Dear Jeffrey, Ben, Jon, Edwina, Benjamin, Eugene, and others on list:


How about instead,



C = Father and not God,   God                                poet

A = Son ( *viz*., Jesus),       man, “philosopher”,        scientist

B = Spirit,                          *daimonion,                      *
musician



Does that sufficiently address the perfection of man as man problem if we
include one two three…utterer interpreter commens…sophist statesman
philosopher?



That is, is CP 5.189 *ugly* enough to be safe from kidnappers?

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/07/opinion/the-real-leo-strauss.html?_r=0



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jeffrey - I have a few problems with your analysis. I'll comment below:
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
> To: "Peirce-L" <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 5:06 PM
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
>
> Hello Jon, List,
>
> The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully
> in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the
> details a bit more:
>
> 1) JEFFREY: Major premiss:  Every inference is, in one way or another,
> valid as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive.
> Those that appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are,
> themselves, valid, but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the
> fact that we have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we
> think it is inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent
> invalidity is really just a lack of soundness in that something in the
> premisses involves an error on our part and it is really false. As a form
> of inference, every retroductive conjecture that meets certain conditions
> (e.g., it responds to a question occasioned by real doubt, it is really
> explanatory, it is possible to deduce consequences that can be put to the
> test, it is possible to make inductive inferences that will tend to show
> the hypotheses is confirmed or disconfirmed by observations, the
> observations that will be used to test the hypothesis are not the same
> observations that will be used to make the inductive inference, etc.) is a
> valid abductive inference--and hence has a logical character. Such
> arguments can, in time, be the subject of further development in arguments
> that are more fully under our conscious control. As such, they can be made
> into logical inferences that may rise up to higher levels of assurance,
> including those of experience as well as form.
>
> EDWINA: Can you really mix up validity of format and false/truth of the
> content? [where you write that 'something in the premisses involves an
> error on our part and it is really false'.
> ---------------------------------
>
> 2) JEFFREY: Minor premiss:  The humble argument for the Reality of God is
> a retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it
> has in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at
> different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it
> appears that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in
> the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different
> communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of
> different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such
> communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in
> orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in
> orientation. Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have
> been developed in different human communities, and focusing on the core
> ideas that appear to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas
> can be developed into hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and
> self-controlled manner by those who are deeply infused by the desire to
> learn and who have a relatively refined sense of how to conduct their
> inquires according to experimental methods.
>
> EDWINA: I think that you are ADDING premises to this that are not in the
> basic syllogism.
>
> You are declaring that 'it has been met with the support of large
> communities of inquirers'..BUT - this does not have anything to do with the
> logical format, and frankly cannot be used to substantiate the
> truth/falseness of the argument. [Argument ad populum]
>
> You declare that 'the core inferential patterns in the argument are
> prevalent in the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings'. Again,
> an appeal-to-authority and majority - but, this does not prove
> truth/falseness of the argument. It also doesn't deal with the faft that
> 'reasonable human beings' can be atheists.
>
> ---------------------------
>
>
> 3) JEFFConclusion:  The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical
> in all three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and
> according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should
> remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the
> argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible.
> While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of
> uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which
> serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy
> of our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of
> common sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special
> sciences--has shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it
> informs the healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices
> and in the ongoing logical growth of our thought.
>
> EDWINA: I agree - as you say, it's not a claim that the conclusion is
> true. But, I'm not sure that you can say that because an argumental format
> is logical, that the conclusion is plausible.
> ---------------------------------------
>
> So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God
> involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the
> inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The
> Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is
> the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the
> alternate hypotheses?
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> ________________________________________
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> List:
>
> Based on what Peirce wrote in R 842 ...
>
> CSP:  Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a
> certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple
> syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever
> acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion.
>
> ... I am now inclined to think that the syllogism that he had in mind was
> something like this.
>
> Major premiss:  Every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive
> reason is logical.
> Minor premiss:  The humble argument for the Reality of God is a
> retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason.
> Conclusion:  The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical.
>
> Again, this is a relatively modest claim, especially since Peirce clearly
> recognized that retroduction is the least secure form of inference.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/
> in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<htt
> p://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> --------------------
>
>
>
>
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