> On Sep 16, 2016, at 11:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> This to me suggests that at least some of the force of the NA is “extracted” 
> not from the concept of God as defined by Peirce but from the vernacular 
> concept. Peirce does distinguish between the two concepts, right at the 
> beginning, but as far as I can see he does not make it very clear which one 
> of them is supposed to be instinctive and therefore at the root of the NA.

This is really an important point. I’ll confess I don’t know the nuances of 
Peirce’s religious belief. However it seems to me the problem with the NA is 
that in theory people with different conceptions of God could conduct the same 
experiment and it’d equally be an argument for those conceptions. 

When I’ve discussed the NA with others I also note that in terms of pragmatic 
inquiry and fallibilism the fact so many who’d conduct the argument would not 
come to Peirce’s conclusions is problematic. (Think all the atheists who 
probably make up the majority of Peirceans) Given that it’s the community of 
inquirers in the long run that matters, this is a big problem for the NA. (IMO)

> On Sep 16, 2016, at 5:20 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:
> The existence of God amuses me. What about the nature of god. This was 
> radically changed by Jesus who did not appear to accept him as a tribal 
> deity, or the explicit ruler of history in an interventionist mode. etc. I 
> have always assumed Peirce had a mystical experience in a church not far from 
> where I write, and that his encounter was with a deity rather more benign 
> than the one who inhabits the pages of most Scripture. I am merely commenting 
> on the fact that the nature is more important than existence per se.

While Peirce’s conception of God appears somewhat idiosyncratic compared to the 
majority view of the 19th century, it does seem heavily influenced by 
traditional creeds that defined the Trinity. I’d love to know how Peirce dealt 
with that sort of criticism.

On Sep 16, 2016, at 11:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> I take this as a version of the “light of nature” doctrine I mentioned above; 
> but again, it leaves open the question of whether we are referring to God as 
> ens necessarium or to the vernacular concept. If the former, this use of the 
> term “God” would make Peirce a pantheist or panentheist, but would not commit 
> him to the belief that the creator is benign. It would also not commit him to 
> the habit of regarding the creator as “vaguely like a man” (CP 5.536), which 
> does seem to be involved in Peirce’s NA, and which he takes to be an 
> instinctive belief. On that point I disagree with Peirce; and I think this 
> deflates the argument as summarized by Nubiola, as it renders the term “God” 
> quite dispensable from it. The conclusion would be better stated as: there is 
> reason to suspect that human minds and nature come from the same source. Or 
> that human mind is part of nature.

Your very useful “Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God” (CP 6.494) 
ends up leaving me more questions than answers on just these matters - in 
particular how he deals with the Christian doctrine of the incarnation and the 
two natures of Jesus.

http://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm <http://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm>

Admittedly Peirce was raised an Unitarian who don’t think Jesus is God as I 
recall but is a creature created by God. (Please correct me if I’m wrong in 
that) However in his first marriage he became Episcopal and adopted its notion 
of the trinity. At times he applies the trinity to his trichotomies.

While we’ve been talking of God in the NA as real but not existing, Peirce I 
believe at other times talks of God as second which is Jesus who does exist. 
Gerard Deledalle’s paper on this has been reprinted in numerous books. I 
confess even after checking it again I still don’t know what Peirce means by 
that. He takes the NA as showing the reality of God but just doesn’t deal with 
existence and thus is compatible with the incarnation.

Anyone else have further information on this point relative to Peirce? 

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