Jon, list, Jon, I fully understand why you want to return to the subject of the original post in this thread, your four questions. Still, I've been following this thread rather closely and wanted to comment on some recent exchanges in it concerning the distinction between reality and existence (and a couple other themes) before we leave that topic.
In my view you nicely summarized Peirce's views of 'the real' as expressed in his 1908 (N.A.) CP 6.455. JS: Ideas are Real by virtue of their "mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them." A Sign is Real by virtue of its "active power to establish connections between different objects, especially objects in different Universes," not its mere embodiment, which is not essential to its Being. Things and facts are Real because "their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces"; i.e., they *exist*. And, again, to reiterate a point you've been making, it seems to me that to "a fair minded" reader of the several texts you've been quoting from, this summary is entirely consistent with Peirce's most evolved views in expressing an "extreme scholastic realism." As you succinctly put it: "Peirce. . . associate[d] being with reality. Everything in all three Universes of Experience has Being, but only things and facts in the Universe of Brute Actuality exist." And, so in considering the famous diamond example, the earlier version deemed "too nominalistic" by Peirce, later revised to illustrate the evolution of his thinking in this matter, namely, his "extreme scholastic realism, you wrote: JS: Peirce] basically says [ca. 1905] that his own realism goes *beyond *that of Scotus, and calls it "*extreme *scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes" and "would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts. Robert Lane's excellent paper, "On Peirce's Early Realism," http://philpapers.org/rec/LANOPE is quite valuable in getting at the progress of Peirce's thinking on realism through the course of his philosophical career, I think. Abstract It is well known that C. S. Peirce eventually accepted an "extreme scholastic realism" about "generals" and "vagues." But it has been a subject of debate among Peirce scholars whether he was a nominalist early on. In particular, it remains unsettled whether Peirce's earliest position regarding generals was one of antirealism or whether he was a realist about generals from the very beginning. In this essay I argue that despite first appearances, the textual evidence does not support the claim that Peirce moved from a position of antirealism to one of realism about generals. His earliest statements on the subject are compatible with a moderate, nonmodal realism about generality. Continuing: JS: It seems incontrovertible to me that Peirce DID NOT confine the three Categories to "processes of semiosis" [or why, for example, the positing of a science of phenomenology preceeding logic as semiotic in his classification of the sciences? GR], DID consider Firstness (after about 1890) and Thirdness (his whole adult life) to be examples of "the real," and DID (repeatedly) define "the real" in precisely the way that I have summarized it (see http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/real and, for good measure, http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/existence). Others are, of course, free to interpret Peirce as they may; but if one's interpretation is not in line with Peirce's own understanding, then a system built upon such revisionist interpretations would seem to be at variance with his theories. As for Peirce's understanding of the place of the community in considering "what is real?" I again agree with this statement: JS: [T]hecommunity is required for the *analysis* of reality; but reality is whatever it is, *regardless* of that analysis--in fact, regardless of whether there even *is* a community to analyze it! What is nominalism, if not the view that there must be thinkers in order for generals to be real? Logic (including logical analysis) may be "rooted in the the social principle," but it is a core principle of Peirce that the truth of reality is independent of what any individual or community (past, present or future) might think it to be. You offered 3 Peirce quotations making exactly this point, and I'll quote again the last of them (the last historically, as well). To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. (EP 2.456-457; 1911) And whatever the definitive status of the existential may be (and Ben's earlier post which Clark quoted is quite helpful in sorting that out, I think), his quotation (again, a late one), referenced by both Clark and you, seems to me to "bring home" Peirce's conception of reality. Here's Clark's more extended excerpt: For what is it for a thing to be Real ? [---] to say that a thing is *Real* is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it *would* , under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is *Real* , provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a *Real Habit* , even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled. ['A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911 http://www.helsinki.fi/sc ience/commens/terms/real.html And so I agree with you that: JS: In Peirce's carefully considered later terminology, this is precisely what it means to be *real*--and it is clearly different from what it means to *exist*. Hardness, colors, and shapes cannot and do not exist as such; *actual *objects that are hard and have *specific *colors and shapes can (and do) exist. So, again, it is my sense that until we are as an intellectual community much clearer on what Peirce said and what he meant by such notions as 'reality' and 'existence' (and your grouping Peirce quotations which make his meaning "incontrovertible" for fair minded readers is exceeding helpful in approaching that goal), I believe that we must continue to distinguish Peirce's incontrovertible meanings--whether we agree with them or not--from those which tend toward idiosyncratic revisionism (for example, as did Joe Ransdell, I consider much of Tom Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs* to fall under that rubric) . Finally, while I too appreciate Stephen's desire that the list might also find contemporary applications and uses of Peirce's ideas, I agree that: JS: "While trying to determine "why Peirce is significant today" is certainly one reason "why one might be drawn to this forum," another is to gain a better understanding of what Peirce wrote and meant; and the latter task strikes me as a prerequisite for the former." In my opinion we clearly need to get a much firmer grasp "of what Peirce wrote and meant" if we are to attempt valid and useful contemporary applications. Yet, as I see it, there is no reason whatsover why both of these approaches can't be taken up on this list, each informing the other. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List: > > > Returning to the four questions in my post that started this thread … > > > 1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the > nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their > "logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or > something else? > 2. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with > "the hypothesis of God's reality"? > 3. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of > thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, deductively > trace and inductively test? > 4. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the > nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would > thereby also be "proved"? > > … here are a few places in the secondary literature where I found > potential hints of answers. > > > First, Dennis Rohatyn's 1982 *Transactions* article, "Resurrecting > Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/ > 40319950), takes the interesting approach of reformulating CP > 6.490--which, again, is quite fascinating in its own right, and probably > worth discussing in a separate thread on Peirce's cosmology--as an > Argumentation with nine distinct steps. He then raises five specific > objections, and replies to each one of them on behalf of Peirce. He > responds to the first objection, that Peirce begs the question by assuming > the Reality of an atemporal being from the outset, as follows. > > > DR: The assumption of an atemporal being is just part of the hypothesis > being examined. No retroduction is devoid of assumptions; the test of an > assumption's adequacy is how well it squares with, or enables us to > predict, the facts. The assumption, consequently, does not beg the > question; it is instead confirmed (or refuted) by experience … the argument > in general seeks to establish at least the compatibility of the hypothesis > with known (and sometimes, previously unaccounted-for) facts. That it > ought to do more, is one thing; but it does not do less, and it is no more > circular than the scientific explanation of any phenomena whatsoever. > > > Similarly, Rohatyn responds to the second objection, that Peirce > illegitimately relies on an analogy between the known and the unknown, by > stating that "if [this objection] is sound it invalidates every type of > scientific reasoning and inference. Analogies are of course not the only > form of reasoning, but if they may be used elsewhere in science, why not > here?" Finally, after addressing the other three objections, he concludes > that Peirce's argument is not "an elucidation of the concept of God so much > as an attempt to extract from that concept consequences that are at least > congruent with the known facts of temporal existence and change." > > > Second, Jaime Nubiola's 2004 *Semiotiche* article, "*Il Lume Naturale*: > Abduction and God" (http://www.unav.es/users/LumeNaturale.html), aims "to > highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole > scientific enterprise." He states, "The central question … is precisely > why we abduce correctly and easily in a relative few number of attempts? > Why this instinct of guessing right is so efficient?" He characterizes > this as a "surprising fact," and presents his answer to these questions in > the format of CP 5.189 accordingly. > > > JN: The efficiency of the scientist (guessing right between innumerable > hypotheses) is a really surprising fact. > > If God were the creator of human cognitive abilities and of nature this > efficiency would be a matter of course. > > Hence, there is reason to suspect that God is the creator of human minds > and nature. > > > Nubiola concludes that "the surprising efficiency of our scientific > enterprise … would be totally improbable by mere chance: it requires God's > creation as the common source of knower and known." > > > Finally, Kathleen Hull's 2005 *Transactions* article, "The Inner Chambers > of His Mind: Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God as Related to > Mathematical Experience" (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40321042), is even > more speculative, by her own admission. She poses essentially the same > question that I did, "What theory about the nature of thinking is Peirce > attempting to prove here?" Her proposed answer is that "the method for > arriving at the God-hypothesis is fundamentally tied to a general theory > about the use of diagrams in our reasoning." > > > KH: Beginning with a diagram of the three universes, if we playfully > allow our ideas to connect themselves into a continuing series of classes > or sets, and alter our diagrams in response to those connections, what > naturally will come to mind is the idea of God. What we perceive are the > diagrams. The diagram of the relationship among the categories (such as > the nesting of one class within another) is an iconic sign of the > relationship … What we directly perceive, then, is not God as a person, but > instead, God as a hypothesized form of relation as diagram. On this model, > God is not a being qua being that we directly perceive; but God is the > result of an abductive inference emerging from the mind's exploration of > the interrelations of the three categories or universes. > > > Hull concludes, "Peirce's reconceptualized model of mathematical > reasoning, in which the thinker is an active agent, an active participant > in the unfolding of necessary reasoning by way of diagrams in the inner > world, may be one means of leading the mind to reach an understanding of > God." > > > Although Hull's interpretation is certainly attractive to me, given the > central role of diagrammatic reasoning in my "logic of ingenuity" thesis, > Rohatyn and especially Nubiola strike me as being more on the right track. > What do you think? > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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