Dear Ben U., List: Many thanks to Ben Udell for his help regarding my Intelex CDs of Peirce and Anselm.
I went to Craigslist where I found a laptop with a Vista operating system, called the seller, and drove 50 miles to test it out. It worked like a charm. For $70, and a hundred miles worth of gasoline, I have my Intelex investment back. By way of explanation, when my CDs became inoperable I called Intelex and they were very gracious in giving me access to the internet version. But the internet version does not have several search features of the CDs--which were essential to my use of it. Ben U's explanation allowed me to get the use of my CD's back, for which I am *pro-found-ly* grateful. I have a lot of thoughts relative to recent emails on this thread, but will have a lot of work and travel over the next month that limit my opportunities to set them out for you. Hopefully you will all be going strong on this subject for a while longer. In my view, a heck of a lot of progress has been made, and I especially thank Jon for starting it off. Many thanks again to Ben U. and to all the participants in this discussion. Ben N. Ben *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 Telephone: (814) 808-5702 *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler On Wed, Sep 21, 2016 at 6:49 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Edwina, List, > > I'll let others chime in before saying much by way of response. Here are a > few quick remarks offered in the hopes of staying on track. > > EDWINA: Can you really mix up validity of format and false/truth of the > content? [where you write that 'something in the premisses involves an > error > on our part and it is really false'. > > Jeff: I'm not mixing these up. While I recognize a difference between > validity and soundness, we must keep in mind Peirce's decision in the > development of his logical theory--made quite early on--to treat all > inferences as valid. It is part of a strategy that grows from his early > efforts to reconstruct the natural classes arguments fully by making all of > the premisses explicit, including the principles of logic that are > governing the inference. Once those are added to the premisses, the > differences between validity and soundness are not so simple. (see Smyth, > Reading Peirce Reading, Chapter 2 and 3). > > EDWINA: I think that you are ADDING premises to this that are not in the > basic syllogism. > > Jeff: what, do you think, is involved in the conceptions at work in this > "basic" syllogism? There is more, I suspect, than is involved in the > conceptions employed in the basic definitions, postulates and axioms of > arithmetic. Notice all that follows from those simply conceptions > deductively. You say that I am adding something that I believe is already > there. That, at least, is how I interpret the argument. If you would like > to offer an alternate interpretation, then be my guest. > > EDWINA: You are declaring that 'it has been met with the support of large > communities of inquirers'..BUT - this does not have anything to do with the > logical format, and frankly cannot be used to substantiate the > truth/falseness of the argument. [Argument ad populum] > > Jeff: The fact that it has been met with the support of large communities > of inquirers does lead me to suspect that those who dismiss the argument > out of hand might be missing something. Those who, like Euthyphro, entirely > ignore the judgment of others (such as his own relatives, not to mention > Socrates), seem hasty--to say the least--in their convictions about what > makes for a good or a bad argument. What is more, Peirce accepts > Aristotle's methodological approach in his ethics, which is to draw the > evidence for a normative theory from samples of arguments that we take to > be good or bad. The fact that many people for a long time have taken this > kind of argument to be good gives me some reason to toss it into that > class. What is more, we can learn something about wisdom by looking at > those who are reputed to have considerable wisdom. So, Peirce thinks that > we should give some extra weight to those who are expert reasoners. As > such, the fact that Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Boethius, Augustine, > Aquinas, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant--as well as Emerson, Thoreau, Martin > Luther King an Ghandi--all seem, in their more reflective moments, to > recognize the humble argument even if they don't try to develop it as a > full-fledged philosophical argumentation, does give me more reason to think > that this pattern of inference should be classed as good and not as bad. > The question is, how should we explain the inference in our logical theory? > > EDWINA: I agree - as you say, it's not a claim that the conclusion is true. > But, I'm not sure that you can say that because an argumental format is > logical, that the conclusion is plausible. > > Jeff: I am trying to show that Peirce's argument, when reconstructed more > fully, is sufficient to support a claim that the conclusion is plausible. > How might we put it to the test. Well, I happen to think that we've been > putting it to the test for quite a long time. Hence the reference to the > collective wisdom of the ages serves a double function. > > As a rejoinder, let me press my last question. What are the alternate > hypotheses? Do they meet the requirements that must be met for the > abductive inferences to be valid. If they do, what support have they > garnered when put to the test. For my part, I think the arguments made by > the likes of Dawkins and Dennett about the reality of God leave something > to be desired. It is not just that the arguments are bad, but they are bad > in a particular egregious kind of way--or so it seems to me. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 2:53 PM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Jeffrey - I have a few problems with your analysis. I'll comment below: > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > To: "Peirce-L" <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 5:06 PM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > > Hello Jon, List, > > The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully > in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the > details a bit more: > > 1) JEFFREY: Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, > valid > as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that > appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, > but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. As a form of inference, every retroductive > conjecture that meets certain conditions (e.g., it responds to a question > occasioned by real doubt, it is really explanatory, it is possible to > deduce > consequences that can be put to the test, it is possible to make inductive > inferences that will tend to show the hypotheses is confirmed or > disconfirmed by observations, the observations that will be used to test > the > hypothesis are not the same observations that will be used to make the > inductive inference, etc.) is a valid abductive inference--and hence has a > logical character. Such arguments can, in time, be the subject of further > development in arguments that are more fully under our conscious control. > As > such, they can be made into logical inferences that may rise up to higher > levels of assurance, including those of experience as well as form. > > EDWINA: Can you really mix up validity of format and false/truth of the > content? [where you write that 'something in the premisses involves an > error > on our part and it is really false'. > --------------------------------- > > 2) JEFFREY: Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it > has > in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at > different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it > appears > that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in the > thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different > communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of > different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such > communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in > orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in > orientation. > Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have been > developed > in different human communities, and focusing on the core ideas that appear > to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas can be developed > into > hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and self-controlled manner > by those who are deeply infused by the desire to learn and who have a > relatively refined sense of how to conduct their inquires according to > experimental methods. > > EDWINA: I think that you are ADDING premises to this that are not in the > basic syllogism. > > You are declaring that 'it has been met with the support of large > communities of inquirers'..BUT - this does not have anything to do with the > logical format, and frankly cannot be used to substantiate the > truth/falseness of the argument. [Argument ad populum] > > You declare that 'the core inferential patterns in the argument are > prevalent in the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings'. Again, > an appeal-to-authority and majority - but, this does not prove > truth/falseness of the argument. It also doesn't deal with the faft that > 'reasonable human beings' can be atheists. > > --------------------------- > > > 3) JEFFConclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical > in > all three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and > according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should > remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the > argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. > While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of > uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which > serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy > of > our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of common > sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special sciences--has > shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it informs the > healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices and in the > ongoing logical growth of our thought. > > EDWINA: I agree - as you say, it's not a claim that the conclusion is true. > But, I'm not sure that you can say that because an argumental format is > logical, that the conclusion is plausible. > --------------------------------------- > > So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God > involve > some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the > inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The > Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is > the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the > alternate hypotheses? > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > List: > > Based on what Peirce wrote in R 842 ... > > CSP: Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a > certain > theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism > that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever > acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its > conclusion. > > ... I am now inclined to think that the syllogism that he had in mind was > something like this. > > Major premiss: Every retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive > reason > is logical. > Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a > retroductive > conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. > Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical. > > Again, this is a relatively modest claim, especially since Peirce clearly > recognized that retroduction is the least secure form of inference. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www. > LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > > . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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