Ben, Jeff, List, Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis.
Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post: JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, Edwina, list, > > I've just a few quibbles, nothing major. > > Jeff, you wrote: > > Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of > inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be > invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the > appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. > [End quote] > > Some of that is very close to what Peirce said in his articles in _Journal > of Speculative Philosophy_ in 1868, but with a decisive difference. > Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not > that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference. In "Some > Consequences of Four Incapacities," he said: > > It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we > are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other > supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the > formula of valid reasoning. > [CP 5.266, W 2:214, http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ > menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm ] > > Yes, invalidity of inference arises from mistaking what kind of inference > it is - where "it" refers to the mental action. But saying that every > inference is valid as a pattern of inference sounds confusingly like saying > that there is no invalid inference. > > An unsound deduction is unsound by virtue (or should I say 'vice') of a > falsehood in the premisses, an invalidity in the deductive form, or both. A > valid deduction is unsound if it has one or more false premisses, and is > necessarily unsound if there is an inconsistency (a.k.a. necessary > falsehood) in a premiss or among premisses. A 'forward-only' deduction can > be valid and unsound yet true in its conclusion, e.g., Socrates is a > cro-magnon, all cro-magnons are mortal, ergo Socrates is mortal. (A > particularly vacuous example, based on a necessarily false conjunction of > premisses, is: *p*&~*p*, ergo *p* or ~*p*.) It's difficult to think of a > deduction whose seeming invalidity boils down to the occurrence of > something contingently or necessarily false in its premisses, maybe that > difficulty is what Edwina was getting at in her reply (I haven't had time > to catch up with this thread). Anyway, whether one can explain seeming > invalidity as unsoundness in non-deductive inference modes depends I guess > on how one defines validity and soundness for them. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/21/2016 5:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > Hello Jon, List, > > The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully > in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the > details a bit more: > > Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a > pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that > appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, > but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. As a form of inference, every retroductive > conjecture that meets certain conditions (e.g., it responds to a question > occasioned by real doubt, it is really explanatory, it is possible to > deduce consequences that can be put to the test, it is possible to make > inductive inferences that will tend to show the hypotheses is confirmed or > disconfirmed by observations, the observations that will be used to test > the hypothesis are not the same observations that will be used to make the > inductive inference, etc.) is a valid abductive inference--and hence has a > logical character. Such arguments can, in time, be the subject of further > development in arguments that are more fully under our conscious control. > As such, they can be made into logical inferences that may rise up to > higher levels of assurance, including those of experience as well as form. > > Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it > has in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at > different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it > appears that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in > the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different > communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of > different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such > communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in > orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in > orientation. Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have > been developed in different human communities, and focusing on the core > ideas that appear to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas > can be developed into hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and > self-controlled manner by those who are deeply infused by the desire to > learn and who have a relatively refined sense of how to conduct their > inquires according to experimental methods. > > Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical in all > three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and > according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should > remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the > argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. > While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of > uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which > serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy > of our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of > common sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special > sciences--has shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it > informs the healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices > and in the ongoing logical growth of our thought. > > So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God > involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the > inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The > Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is > the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the > alternate hypotheses? > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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