Edwina, What part does the object play in that universe?
Thanks, Jerry On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 5:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut - well, I'm an atheist and am also bothered by the anthropocentric > images of an individual Agential Creator - which, in my view, can't be > empirically substantiated or logically validated - and ends up just being A > Belief. A tenacious or authoritative belief. > > I consider the universe to be a massive function/operation of Mind; and as > such, is itself completely and totally self-organized and self-generating - > outlined as such by Peirce in his examination of the development of both > instantiations and habits..and evolution[1.412]. I consider that Peircean > semiosis explains, using his triadic set and his Categories, how 'matter is > effete mind' and how this Matter/Mind is always evolving, adapting, > interacting [agapasm]...within the ongoing process of semiosis. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *To:* m...@mkbergman.com > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Friday, October 14, 2016 5:56 PM > *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > > Dear list members, > I am afraid this is not very Peirce-related, but I want to say something > about the creation concept, as I more and more am getting the opinion, that > it is anthropocentric and misleading. "Atum", the ancient Egyptian myth, as > you wrote, is the state of the beginning, and it is nothing and everything > at the same time. I think this is impossible. Either there was nothing or > everything. If there was nothing at the beginning, then evolution is based > on creation. If there was everything, then it is based on limitation by > habit-taking: Viable events and patterns are reinforced, nonviable ones are > forgotten. Obviously there is both, creativity, and habit-taking. So the > Egyptians concluded that at the beginning there should have been a > situation which is both, "all" and "nothing" at the same time. But all is > the opposite of nothing, isnt it. An Esoterician perhaps would answer that > I just cannot combine these two concepts, because my mind is too narrow, > and I have not pondered enough about the divine wisdom. But I do not like > this typical esoterian patronizing rethorical move, so I would rather > conclude, that there was no beginning. I think, logically this is the best > explanation. So I think, that there is creativity, ok, but no creation out > of nothing. That does not mean that I am an atheist, I just do not share > the anthropocentric definition of God as an engineer or craftsman occupied > with a job. If He is nonlocal, He most likely is nontemporal too (Einstein, > time-space-transformation), and nontemporality means that logically there > is no need to suggest a beginning and a creation. Btw: To say, that the big > bang was the beginning of time is a contradiction too: A beginning is in > time, not of time. Time can not begin, because a start requires an already > existing time, isnt that so. > Best, > Helmut > Freitag, 14. Oktober 2016 um 22:58 Uhr > "Michael Bergman" <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > > Thanks, Gary. > > This is exactly the mindset of the KBpedia Knowledge Ontology [1], which > has a triadic upper structure until typologies of natural classes come > into play. > > This KKO structure is likely to undergo substantial revision over time, > but the application of Peirce's ideas of the three categories and > categorization (including a speculative grammar for knowledge bases [2]) > has guided the initial development. > > Mike > > [1] http://www.mkbergman.com/1985/threes-all-of-the-way-down-to- > typologies/ > [2] http://www.mkbergman.com/1958/a-speculative-grammar-for- > knowledge-bases/ > > On 10/14/2016 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List, > > > > John Sheriff, in /Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for > > Human Significance/, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" > > state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later > > blackboard metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being > > there was in that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " > > 'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of > > determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This > > "potential being" is, then, decidedly /not /the "nothing of negation," > > but rather "the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is > > involved or foreshadowed" (CP 6.217). > > > > Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the > > parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this > > in a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this > > "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure > > zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer > > to the Kemetic /Nun /in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth; > > while it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics > > and may well have been acquainted with this myth). > > > > Jon wrote: > > > > [M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of > > thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the /possible /chalk > > marks and then draws /some /of them on the blackboard, rather than > > the blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow > > spontaneously appear; instead, the blackboard > > represents /created /Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant > > that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind. > > > > > > I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is > > "creat/ed/" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat/ive/" 3ns as distinguished > > from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, > > in a word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' > > 3nses. > > > > One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just > > mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power, > > alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the > > infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or > > Time." At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum, > > "which means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of > > the Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . . > > distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its > > original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's > > book, /Egyptian Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge/, p 8, a > > popularization of her grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great > > scholarly work in Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as > > it ought to be in my opinion). > > > > I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this > > 'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in > > three major ways" such that A/tum/, as /tum/ in Nun, "projects" himself > > as Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All the /neteru/ ('powers' > > according to S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods') > > will follow from that priordial 'act'. > > > > Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the > > ur-continuity represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon, > > in your view that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of > > all three Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would > > fly in the face of Peirce own words: "The word 'God' ... > > is /the /definable proper name, signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my > > belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452). > > How can one deny Peirce's own words here? > > > > Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for > > one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A > > Unified Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human > > Reason"), Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this > > quote:"[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the > > world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of > > how life came about."(6.322) > > > > Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim > > that /everything/ is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive > > use of the categories throughout Peirce's /oevre /which does not pertain > > to semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as > > you mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic > > sciences, viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this > > classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned > > explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much, > > much else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which > > is not semeiotic). > > > > But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the > > Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the > > topic, /Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the > > Sciences/, has a number of things to say about the categories in > > relation to the classification. For example, after mentioning that one > > of his earliest classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent > > comments: "Fearing that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set > > it aside and developed alternative schemes, only to find himself > > ineluctably led back. Even so, it was some time before he conceded that > > the resulting divisions conformed to his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis > > Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the same point. > > > > Kent later remarks that regarding his final /Outline Classification of > > the Sciences/ (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his > > subsequent works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory" > > as late as 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are > > 'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving the three > > categories (much as Jon outlined them in a recent post). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > Gary Richmond* > > * > > * > > * > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690* > > > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > ET: When you say that /some /of Peirce's positions are > > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is > > your opinion. > > > > > > Are you claiming here that /none/ of Peirce's positions are > > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that /all/ of > > his positions are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for > > debate? Is there /anything /that you would confidently assert to be > > Peirce's position, without qualifying it as merely your > > interpretation or opinion? > > > > ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on > > 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. > > > > > > My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as /Ens necessarium/ is > > Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote, > > in CP 6.452, "The word 'God' ... is /the /definable proper name, > > signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my belief Really creator of all > > three Universes of Experience." What is the basis for your > > disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what > > meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own? > > > > ET: I completely disagree with you on the above. > > > > > > My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads, > > and thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote, > > in CP 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality > > nor in that of fact," which means that it can only be "in the > > universe of /representations/." What is the basis for your > > disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what > > meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own? > > > > ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a > > 'quality' in itself. > > > > > > Are you saying that /all /qualities are /also /qualisigns--i.e., > > tthat here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe > > that this was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific > > passages in his writings? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon > > > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca > > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: > > > > __ > > 1) Jon - When you say that /some/ of Peirce's positions are > > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is > > your opinion. I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's > > view on 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. You have your > > opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect for you to declare > > that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'. > > > > 2) Now - when you write: > > "My example was a qualisign, which as a /quality/ (as well as an > > icon and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a > > /sign/--at least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only > > belong to the third Universe." > > > > I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a > > rhematic iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness > > and _is a sign_. And does NOT belong to the third Universe. > > There is no such thing as a single relation i.e.,the > > Representamen-Object, existing on its own. The triad of all > > three relations _is irreducible_. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of these > > exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a > > quality, a feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'. > > > > A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something > > operating outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a > > 'quality' in itself. > > The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That > > between the Representamen and the Object; that of the > > Representamen in itself; that between the Representamen and the > > Interpretant. The Representamen acts as mediation - and _can be > > in a mode of Firstness. _An Interpretant is not an Object but > > is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to the > > stimuli of the Object. > > > > And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT > > have their Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That > > includes the genuine sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and > > the Dicent Indexical Sinsign... > > And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in > > them at all. > > See 2.227 and on. > > > > Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily > > require Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes > > 2.227..] and ..there is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed > > anything, functioning outside of the semiosic triad. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think > > that you have the right to self-define yourself as > > someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'. > > > > > > Those are your words, not mine; I have /never /claimed to be > > "one with Peirce." What I /have /claimed is that /some /of > > Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and not reasonably > > disputable, whether I happen to agree with him or not. That > > he believed in the Reality of God as /Ens necessarium/, > > Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of > > those--and I /do /happen to agree with him about that. At > > the same time, this is not to say that his entire "view of > > Mind and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite > > certain that it was not. > > > > ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and > > - your and my comments - and make up their minds as to > > how 'accurately' we interpret him. > > > > > > On this, we are in complete agreement. > > > > ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see > > that eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical > > mode of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would > > be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic > > legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS. > > > > > > Again, this conflates the /mode /of a sign with the Universe > > of Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even > > sure that all mathematical reasoning should be assigned to > > the Universe of Ideas. My example was a qualisign, which as > > a /quality/ (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely in > > the mode of Firstness, but as a /sign/--at least, according > > to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe. > > > > ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a > > mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish > > connections between different objects' and therefore, I > > simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to > > 'Thirdness'. > > > > > > If something does not have "active power to establish > > connections between different objects," then it is not a > > /sign /at all--in this case, it is merely a /quality/, > > rather than a /qualisign/. The very definition of what it > > means to /be /a sign is that it is able to connect different > > objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant. > > > > ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers > > to THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'. > > > > > > Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if > > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of > > fact," which means that all three kinds of genuine triads > > can only be "in the universe of /representations/." Again, > > this is not about the /mode /of the sign, which can be in > > any of the three categories, but about the /Universe of > > Experience /where it belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed, > > representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it > > involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or > > inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting > > thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since > > thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought > > is living." Here we see that /all/ representation--i.e., > > all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily involves a > > genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe > > precisely /because /it mediates between an object and > > interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and > > "thought is living," which is another way of saying that > > thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought > > is in /signs/. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky > > <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: > > > > __ > > Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] > > am wrong inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all > > of us, readers of Peirce - and thus - interpreters. We > > each read him a different way and I don't think that you > > have the right to self-define yourself as someone who > > is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to > > read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up > > their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him. > > > > For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - > > whereas, I'm not sure what meaning you assign to the > > word. For me - all actions within the physico-chemical, > > biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and > > don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is > > effete mind'. > > > > I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that > > eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode > > of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would be, in > > the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic legisign > > argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS. > > > > So, i don't equate the three universes to match the > > three categories. The quotation you provide "I said that > > a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., > > a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of > > Experience, as something "/whose being consists in > > active power to establish connections between different > > objects"/ (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this /quote > > /_refers to Thirdness_. And therefore - I don't see that > > a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has > > any 'active power to establish connections between > > different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how > > you can declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'. > > > > With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to > > THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad > > as operational in*A* quality and in*A* fact. So- 1-1-1, > > a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of Firstness; it > > is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a > > /thoroughly genuine triad/' which involves generality or > > Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a > > total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is > > not the same as a /thoroughly genuine triad/ which > > involves generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in > > a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce, > > belong in 'the Third universe'; there is _no > > generality_. Firstness has no capacity to 'make > > connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature > > of Firstness - its isolate vividness. > > So- we disagree in our readings. > > > > As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I > > maintain that it remains your interpretation and that > > Peirce's view of Mind and creation - is quite different > > from yours. > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > I try to be careful about only attributing to > > Peirce, rather than myself, those things that strike > > me as incontrovertibly clear in his writings--things > > that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize > > to be HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I > > do not subscribe to the approach that all > > interpretations are equally valid; while there can > > certainly be legitimate differences, there are also > > objectively /incorrect/ readings, assuming (as Gary > > F. once put it) that Peirce said what he meant and > > meant what he said. Of course, I am (very) > > fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in > > some cases. I even conceded in my last post, "We > > might quibble about these particular assignments of > > the labels, which are just off the top of my head." > > The overall point remains--Peirce /did not/ limit > > the categories to semeiosis, as you apparently do. > > If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong > > about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it. > > > > There seems to be a particular terminological > > difficulty with the word "mode." I did not say > > "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness > > [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a > > /mode/ of representation," I said that a thoroughly > > genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a > > qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of > > Experience, as something "whose being consists in > > active power to establish connections between > > different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts, > > the categories do correspond to modes, such as > > possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In any > > case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what > > Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I > > indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if > > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in > > that of fact ... But a /thoroughly/ genuine triad is > > separated entirely from those worlds and exists in > > the universe of /representations/." So I am not the > > only one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the > > third Universe"--Peirce did, as well. If I am wrong > > about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it. > > > > Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to > > whether Peirce believed in the Reality of God as > > /Ens necessarium/ and Creator of all three Universes > > of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I > > am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong > > about it. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky > > <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: > > > > __ > > Jon, you wrote: > > > > "For Peirce, the categories do not /only > > /function within the O-R-I triad--for one thing, > > they are /everywhere /in his architectonic > > arrangement of the sciences!" > > > > PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the > > sole interpreter of Peirce. Therefore, please > > write something like: ' _In my [Jon Alan > > Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of > > Peirce do not only function within the O-R-I > > triad...etc etc._ > > > > Do you see the difference? I am always careful > > to make it clear that what I write is MY > > interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I > > had the direct or correct view of Peirce. > > > > Now - to your points - > > > > 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a > > pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness > > [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a > > mode of representation - and representation > > suggests Thirdness or the use of some symbolic > > mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim > > that "it belongs primarily to the Third > > Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean > > to Thirdness]?? > > > > Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if > > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in > > that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or > > regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - > > I cannot find this quote at 1.515. > > > > However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is > > an essential part of Thirdness...and Firstness > > is an essential element of both Secondness and > > Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that > > the three categories are a complex embedded > > function. > > > > 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning > > various sciences with the categories. I don't > > think that his differentiation of the various > > sciences etc has any real relationship to the > > categories. The categories, as I read Peirce, > > refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of > > all that is in any way or in any sense present > > to the mind quite regardless of whether it > > corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284 > > > > Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, > > mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as > > Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; " > > > > I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified > > the various fields of studies - but not within > > the categories. Mathematics, which refers to > > 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to > > actual facts? > > > > But he certainly classified fields of study into > > 'threes'. - and one can see that some of the > > descriptions of the modal categories can be > > loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed > > have an element of 'feeling, quality, freedom'; > > and induction does have an element of actual > > fact; and deduction does have an element of > > necessity. But I think this is a loose > > description for all three are, after all, > > aspects of reasoning [Thirdness]. > > > > 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a > > pre-existent creator. > > "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say > > that there would have come something, by the > > principle of Firstness, which we may call a > > flash. Then by the principle of habit there > > would have been a second flash. Thought time > > would not yet have been, this second flash was > > in some sense after the first, because resulting > > from it" 1.412. > > > > Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need > > a prior 'ens necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of > > your view of genesis and god, since you have > > provided your supportive quotations from the > > Bible - which sees god as an agential creator - > > but - I don't see that this Agential Force is > > accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the > > agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open > > force - and a part of matter - i.e., not > > separate from matter- and therefore not prior to > > time or matter. [see his discussion in the > > Reality of God - 6.489 .... > > > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > > *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard > > <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L > > <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > > > Edwina, List: > > > > ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' > > triads where the Relations between the > > Object-Representamen-Interpretant are > > all of one mode; all in the mode of > > Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. > > > > > > I do not believe that Jeff's post was > > referring to the O-R-I relations > > specifically, but rather to triadic > > relations in general, since that is what > > Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In > > other words, O-R-I is not the /only kind/ of > > triad, even though it is probably the > > /paradigmatic example /of a triad. > > > > In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly > > that all /genuine /triads belong to the > > world of representation, and not to the > > world of quality or the world of fact. > > These are undoubtedly what he later called > > the three Universes of Experience--quality > > corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute > > Actuality, and representation to Signs. > > However, this is not to say that all signs > > are in the /mode /of Thirdness; i.e., > > Necessitants. Even a qualisign, which must > > be iconic and rhematic in its relations to > > its object and interpretant, and thus is > > classified entirely in the mode of > > Firstness, belongs primarily to the third > > Universe--its "being consists in active > > power to establish connections between > > different objects." However, specifically > > as a /quali/sign--a quality that is a > > sign--it also, in some sense, belongs to the > > first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs > > to both the third Universe as a sign and the > > second Universe as an existent. I am still > > thinking through how all of this works, > > including how the R-O and R-I relations fit > > into the picture, so I would welcome input > > from others on it. > > > > ET: As such the categories only > > function within the triad - the O-R-I triad. > > > > > > Perhaps this is our fundamental > > disagreement, at least when it comes to this > > subject. For Peirce, the categories do not > > /only /function within the O-R-I triad--for > > one thing, they are /everywhere /in his > > architectonic arrangement of the sciences! > > For sciences of discovery, mathematics as > > Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and > > special sciences as Thirdness; for > > philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as > > Firstness, normative sciences as Secondness, > > and metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative > > sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as > > Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness. > > Within mathematics, the categories manifest > > as monads, dyads, and triads; within > > phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and > > representation; within metaphysics, as > > possibility, actuality, and necessity > > (habituality); within logic, as speculative > > grammar, critic, and methodeutic. We might > > quibble about these particular assignments > > of the labels, which are just off the top of > > my head, but the point is that restricting > > the categories to semeiosis is decidedly > > contrary to Peirce's own approach. > > > > ET: I don't see either that the 'pure > > or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic > > Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens > > necessarium' because I consider that our > > universe requires both Firstness and > > Secondness and I therefore reject such a > > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all > > three modes or universes'. > > > > > > No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine > > Thirdness" is identical to an Argument; this > > thread concerns metaphysics in general, and > > cosmology in particular, rather than > > semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now] > > requires both Firstness and Secondness," > > this does not /entail /that they were also > > required "before" our actual universe came > > into being. While you "reject such a > > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three > > modes or universes," Peirce quite explicitly > > believed in just such a Creator, and I > > honestly do not see how any /legitimate/ > > reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny this. > > > > CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" > > (as we Americans say), is /the > > /definable proper name, signifying /Ens > > necessarium/; in my belief Really > > creator of all three Universes of > > Experience. (CP 6.452) > > > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, > > Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > > - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina > > Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca > > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: > > > > __ > > Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the > > three 'pure' triads where the Relations > > between the > > Object-Representamen-Interpretant are > > all of one mode; all in the mode of > > Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. > > These are only three of the ten - and > > the function of the non-genuine or > > degenerate modes is, in my view, to > > provide the capacity for evolution, > > adaptation and change. That is, > > Firstness linked to Secondness and > > Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad > > of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - > > introduces novelty to actuality to > > habit. That's quite something. > > > > My point is that the modal categories > > have no 'per se' reality [Jon considers > > that both Firstness and Thirdness have > > such a reality] but are modes of > > organization and experience of > > matter/concepts within ongoing events, > > i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such > > the categories only function within the > > triad - the O-R-I triad. > > > > I don't see either that the 'pure or > > genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic > > Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens > > necessarium' because I consider that our > > universe requires both Firstness and > > Secondness and I therefore reject such a > > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all > > three modes or universes'. That is - > > I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of > > Peirce also within his belief in Genesis > > and God - but I can't see this same view > > within the writings of Peirce. > > > > Edwina > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To > > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > > l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line > > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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