man in the sense of consequent thinking and behaviour (ok,
> perhaps you have not meant it like this), because that may lead even to
> terrorism in an unperfect world- and a perfect world would be no world at
> all, nothing would happen in an equilibrium such as perfection. What one
> should try to be, about this I would replace "perfect" with "good" in the
> sense of "not bad" or "not evil". The categorical imperative by Kant helps
> with that. My opinion is influenced (and of course much better elaborated
> than I would be able to do) by the book "Thinking evil" by Bettina
> Stangneth.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 09. September 2016 um 04:10 Uhr
>  "Jerry Rhee" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> Jon, list:
>
>
>
> They are all consistent.
>
>
>
> What is analogical reasoning but saying one thing in terms of another?
>
>
>
> essence and esse
>
> Subject and predicate
>
> Father and Son
>
> Non-being and being
>
> Agent and patient
>
> First and Second
>
> ens originarium and ens necessarium
>
> theologico-physico
>
> name and definition
>
> C and A
>
>
>
> If you should look into it, you will find they all suffer in some way from
> double-meanings of terminology, which is why providing a diagram is
> preferred.  This also shows why the existence of God problem is inherently
> unsuited for analytical dissection such as what you seek, even though it is
> best for examining the issue of man’s perfection.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 8:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]
> > wrote:
>>
>> List:
>>
>>
>>
>> Returning to the four questions in my post that started this thread …
>>
>>
>>
>>    1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the
>>    nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their
>>    "logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or
>>    something else?
>>    2. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with
>>    "the hypothesis of God's reality"?
>>    3. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of
>>    thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively
>>    trace and inductively test?
>>    4. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the
>>    nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would
>>    thereby also be "proved"?
>>
>>
>> … here are a few places in the secondary literature where I found
>> potential hints of answers.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> First, Dennis Rohatyn's 1982 *Transactions* article, "Resurrecting
>> Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/
>> 40319950), takes the interesting approach of reformulating CP
>> 6.490--which, again, is quite fascinating in its own right, and probably
>> worth discussing in a separate thread on Peirce's cosmology--as an
>> Argumentation with nine distinct steps.  He then raises five specific
>> objections, and replies to each one of them on behalf of Peirce.  He
>> responds to the first objection, that Peirce begs the question by assuming
>> the Reality of an atemporal being from the outset, as follows.
>>
>>
>>
>> DR:  The assumption of an atemporal being is just part of the hypothesis
>> being examined.  No retroduction is devoid of assumptions; the test of an
>> assumption's adequacy is how well it squares with, or enables us to
>> predict, the facts.  The assumption, consequently, does not beg the
>> question; it is instead confirmed (or refuted) by experience … the argument
>> in general seeks to establish at least the compatibility of the hypothesis
>> with known (and sometimes, previously unaccounted-for) facts.  That it
>> ought to do more, is one thing; but it does not do less, and it is no more
>> circular than the scientific explanation of any phenomena whatsoever.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Similarly, Rohatyn responds to the second objection, that Peirce
>> illegitimately relies on an analogy between the known and the unknown, by
>> stating that "if [this objection] is sound it invalidates every type of
>> scientific reasoning and inference.  Analogies are of course not the only
>> form of reasoning, but if they may be used elsewhere in science, why not
>> here?"  Finally, after addressing the other three objections, he concludes
>> that Peirce's argument is not "an elucidation of the concept of God so much
>> as an attempt to extract from that concept consequences that are at least
>> congruent with the known facts of temporal existence and change."
>>
>>
>>
>> Second, Jaime Nubiola's 2004 *Semiotiche* article, "*Il Lume Naturale*:
>> Abduction and God" (http://www.unav.es/users/LumeNaturale.html), aims
>> "to highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole
>> scientific enterprise."  He states, "The central question … is precisely
>> why we abduce correctly and easily in a relative few number of attempts?
>> Why this instinct of guessing right is so efficient?"  He characterizes
>> this as a "surprising fact," and presents his answer to these questions in
>> the format of CP 5.189 accordingly.
>>
>>
>>
>> JN:  The efficiency of the scientist (guessing right between innumerable
>> hypotheses) is a really surprising fact.
>>
>> If God were the creator of human cognitive abilities and of nature this
>> efficiency would be a matter of course.
>>
>> Hence, there is reason to suspect that God is the creator of human minds
>> and nature.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nubiola concludes that "the surprising efficiency of our scientific
>> enterprise … would be totally improbable by mere chance:  it requires God's
>> creation as the common source of knower and known."
>>
>>
>>
>> Finally, Kathleen Hull's 2005 *Transactions* article, "The Inner
>> Chambers of His Mind:  Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God as Related to
>> Mathematical Experience" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321042), is even
>> more speculative, by her own admission.  She poses essentially the same
>> question that I did, "What theory about the nature of thinking is Peirce
>> attempting to prove here?"  Her proposed answer is that "the method for
>> arriving at the God-hypothesis is fundamentally tied to a general theory
>> about the use of diagrams in our reasoning."
>>
>>
>>
>> KH:  Beginning with a diagram of the three universes, if we playfully
>> allow our ideas to connect themselves into a continuing series of classes
>> or sets, and alter our diagrams in response to those connections, what
>> naturally will come to mind is the idea of God.  What we perceive are the
>> diagrams.  The diagram of the relationship among the categories (such as
>> the nesting of one class within another) is an iconic sign of the
>> relationship … What we directly perceive, then, is not God as a person, but
>> instead, God as a hypothesized form of relation as diagram.  On this model,
>> God is not a being qua being that we directly perceive; but God is the
>> result of an abductive inference emerging from the mind's exploration of
>> the interrelations of the three categories or universes.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Hull concludes, "Peirce's reconceptualized model of mathematical
>> reasoning, in which the thinker is an active agent, an active participant
>> in the unfolding of necessary reasoning by way of diagrams in the inner
>> world, may be one means of leading the mind to reach an understanding of
>> God."
>>
>>
>>
>> Although Hull's interpretation is certainly attractive to me, given the
>> central role of diagrammatic reasoning in my "logic of ingenuity" thesis,
>> Rohatyn and especially Nubiola strike me as being more on the right track.
>> What do you think?
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>>
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