The object is a morphological existential embodiment of matter/mind. Operative 
within the triad [O-R-I]; i.e., it is a Sign. So that object, be it an insect 
or a rock or a word - is in itself acting as an Interpretant of other 
information [which has made it that insect/rock/word]...and is also embodying 
the habits of organization [which make it and stabilize it as that 
insect/rock/word]...and it then is acting as a stimuli object to OTHER objects 
[insects, rocks, words]. So, the object, that Sign [the triad of O-R-I] is 
vital.

And, of course, it functions within the three categories which gives it even 
more adaptive capacities since that same object can be in any one, or two or 
three of those categories at different times.. - and has the capacity for both 
stability and novelty.

And - objects, as captured morphologically formed spatiotemporal 
'instantiations' in hic et nunc time, prevent entropic dissipation of 
matter/mind in our universe. And enable more complex instantiations to develop 
by developing Mind/habits within themselves and by developing more semiosic 
networked connections with other Objects.

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Helmut Raulien ; Mike Bergman ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 6:41 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Edwina,


  What part does the object play in that universe?

  Thanks,

  Jerry


  On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 5:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

    Helmut - well, I'm an atheist and am also bothered by the anthropocentric 
images of an individual Agential Creator - which, in my view, can't be 
empirically substantiated or logically validated - and ends up just being A 
Belief.  A tenacious or authoritative belief.

    I consider the universe to be a massive function/operation of Mind; and as 
such, is itself completely and totally self-organized and self-generating - 
outlined as such by Peirce in his examination of the development of both 
instantiations and habits..and evolution[1.412]. I consider that Peircean 
semiosis explains, using his triadic set and his Categories, how 'matter is 
effete mind' and how this Matter/Mind is always evolving, adapting, interacting 
[agapasm]...within the ongoing process of semiosis.

    Edwina
      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Helmut Raulien 
      To: m...@mkbergman.com 
      Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
      Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 5:56 PM
      Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


        
      Dear list members,
      I am afraid this is not very Peirce-related, but I want to say something 
about the creation concept, as I more and more am getting the opinion, that it 
is anthropocentric and misleading. "Atum", the ancient Egyptian myth, as you 
wrote, is the state of the beginning, and it is nothing and everything at the 
same time. I think this is impossible. Either there was nothing or everything. 
If there was nothing at the beginning, then evolution is based on creation. If 
there was everything, then it is based on limitation by habit-taking: Viable 
events and patterns are reinforced, nonviable ones are forgotten. Obviously 
there is both, creativity, and habit-taking. So the Egyptians concluded that at 
the beginning there should have been a situation which is both, "all" and 
"nothing" at the same time. But all is the opposite of nothing, isnt it. An 
Esoterician perhaps would answer that I just cannot combine these two concepts, 
because my mind is too narrow, and I have not pondered enough about the divine 
wisdom. But I do not like this typical esoterian patronizing rethorical move, 
so I would rather conclude, that there was no beginning. I think, logically 
this is the best explanation. So I think, that there is creativity, ok, but no 
creation out of nothing. That does not mean that I am an atheist, I just do not 
share the anthropocentric definition of God as an engineer or craftsman 
occupied with a job. If He is nonlocal, He most likely is nontemporal too 
(Einstein, time-space-transformation), and nontemporality means that logically 
there is no need to suggest a beginning and a creation. Btw: To say, that the 
big bang was the beginning of time is a contradiction too: A beginning is in 
time, not of time. Time can not begin, because a start requires an already 
existing time, isnt that so.
      Best,
      Helmut
       Freitag, 14. Oktober 2016 um 22:58 Uhr
       "Michael Bergman" <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
       
      Thanks, Gary.

      This is exactly the mindset of the KBpedia Knowledge Ontology [1], which
      has a triadic upper structure until typologies of natural classes come
      into play.

      This KKO structure is likely to undergo substantial revision over time,
      but the application of Peirce's ideas of the three categories and
      categorization (including a speculative grammar for knowledge bases [2])
      has guided the initial development.

      Mike

      [1] 
http://www.mkbergman.com/1985/threes-all-of-the-way-down-to-typologies/
      [2] 
http://www.mkbergman.com/1958/a-speculative-grammar-for-knowledge-bases/

      On 10/14/2016 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
      > Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,
      >
      > John Sheriff, in /Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for
      > Human Significance/, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero"
      > state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later
      > blackboard metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being
      > there was in that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, "
      > 'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of
      > determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This
      > "potential being" is, then, decidedly /not /the "nothing of negation,"
      > but rather "the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is
      > involved or foreshadowed" (CP 6.217).
      >
      > Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
      > parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this
      > in a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this
      > "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure
      > zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer
      > to the Kemetic /Nun /in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth;
      > while it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics
      > and may well have been acquainted with this myth).
      >
      > Jon wrote:
      >
      > [M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
      > thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the /possible /chalk
      > marks and then draws /some /of them on the blackboard, rather than
      > the blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow
      > spontaneously appear; instead, the blackboard
      > represents /created /Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant
      > that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind.
      >
      >
      > I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is
      > "creat/ed/" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat/ive/" 3ns as distinguished
      > from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So,
      > in a word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created'
      > 3nses.
      >
      > One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just
      > mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power,
      > alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the
      > infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or
      > Time." At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum,
      > "which means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of
      > the Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . .
      > distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its
      > original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's
      > book, /Egyptian Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge/, p 8, a
      > popularization of her grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great
      > scholarly work in Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as
      > it ought to be in my opinion).
      >
      > I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this
      > 'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in
      > three major ways" such that A/tum/, as /tum/ in Nun, "projects" himself
      > as Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All the /neteru/ ('powers'
      > according to S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods')
      > will follow from that priordial 'act'.
      >
      > Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the
      > ur-continuity represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon,
      > in your view that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of
      > all three Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would
      > fly in the face of Peirce own words: "The word 'God' ...
      > is /the /definable proper name, signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my
      > belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452).
      > How can one deny Peirce's own words here?
      >
      > Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for
      > one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A
      > Unified Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human
      > Reason"), Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this
      > quote:"[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the
      > world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of
      > how life came about."(6.322)
      >
      > Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim
      > that /everything/ is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive
      > use of the categories throughout Peirce's /oevre /which does not pertain
      > to semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as
      > you mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic
      > sciences, viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this
      > classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned
      > explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much,
      > much else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which
      > is not semeiotic).
      >
      > But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the
      > Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the
      > topic, /Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the
      > Sciences/, has a number of things to say about the categories in
      > relation to the classification. For example, after mentioning that one
      > of his earliest classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent
      > comments: "Fearing that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set
      > it aside and developed alternative schemes, only to find himself
      > ineluctably led back. Even so, it was some time before he conceded that
      > the resulting divisions conformed to his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis
      > Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the same point.
      >
      > Kent later remarks that regarding his final /Outline Classification of
      > the Sciences/ (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his
      > subsequent works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory"
      > as late as 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are
      > 'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving the three
      > categories (much as Jon outlined them in a recent post).
      >
      > Best,
      >
      > Gary R
      >
      > Gary Richmond*
      > *
      > *
      > *
      > *Gary Richmond*
      > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
      > *Communication Studies*
      > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
      > *C 745*
      > *718 482-5690*
      >
      > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
      > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
      >
      > Edwina, List:
      >
      > ET: When you say that /some /of Peirce's positions are
      > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is
      > your opinion.
      >
      >
      > Are you claiming here that /none/ of Peirce's positions are
      > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that /all/ of
      > his positions are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for
      > debate? Is there /anything /that you would confidently assert to be
      > Peirce's position, without qualifying it as merely your
      > interpretation or opinion?
      >
      > ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on
      > 'god- as 'creator of the three universes.
      >
      >
      > My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as /Ens necessarium/ is
      > Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote,
      > in CP 6.452, "The word 'God' ... is /the /definable proper name,
      > signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my belief Really creator of all
      > three Universes of Experience." What is the basis for your
      > disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
      > meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own?
      >
      > ET: I completely disagree with you on the above.
      >
      >
      > My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads,
      > and thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote,
      > in CP 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality
      > nor in that of fact," which means that it can only be "in the
      > universe of /representations/." What is the basis for your
      > disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
      > meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own?
      >
      > ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a
      > 'quality' in itself.
      >
      >
      > Are you saying that /all /qualities are /also /qualisigns--i.e.,
      > tthat here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe
      > that this was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific
      > passages in his writings?
      >
      > Thanks,
      >
      > Jon
      >
      > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca
      > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
      >
      > __
      > 1) Jon - When you say that /some/ of Peirce's positions are
      > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is
      > your opinion. I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's
      > view on 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. You have your
      > opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect for you to declare
      > that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'.
      >
      > 2) Now - when you write:
      > "My example was a qualisign, which as a /quality/ (as well as an
      > icon and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a
      > /sign/--at least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only
      > belong to the third Universe."
      >
      > I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a
      > rhematic iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness
      > and _is a sign_. And does NOT belong to the third Universe.
      > There is no such thing as a single relation i.e.,the
      > Representamen-Object, existing on its own. The triad of all
      > three relations _is irreducible_. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of these
      > exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a
      > quality, a feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'.
      >
      > A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something
      > operating outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a
      > 'quality' in itself.
      > The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That
      > between the Representamen and the Object; that of the
      > Representamen in itself; that between the Representamen and the
      > Interpretant. The Representamen acts as mediation - and _can be
      > in a mode of Firstness. _An Interpretant is not an Object but
      > is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to the
      > stimuli of the Object.
      >
      > And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT
      > have their Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That
      > includes the genuine sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and
      > the Dicent Indexical Sinsign...
      > And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in
      > them at all.
      > See 2.227 and on.
      >
      > Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily
      > require Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes
      > 2.227..] and ..there is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed
      > anything, functioning outside of the semiosic triad.
      >
      > Edwina
      >
      > ----- Original Message -----
      > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
      > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
      > *Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
      > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
      > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
      >
      > Edwina, List:
      >
      > ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think
      > that you have the right to self-define yourself as
      > someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
      >
      >
      > Those are your words, not mine; I have /never /claimed to be
      > "one with Peirce." What I /have /claimed is that /some /of
      > Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and not reasonably
      > disputable, whether I happen to agree with him or not. That
      > he believed in the Reality of God as /Ens necessarium/,
      > Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of
      > those--and I /do /happen to agree with him about that. At
      > the same time, this is not to say that his entire "view of
      > Mind and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite
      > certain that it was not.
      >
      > ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and
      > - your and my comments - and make up their minds as to
      > how 'accurately' we interpret him.
      >
      >
      > On this, we are in complete agreement.
      >
      > ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see
      > that eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical
      > mode of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would
      > be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
      > legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
      >
      >
      > Again, this conflates the /mode /of a sign with the Universe
      > of Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even
      > sure that all mathematical reasoning should be assigned to
      > the Universe of Ideas. My example was a qualisign, which as
      > a /quality/ (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely in
      > the mode of Firstness, but as a /sign/--at least, according
      > to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe.
      >
      > ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a
      > mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish
      > connections between different objects' and therefore, I
      > simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
      > 'Thirdness'.
      >
      >
      > If something does not have "active power to establish
      > connections between different objects," then it is not a
      > /sign /at all--in this case, it is merely a /quality/,
      > rather than a /qualisign/. The very definition of what it
      > means to /be /a sign is that it is able to connect different
      > objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant.
      >
      > ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers
      > to THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'.
      >
      >
      > Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if
      > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of
      > fact," which means that all three kinds of genuine triads
      > can only be "in the universe of /representations/." Again,
      > this is not about the /mode /of the sign, which can be in
      > any of the three categories, but about the /Universe of
      > Experience /where it belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed,
      > representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it
      > involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
      > inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting
      > thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
      > thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought
      > is living." Here we see that /all/ representation--i.e.,
      > all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily involves a
      > genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe
      > precisely /because /it mediates between an object and
      > interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and
      > "thought is living," which is another way of saying that
      > thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought
      > is in /signs/.
      >
      > Regards,
      >
      > Jon
      >
      > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky
      > <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
      >
      > __
      > Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon]
      > am wrong inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all
      > of us, readers of Peirce - and thus - interpreters. We
      > each read him a different way and I don't think that you
      > have the right to self-define yourself as someone who
      > is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to
      > read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up
      > their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
      >
      > For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic -
      > whereas, I'm not sure what meaning you assign to the
      > word. For me - all actions within the physico-chemical,
      > biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and
      > don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is
      > effete mind'.
      >
      > I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that
      > eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode
      > of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would be, in
      > the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic legisign
      > argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
      >
      > So, i don't equate the three universes to match the
      > three categories. The quotation you provide "I said that
      > a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e.,
      > a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
      > Experience, as something "/whose being consists in
      > active power to establish connections between different
      > objects"/ (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this /quote
      > /_refers to Thirdness_. And therefore - I don't see that
      > a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has
      > any 'active power to establish connections between
      > different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how
      > you can declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'.
      >
      > With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to
      > THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad
      > as operational in*A* quality and in*A* fact. So- 1-1-1,
      > a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of Firstness; it
      > is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a
      > /thoroughly genuine triad/' which involves generality or
      > Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a
      > total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is
      > not the same as a /thoroughly genuine triad/ which
      > involves generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in
      > a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce,
      > belong in 'the Third universe'; there is _no
      > generality_. Firstness has no capacity to 'make
      > connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature
      > of Firstness - its isolate vividness.
      > So- we disagree in our readings.
      >
      > As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I
      > maintain that it remains your interpretation and that
      > Peirce's view of Mind and creation - is quite different
      > from yours.
      >
      > Edwina
      >
      > ----- Original Message -----
      > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
      > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
      > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
      > *Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
      > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
      > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
      >
      > Edwina, List:
      >
      > I try to be careful about only attributing to
      > Peirce, rather than myself, those things that strike
      > me as incontrovertibly clear in his writings--things
      > that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize
      > to be HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I
      > do not subscribe to the approach that all
      > interpretations are equally valid; while there can
      > certainly be legitimate differences, there are also
      > objectively /incorrect/ readings, assuming (as Gary
      > F. once put it) that Peirce said what he meant and
      > meant what he said. Of course, I am (very)
      > fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in
      > some cases. I even conceded in my last post, "We
      > might quibble about these particular assignments of
      > the labels, which are just off the top of my head."
      > The overall point remains--Peirce /did not/ limit
      > the categories to semeiosis, as you apparently do.
      > If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong
      > about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.
      >
      > There seems to be a particular terminological
      > difficulty with the word "mode." I did not say
      > "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
      > [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a
      > /mode/ of representation," I said that a thoroughly
      > genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a
      > qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
      > Experience, as something "whose being consists in
      > active power to establish connections between
      > different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts,
      > the categories do correspond to modes, such as
      > possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In any
      > case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what
      > Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I
      > indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if
      > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in
      > that of fact ... But a /thoroughly/ genuine triad is
      > separated entirely from those worlds and exists in
      > the universe of /representations/." So I am not the
      > only one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the
      > third Universe"--Peirce did, as well. If I am wrong
      > about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
      >
      > Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to
      > whether Peirce believed in the Reality of God as
      > /Ens necessarium/ and Creator of all three Universes
      > of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I
      > am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong
      > about it.
      >
      > Regards,
      >
      > Jon
      >
      > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky
      > <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
      >
      > __
      > Jon, you wrote:
      >
      > "For Peirce, the categories do not /only
      > /function within the O-R-I triad--for one thing,
      > they are /everywhere /in his architectonic
      > arrangement of the sciences!"
      >
      > PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the
      > sole interpreter of Peirce. Therefore, please
      > write something like: ' _In my [Jon Alan
      > Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of
      > Peirce do not only function within the O-R-I
      > triad...etc etc._
      >
      > Do you see the difference? I am always careful
      > to make it clear that what I write is MY
      > interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I
      > had the direct or correct view of Peirce.
      >
      > Now - to your points -
      >
      > 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a
      > pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
      > [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a
      > mode of representation - and representation
      > suggests Thirdness or the use of some symbolic
      > mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim
      > that "it belongs primarily to the Third
      > Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean
      > to Thirdness]??
      >
      > Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if
      > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in
      > that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
      > regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET -
      > I cannot find this quote at 1.515.
      >
      > However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is
      > an essential part of Thirdness...and Firstness
      > is an essential element of both Secondness and
      > Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that
      > the three categories are a complex embedded
      > function.
      >
      > 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning
      > various sciences with the categories. I don't
      > think that his differentiation of the various
      > sciences etc has any real relationship to the
      > categories. The categories, as I read Peirce,
      > refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of
      > all that is in any way or in any sense present
      > to the mind quite regardless of whether it
      > corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284
      >
      > Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery,
      > mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as
      > Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "
      >
      > I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified
      > the various fields of studies - but not within
      > the categories. Mathematics, which refers to
      > 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to
      > actual facts?
      >
      > But he certainly classified fields of study into
      > 'threes'. - and one can see that some of the
      > descriptions of the modal categories can be
      > loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed
      > have an element of 'feeling, quality, freedom';
      > and induction does have an element of actual
      > fact; and deduction does have an element of
      > necessity. But I think this is a loose
      > description for all three are, after all,
      > aspects of reasoning [Thirdness].
      >
      > 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a
      > pre-existent creator.
      > "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say
      > that there would have come something, by the
      > principle of Firstness, which we may call a
      > flash. Then by the principle of habit there
      > would have been a second flash. Thought time
      > would not yet have been, this second flash was
      > in some sense after the first, because resulting
      > from it" 1.412.
      >
      > Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need
      > a prior 'ens necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of
      > your view of genesis and god, since you have
      > provided your supportive quotations from the
      > Bible - which sees god as an agential creator -
      > but - I don't see that this Agential Force is
      > accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the
      > agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open
      > force - and a part of matter - i.e., not
      > separate from matter- and therefore not prior to
      > time or matter. [see his discussion in the
      > Reality of God - 6.489 ....
      >
      > Edwina
      >
      > ----- Original Message -----
      > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
      > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
      > *To:* Edwina Taborsky
      > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
      > *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
      > <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L
      > <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
      > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
      > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
      >
      > Edwina, List:
      >
      > ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure'
      > triads where the Relations between the
      > Object-Representamen-Interpretant are
      > all of one mode; all in the mode of
      > Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
      >
      >
      > I do not believe that Jeff's post was
      > referring to the O-R-I relations
      > specifically, but rather to triadic
      > relations in general, since that is what
      > Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In
      > other words, O-R-I is not the /only kind/ of
      > triad, even though it is probably the
      > /paradigmatic example /of a triad.
      >
      > In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly
      > that all /genuine /triads belong to the
      > world of representation, and not to the
      > world of quality or the world of fact.
      > These are undoubtedly what he later called
      > the three Universes of Experience--quality
      > corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute
      > Actuality, and representation to Signs.
      > However, this is not to say that all signs
      > are in the /mode /of Thirdness; i.e.,
      > Necessitants. Even a qualisign, which must
      > be iconic and rhematic in its relations to
      > its object and interpretant, and thus is
      > classified entirely in the mode of
      > Firstness, belongs primarily to the third
      > Universe--its "being consists in active
      > power to establish connections between
      > different objects." However, specifically
      > as a /quali/sign--a quality that is a
      > sign--it also, in some sense, belongs to the
      > first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs
      > to both the third Universe as a sign and the
      > second Universe as an existent. I am still
      > thinking through how all of this works,
      > including how the R-O and R-I relations fit
      > into the picture, so I would welcome input
      > from others on it.
      >
      > ET: As such the categories only
      > function within the triad - the O-R-I triad.
      >
      >
      > Perhaps this is our fundamental
      > disagreement, at least when it comes to this
      > subject. For Peirce, the categories do not
      > /only /function within the O-R-I triad--for
      > one thing, they are /everywhere /in his
      > architectonic arrangement of the sciences!
      > For sciences of discovery, mathematics as
      > Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and
      > special sciences as Thirdness; for
      > philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as
      > Firstness, normative sciences as Secondness,
      > and metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative
      > sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as
      > Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness.
      > Within mathematics, the categories manifest
      > as monads, dyads, and triads; within
      > phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and
      > representation; within metaphysics, as
      > possibility, actuality, and necessity
      > (habituality); within logic, as speculative
      > grammar, critic, and methodeutic. We might
      > quibble about these particular assignments
      > of the labels, which are just off the top of
      > my head, but the point is that restricting
      > the categories to semeiosis is decidedly
      > contrary to Peirce's own approach.
      >
      > ET: I don't see either that the 'pure
      > or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic
      > Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens
      > necessarium' because I consider that our
      > universe requires both Firstness and
      > Secondness and I therefore reject such a
      > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all
      > three modes or universes'.
      >
      >
      > No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine
      > Thirdness" is identical to an Argument; this
      > thread concerns metaphysics in general, and
      > cosmology in particular, rather than
      > semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now]
      > requires both Firstness and Secondness,"
      > this does not /entail /that they were also
      > required "before" our actual universe came
      > into being. While you "reject such a
      > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three
      > modes or universes," Peirce quite explicitly
      > believed in just such a Creator, and I
      > honestly do not see how any /legitimate/
      > reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny this.
      >
      > CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized"
      > (as we Americans say), is /the
      > /definable proper name, signifying /Ens
      > necessarium/; in my belief Really
      > creator of all three Universes of
      > Experience. (CP 6.452)
      >
      >
      > Regards,
      >
      > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
      > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
      > Lutheran Layman
      > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
      > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
      > - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
      > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
      >
      > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina
      > Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca
      > <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
      >
      > __
      > Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the
      > three 'pure' triads where the Relations
      > between the
      > Object-Representamen-Interpretant are
      > all of one mode; all in the mode of
      > Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
      > These are only three of the ten - and
      > the function of the non-genuine or
      > degenerate modes is, in my view, to
      > provide the capacity for evolution,
      > adaptation and change. That is,
      > Firstness linked to Secondness and
      > Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad
      > of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign -
      > introduces novelty to actuality to
      > habit. That's quite something.
      >
      > My point is that the modal categories
      > have no 'per se' reality [Jon considers
      > that both Firstness and Thirdness have
      > such a reality] but are modes of
      > organization and experience of
      > matter/concepts within ongoing events,
      > i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such
      > the categories only function within the
      > triad - the O-R-I triad.
      >
      > I don't see either that the 'pure or
      > genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic
      > Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens
      > necessarium' because I consider that our
      > universe requires both Firstness and
      > Secondness and I therefore reject such a
      > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all
      > three modes or universes'. That is -
      > I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of
      > Peirce also within his belief in Genesis
      > and God - but I can't see this same view
      > within the writings of Peirce.
      >
      > Edwina
      >
      >
      >
      > -----------------------------
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