Gary R:
You said: Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post: Of which Jeffrey said: As a rejoinder, let me press my last question. *What are the alternate hypotheses*? Do they meet the requirements that must be met for the abductive inferences to be valid. Which recalls what Edwina said: “…is it rather the case that this semiosis activity must continue on, for some time *until that I-O relation does indeed correlate with the R-O Relation? Isn't this what Peirce meant by eventually arriving at the truth?”* And if we recall what Peirce said: *T*he word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium...* Of which the Bible said: “If you really know me, you will know my Father as well. From now on, you do know him and have seen him." John 14:7. So, the Father is First, the Son is Second (Representamen) and Spirit is Third. Which recalls another thing Edwina said: “The problem I have with a truth defined as the I-O being similar to the R-O, is ..well....it requires that the Representamen be somehow 'untouched' or unaffected by experience. That is, *can we trust the Representamen*? I think the community-of-scholars is necessary in this situation, but even so..wasn't it Tolstoy who said that 'wrong does not cease to be wrong just because the majority shares in it'... So going back to Gary R’s statement about the hope that “critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post”, I will support Gary R’s challenge and ask you to put your hypothesis up next to *this* argumentation involving the Father, Son and Spirit and see how humbling your response is against that made by a different community of inquirers, *viz*., *us*. For instance, what is plausible about Jesus being the Son of God? With best wishes, Jerry Rhee On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 1:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Gary R., Ben U., List, > > Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said > that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every > inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken. > > We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected > Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my > part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a > response to the question. > > Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate > hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function > that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, > in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of > logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant > totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses. > > One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings > (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and > Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same > need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our > own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we > recognize a similar need? Like Schiller, I think that aim of further > cultivating our habits of feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to > call out for the kinds of Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer > us hope as we seek to bring the conflicting tendencies in our personal and > social lives into better harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of > Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow > to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Ben, Jeff, List, > > Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis. > > Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. > as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post: > > JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God > involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the > inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The > Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is > the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the > alternate hypotheses? > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [Gary Richmond] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com > <mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Jeff, Edwina, list, > > I've just a few quibbles, nothing major. > > Jeff, you wrote: > > Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of > inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be > invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the > appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. > [End quote] > > Some of that is very close to what Peirce said in his articles in _Journal > of Speculative Philosophy_ in 1868, but with a decisive difference. Peirce > said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that > every inference is valid as a pattern of inference. In "Some Consequences > of Four Incapacities," he said: > > It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we > are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other > supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the > formula of valid reasoning. > [CP 5.266, W 2:214, http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ > menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm ] > > Yes, invalidity of inference arises from mistaking what kind of inference > it is - where "it" refers to the mental action. But saying that every > inference is valid as a pattern of inference sounds confusingly like saying > that there is no invalid inference. > > An unsound deduction is unsound by virtue (or should I say 'vice') of a > falsehood in the premisses, an invalidity in the deductive form, or both. A > valid deduction is unsound if it has one or more false premisses, and is > necessarily unsound if there is an inconsistency (a.k.a. necessary > falsehood) in a premiss or among premisses. A 'forward-only' deduction can > be valid and unsound yet true in its conclusion, e.g., Socrates is a > cro-magnon, all cro-magnons are mortal, ergo Socrates is mortal. (A > particularly vacuous example, based on a necessarily false conjunction of > premisses, is: p&~p, ergo p or ~p.) It's difficult to think of a deduction > whose seeming invalidity boils down to the occurrence of something > contingently or necessarily false in its premisses, maybe that difficulty > is what Edwina was getting at in her reply (I haven't had time to catch up > with this thread). Anyway, whether one can explain seeming invalidity as > unsoundness in non-deductive inference modes depends I guess on how one > defines validity and soundness for them. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/21/2016 5:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > Hello Jon, List, > > The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully > in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the > details a bit more: > > Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a > pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that > appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, > but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. As a form of inference, every retroductive > conjecture that meets certain conditions (e.g., it responds to a question > occasioned by real doubt, it is really explanatory, it is possible to > deduce consequences that can be put to the test, it is possible to make > inductive inferences that will tend to show the hypotheses is confirmed or > disconfirmed by observations, the observations that will be used to test > the hypothesis are not the same observations that will be used to make the > inductive inference, etc.) is a valid abductive inference--and hence has a > logical character. Such arguments can, in time, be the subject of further > development in arguments that are more fully under our conscious control. > As such, they can be made into logical inferences that may rise up to > higher levels of assurance, including those of experience as well as form. > > Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it > has in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at > different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it > appears that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in > the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different > communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of > different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such > communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in > orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in > orientation. Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have > been developed in different human communities, and focusing on the core > ideas that appear to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas > can be developed into hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and > self-controlled manner by those who are deeply infused by the desire to > learn and who have a relatively refined sense of how to conduct their > inquires according to experimental methods. > > Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical in all > three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and > according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should > remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the > argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. > While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of > uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which > serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy > of our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of > common sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special > sciences--has shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it > informs the healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices > and in the ongoing logical growth of our thought. > > So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God > involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the > inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The > Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is > the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the > alternate hypotheses? > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> > ________________________________________ > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto: > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] > Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:lis > t...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the > message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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