Hi Jon S, List,

You say, "I find it fascinating, and perhaps relevant in this context, that 
Peirce appealed to his readers' "instinct for that which is rational" in an 
effort to make up for his inability to lay out his theory of logic 'in a 
thoroughly satisfactory manner.'"

And then, a little later: "For many (most?), the NA is sufficient by 
itself--and Peirce is fine with that!  For those not fully satisfied by the NA, 
it serves instead as the initial step of a more rigorous investigation."

The points Peirce is making here about the role of instinctive forms of 
inference is entirely consistent with his later semiotic account of the 
inferential processes that have the assurance of instinct and the assurance of 
experience. What is more, it follows quite reasonably from the larger 
philosophical framework that he calls critical common-sensism. (See Smyth, 
Richard A. "Peirce's Normative Science Revisited." Transactions of the Charles 
S. Peirce Society 38, no. 1/2 (2002): 283-306.)

Within the framework of critical common-sensism, some inferences don't stand in 
need of criticism. They are--at least at the present time--not under higher 
degrees of self-control. As such, those who are engaged in philosophical 
theorizing might do well to hold off on making criticisms of these types of 
inferences.

In fact, the semiotic theory does show that they are valid inferences--and the 
validity hinges in part on the fact that those who are doing the thinking are 
not being overly self-conscious or overly rational in the way that they are 
controlling the conduct of their thought. In short, it can be reasonable to 
hold off on being overly rational. At times--and those who are engaged in the 
process of instinctively making this humble inference may find that it is one 
of those times-- thought may grow more naturally when we let the habits of 
feeling, action and thought express themselves without much conscious direction 
and self-control. Call it listening to the voice of inspiration, or the Divine, 
or Nature. I'm more than happy with any of these sorts of descriptions.

On a separate note, thanks for taking a look at the SPIN project, and for 
engaging in the editing efforts on FromThePage. Several individuals who have 
agreed to engage in the project have expressed an interest in transcribing and 
interpreting the drafts and notes for "The Neglected Argument..." As such, I 
will add a folder with those MS to the Peirce collection on the transcription 
platform ASAP.

For those who would like to take a look:  
http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16
C. S. Peirce Manuscripts | 
FromThePage<http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16>
fromthepage.com
C. S. Peirce Manuscripts - collection overview. The goal of the Scalable Peirce 
Interpretation Network (SPIN) is to develop a model environment for distributed 
collaboration that can support an international network of researchers, 
students, and citizen scholars in cooperative efforts to encode and interpret 
handwritten manuscripts, including those of high complexity. As our testbed, we 
plan to use the "Logic Notebook" that Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of 
Pragmatism, kept as the seedbed and greenhouse for his ideas together with 
related sets of manuscripts in logic and semiotics. We are treating the pages 
in the MS 145 folder as a sandbox. Take the platform for a test run and play 
with the toolset. The enhanced set of LaTeX tools for encoding the algebraic 
formulas and graphical diagrams have been added, and a set of guidelines for 
making the encodings is ready to go. Having said that, many logical and 
mathematical formulas that are expressed on one line of text

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


________________________________
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 1:29 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

List:

As just mentioned in my reply to Gary F., in case anyone missed it, here is 
what I posted a few days ago about the drafts of "A Neglected Argument."

To what was Peirce specifically referring as "a theory of the nature of 
thinking" or "this theory of thinking"?  These were both unusual expressions 
for him to use; neither appears anywhere else in the Collected Papers.  By 
contrast, "theory of logic" and "science of logic" each occur 20 times, while 
"theory of reasoning" occurs 18 times and "science of reasoning" occurs five 
times.  Even "theory of thought" and "science of thought" show up only once 
each, and one of those occasions is in the cited title of a work by someone 
else.  However, in CP 1.573 (also EP 2.376; 1906), Peirce does state that 
"Logic, regarded from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of 
view, is the theory of deliberate thinking."  Furthermore, in manuscript R 634 
(1909), a draft preface for a book whose working title was Meaning, he wrote 
that "logic is the theory of thinking, so far as thinking conduces to the 
attainment of truth."  He went on to say, later in the same paragraph, that 
"logic should be regarded as coextensive with General Semeiotic, the a priori 
theory of signs."  So it seems plausible, and perhaps likely, that Peirce had 
his entire theory of "Logic, Considered as Semeiotic" in mind when he wrote "A 
Neglected Argument."

I have now discovered further clues, which pertain to all four of my 
"interesting questions," in the manuscripts that contain various drafts of that 
article (R 841-844).  The final version, as published in The Hibbert Journal, 
contains a somewhat lengthy description of the "hidden argument," followed by a 
relatively brief discussion of the Three Stages of Inquiry and their logical 
validity.  What appears to be the very first draft (R 842) has it the other way 
around, as the following introductory comments anticipate.

CSP:  Yet this [humble] argument has seldom been much insisted upon by 
theologians for the reason that, persuasive as it is, it has not seemed to them 
to be logical.  This I conceive has been due to a false theory of logic; and 
consequently the main substance of the present paper must be a brief abstract 
of a defence of a theory of logic according to which the theological argument 
in question is as logically sound as it certainly is persuasive.  Thus, I am to 
outline two arguments, one supporting the other.  The latter, which I will 
designate as the humble argument, although every mind can feel its force, rests 
on far too many premisses to be stated in full.  Taking the general description 
of it as a minor premiss, and a certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it 
will follow by a simple syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that 
consequently whoever acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in 
accepting its conclusion.

What Peirce here called "a certain theory of logic" seems to be precisely what 
he later characterized in the first additament as "a theory of the nature of 
thinking" and "this theory of thinking."  It is the major premiss, and "a 
general description of the humble argument" is the minor premiss, of "a simple 
syllogism" whose conclusion is "that the humble argument is logical."  Notice 
the modesty of this claim--Peirce was not so much trying to "prove" the Reality 
of God as merely assert that anyone who embraces his theory of logic and 
recognizes that the humble argument is consistent with it "need have no scruple 
in accepting its conclusion."  He continued ...

CSP:  Only, of course, it becomes necessary to establish the major premiss, 
which is the theory of logic; and it is sufficiently clear that to do this in a 
thoroughly satisfactory manner would involve going over the whole of the 
critical branch of logic and showing that the theory in question satisfactorily 
explains every variety of argument.  Now I cannot, within reasonable limits, 
consider more than the main genera of arguments.  So much, I will do.  The 
subsidiary arguments of a mixed character, although highly important in actual 
reasonings, cannot, within my limits, be considered.  Moreover, the critical 
branch of logic really, even more than apparently, depends upon the very 
difficult and still vexed analytical branch, whose problems could not easily be 
brought to the apprehension of ordinary readers, to say nothing of the task of 
laying the foundations for their scientific solutions.  But fortunately, we 
have an instinct for that which is rational, and upon that ordinary readers 
ought to rely.  Accordingly, while I cannot here present a thoroughly 
scientific defence of my theory of logic, I shall hope to make it appear 
reasonable.

I find it fascinating, and perhaps relevant in this context, that Peirce 
appealed to his readers' "instinct for that which is rational" in an effort to 
make up for his inability to lay out his theory of logic "in a thoroughly 
satisfactory manner."  He then proceeded to offer only a single paragraph 
outlining the "hidden argument," followed by many pages about Retroduction, 
Deduction, and (especially) Induction, before (apparently) realizing that he 
had far exceeded the allotted length and had to start over, almost from 
scratch.  In fact, some of this content was published as CP 2.755-772 under the 
heading, "The Varieties and Validity of Induction," with no indication that it 
is connected with "A Neglected Argument"; instead, it is referenced simply as 
manuscript "G" and incorrectly dated c.1905.  Two different versions of the 
text end with equal abruptness.  A later fragment (in R 843) includes this 
alternative summary.

CSP:  My main concern is to show that that line of reflexion which I call the 
Neglected Argument is an argument, and a particularly strong one, of the kind 
with which every positive scientific inquisition must begin.  The lowliest 
minds will rest content with this without any fault in their conclusion or 
their logic; while the more critical, may still their lingering doubts, by 
completing the line of inquiry which the Neglected Argument opens; while on its 
concomitants they may base another Argument supporting the former, and so be 
led on to further reflections, remarks, and experiences which attain all the 
force of sound induction, the highest grade of certainty to which the human 
mind can attain in any Real subject.

For many (most?), the NA is sufficient by itself--and Peirce is fine with that! 
 For those not fully satisfied by the NA, it serves instead as the initial step 
of a more rigorous investigation.  Both outcomes are fully consistent with 
Peirce's "theory of the nature of thinking," as captured in this structural 
engineering metaphor from the published article.

CSP:  Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such 
ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings 
in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the vaguest, he 
managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of 
induction, held together by scientific struts and ties.  Yet every plank of its 
advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneous 
conjectures of instinctive reason; and neither Deduction nor Induction 
contributes a single new concept to the structure. (CP 4.475)

I am still digesting all of the contents of the manuscripts, but those are some 
thoughts so far.  I am very grateful to Jeffrey Downard for calling to my 
attention the Scalable Peirce Interpretation Network (SPIN), which is making 
images of Peirce's manuscripts available for transcribing 
(http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16).
C. S. Peirce Manuscripts | 
FromThePage<http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16>
fromthepage.com
C. S. Peirce Manuscripts - collection overview. The goal of the Scalable Peirce 
Interpretation Network (SPIN) is to develop a model environment for distributed 
collaboration that can support an international network of researchers, 
students, and citizen scholars in cooperative efforts to encode and interpret 
handwritten manuscripts, including those of high complexity. As our testbed, we 
plan to use the "Logic Notebook" that Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of 
Pragmatism, kept as the seedbed and greenhouse for his ideas together with 
related sets of manuscripts in logic and semiotics. We are treating the pages 
in the MS 145 folder as a sandbox. Take the platform for a test run and play 
with the toolset. The enhanced set of LaTeX tools for encoding the algebraic 
formulas and graphical diagrams have been added, and a set of guidelines for 
making the encodings is ready to go. Having said that, many logical and 
mathematical formulas that are expressed on one line of text



Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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