Woah...so, objects are pretty important. What would you say of the pragmatic maxim as object? What is its representamen and what its interpretant?
Best, J PS. If the pragmatic maxim is not an object, then what is that object to which the pragmatic maxim points? On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 6:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > The object is a morphological existential embodiment of matter/mind. > Operative within the triad [O-R-I]; i.e., it is a *S*ign. So that object, > be it an insect or a rock or a word - is in itself acting as an > Interpretant of other information [which has made it that > insect/rock/word]...and is also embodying the habits of organization [which > make it and stabilize it as that insect/rock/word]...and it then is acting > as a stimuli object to OTHER objects [insects, rocks, words]. So, the > object, that *S*ign [the triad of O-R-I] is vital. > > And, of course, it functions within the three categories which gives it > even more adaptive capacities since that same object can be in any one, or > two or three of those categories at different times.. - and has the > capacity for both stability and novelty. > > And - objects, as captured morphologically formed spatiotemporal > 'instantiations' in *hic et nunc* time, prevent entropic dissipation of > matter/mind in our universe. And enable more complex instantiations to > develop by developing Mind/habits within themselves and by developing more > semiosic networked connections with other Objects. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> ; Mike Bergman > <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, October 14, 2016 6:41 PM > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > Edwina, > > What part does the object play in that universe? > > Thanks, > Jerry > > On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 5:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut - well, I'm an atheist and am also bothered by the anthropocentric >> images of an individual Agential Creator - which, in my view, can't be >> empirically substantiated or logically validated - and ends up just being A >> Belief. A tenacious or authoritative belief. >> >> I consider the universe to be a massive function/operation of Mind; and >> as such, is itself completely and totally self-organized and >> self-generating - outlined as such by Peirce in his examination of the >> development of both instantiations and habits..and evolution[1.412]. I >> consider that Peircean semiosis explains, using his triadic set and his >> Categories, how 'matter is effete mind' and how this Matter/Mind is always >> evolving, adapting, interacting [agapasm]...within the ongoing process of >> semiosis. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Cc:* [email protected] >> *Sent:* Friday, October 14, 2016 5:56 PM >> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> >> >> Dear list members, >> I am afraid this is not very Peirce-related, but I want to say something >> about the creation concept, as I more and more am getting the opinion, that >> it is anthropocentric and misleading. "Atum", the ancient Egyptian myth, as >> you wrote, is the state of the beginning, and it is nothing and everything >> at the same time. I think this is impossible. Either there was nothing or >> everything. If there was nothing at the beginning, then evolution is based >> on creation. If there was everything, then it is based on limitation by >> habit-taking: Viable events and patterns are reinforced, nonviable ones are >> forgotten. Obviously there is both, creativity, and habit-taking. So the >> Egyptians concluded that at the beginning there should have been a >> situation which is both, "all" and "nothing" at the same time. But all is >> the opposite of nothing, isnt it. An Esoterician perhaps would answer that >> I just cannot combine these two concepts, because my mind is too narrow, >> and I have not pondered enough about the divine wisdom. But I do not like >> this typical esoterian patronizing rethorical move, so I would rather >> conclude, that there was no beginning. I think, logically this is the best >> explanation. So I think, that there is creativity, ok, but no creation out >> of nothing. That does not mean that I am an atheist, I just do not share >> the anthropocentric definition of God as an engineer or craftsman occupied >> with a job. If He is nonlocal, He most likely is nontemporal too (Einstein, >> time-space-transformation), and nontemporality means that logically there >> is no need to suggest a beginning and a creation. Btw: To say, that the big >> bang was the beginning of time is a contradiction too: A beginning is in >> time, not of time. Time can not begin, because a start requires an already >> existing time, isnt that so. >> Best, >> Helmut >> Freitag, 14. Oktober 2016 um 22:58 Uhr >> "Michael Bergman" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Thanks, Gary. >> >> This is exactly the mindset of the KBpedia Knowledge Ontology [1], which >> has a triadic upper structure until typologies of natural classes come >> into play. >> >> This KKO structure is likely to undergo substantial revision over time, >> but the application of Peirce's ideas of the three categories and >> categorization (including a speculative grammar for knowledge bases [2]) >> has guided the initial development. >> >> Mike >> >> [1] http://www.mkbergman.com/1985/threes-all-of-the-way-down-to- >> typologies/ >> [2] http://www.mkbergman.com/1958/a-speculative-grammar-for-know >> ledge-bases/ >> >> On 10/14/2016 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> > Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List, >> > >> > John Sheriff, in /Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for >> > Human Significance/, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" >> > state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later >> > blackboard metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being >> > there was in that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " >> > 'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of >> > determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This >> > "potential being" is, then, decidedly /not /the "nothing of negation," >> > but rather "the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is >> > involved or foreshadowed" (CP 6.217). >> > >> > Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the >> > parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this >> > in a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this >> > "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure >> > zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer >> > to the Kemetic /Nun /in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth; >> > while it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics >> > and may well have been acquainted with this myth). >> > >> > Jon wrote: >> > >> > [M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of >> > thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the /possible /chalk >> > marks and then draws /some /of them on the blackboard, rather than >> > the blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow >> > spontaneously appear; instead, the blackboard >> > represents /created /Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant >> > that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind. >> > >> > >> > I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is >> > "creat/ed/" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat/ive/" 3ns as distinguished >> > from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, >> > in a word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' >> > 3nses. >> > >> > One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just >> > mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power, >> > alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the >> > infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or >> > Time." At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum, >> > "which means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of >> > the Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . . >> > distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its >> > original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's >> > book, /Egyptian Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge/, p 8, a >> > popularization of her grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great >> > scholarly work in Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as >> > it ought to be in my opinion). >> > >> > I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this >> > 'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in >> > three major ways" such that A/tum/, as /tum/ in Nun, "projects" himself >> > as Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All the /neteru/ ('powers' >> > according to S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods') >> > will follow from that priordial 'act'. >> > >> > Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the >> > ur-continuity represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon, >> > in your view that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of >> > all three Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would >> > fly in the face of Peirce own words: "The word 'God' ... >> > is /the /definable proper name, signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my >> > belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452). >> > How can one deny Peirce's own words here? >> > >> > Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for >> > one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A >> > Unified Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human >> > Reason"), Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this >> > quote:"[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the >> > world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of >> > how life came about."(6.322) >> > >> > Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim >> > that /everything/ is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive >> > use of the categories throughout Peirce's /oevre /which does not pertain >> > to semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as >> > you mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic >> > sciences, viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this >> > classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned >> > explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much, >> > much else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which >> > is not semeiotic). >> > >> > But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the >> > Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the >> > topic, /Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the >> > Sciences/, has a number of things to say about the categories in >> > relation to the classification. For example, after mentioning that one >> > of his earliest classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent >> > comments: "Fearing that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set >> > it aside and developed alternative schemes, only to find himself >> > ineluctably led back. Even so, it was some time before he conceded that >> > the resulting divisions conformed to his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis >> > Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the same point. >> > >> > Kent later remarks that regarding his final /Outline Classification of >> > the Sciences/ (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his >> > subsequent works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory" >> > as late as 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are >> > 'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving the three >> > categories (much as Jon outlined them in a recent post). >> > >> > Best, >> > >> > Gary R >> > >> > Gary Richmond* >> > * >> > * >> > * >> > *Gary Richmond* >> > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> > *Communication Studies* >> > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> > *C 745* >> > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > Edwina, List: >> > >> > ET: When you say that /some /of Peirce's positions are >> > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is >> > your opinion. >> > >> > >> > Are you claiming here that /none/ of Peirce's positions are >> > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that /all/ of >> > his positions are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for >> > debate? Is there /anything /that you would confidently assert to be >> > Peirce's position, without qualifying it as merely your >> > interpretation or opinion? >> > >> > ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on >> > 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. >> > >> > >> > My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as /Ens necessarium/ is >> > Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote, >> > in CP 6.452, "The word 'God' ... is /the /definable proper name, >> > signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my belief Really creator of all >> > three Universes of Experience." What is the basis for your >> > disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what >> > meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own? >> > >> > ET: I completely disagree with you on the above. >> > >> > >> > My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads, >> > and thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote, >> > in CP 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality >> > nor in that of fact," which means that it can only be "in the >> > universe of /representations/." What is the basis for your >> > disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what >> > meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own? >> > >> > ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a >> > 'quality' in itself. >> > >> > >> > Are you saying that /all /qualities are /also /qualisigns--i.e., >> > tthat here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe >> > that this was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific >> > passages in his writings? >> > >> > Thanks, >> > >> > Jon >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > __ >> > 1) Jon - When you say that /some/ of Peirce's positions are >> > perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is >> > your opinion. I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's >> > view on 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. You have your >> > opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect for you to declare >> > that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'. >> > >> > 2) Now - when you write: >> > "My example was a qualisign, which as a /quality/ (as well as an >> > icon and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a >> > /sign/--at least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only >> > belong to the third Universe." >> > >> > I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a >> > rhematic iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness >> > and _is a sign_. And does NOT belong to the third Universe. >> > There is no such thing as a single relation i.e.,the >> > Representamen-Object, existing on its own. The triad of all >> > three relations _is irreducible_. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of these >> > exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a >> > quality, a feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'. >> > >> > A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something >> > operating outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a >> > 'quality' in itself. >> > The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That >> > between the Representamen and the Object; that of the >> > Representamen in itself; that between the Representamen and the >> > Interpretant. The Representamen acts as mediation - and _can be >> > in a mode of Firstness. _An Interpretant is not an Object but >> > is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to the >> > stimuli of the Object. >> > >> > And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT >> > have their Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That >> > includes the genuine sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and >> > the Dicent Indexical Sinsign... >> > And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in >> > them at all. >> > See 2.227 and on. >> > >> > Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily >> > require Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes >> > 2.227..] and ..there is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed >> > anything, functioning outside of the semiosic triad. >> > >> > Edwina >> > >> > ----- Original Message ----- >> > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM >> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> > >> > Edwina, List: >> > >> > ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think >> > that you have the right to self-define yourself as >> > someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'. >> > >> > >> > Those are your words, not mine; I have /never /claimed to be >> > "one with Peirce." What I /have /claimed is that /some /of >> > Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and not reasonably >> > disputable, whether I happen to agree with him or not. That >> > he believed in the Reality of God as /Ens necessarium/, >> > Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of >> > those--and I /do /happen to agree with him about that. At >> > the same time, this is not to say that his entire "view of >> > Mind and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite >> > certain that it was not. >> > >> > ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and >> > - your and my comments - and make up their minds as to >> > how 'accurately' we interpret him. >> > >> > >> > On this, we are in complete agreement. >> > >> > ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see >> > that eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical >> > mode of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would >> > be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic >> > legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS. >> > >> > >> > Again, this conflates the /mode /of a sign with the Universe >> > of Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even >> > sure that all mathematical reasoning should be assigned to >> > the Universe of Ideas. My example was a qualisign, which as >> > a /quality/ (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely in >> > the mode of Firstness, but as a /sign/--at least, according >> > to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe. >> > >> > ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a >> > mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish >> > connections between different objects' and therefore, I >> > simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to >> > 'Thirdness'. >> > >> > >> > If something does not have "active power to establish >> > connections between different objects," then it is not a >> > /sign /at all--in this case, it is merely a /quality/, >> > rather than a /qualisign/. The very definition of what it >> > means to /be /a sign is that it is able to connect different >> > objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant. >> > >> > ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers >> > to THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'. >> > >> > >> > Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if >> > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of >> > fact," which means that all three kinds of genuine triads >> > can only be "in the universe of /representations/." Again, >> > this is not about the /mode /of the sign, which can be in >> > any of the three categories, but about the /Universe of >> > Experience /where it belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed, >> > representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it >> > involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or >> > inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting >> > thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since >> > thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought >> > is living." Here we see that /all/ representation--i.e., >> > all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily involves a >> > genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe >> > precisely /because /it mediates between an object and >> > interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and >> > "thought is living," which is another way of saying that >> > thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought >> > is in /signs/. >> > >> > Regards, >> > >> > Jon >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky >> > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > __ >> > Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] >> > am wrong inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all >> > of us, readers of Peirce - and thus - interpreters. We >> > each read him a different way and I don't think that you >> > have the right to self-define yourself as someone who >> > is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to >> > read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up >> > their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him. >> > >> > For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - >> > whereas, I'm not sure what meaning you assign to the >> > word. For me - all actions within the physico-chemical, >> > biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and >> > don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is >> > effete mind'. >> > >> > I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that >> > eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode >> > of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would be, in >> > the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic legisign >> > argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS. >> > >> > So, i don't equate the three universes to match the >> > three categories. The quotation you provide "I said that >> > a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., >> > a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of >> > Experience, as something "/whose being consists in >> > active power to establish connections between different >> > objects"/ (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this /quote >> > /_refers to Thirdness_. And therefore - I don't see that >> > a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has >> > any 'active power to establish connections between >> > different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how >> > you can declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'. >> > >> > With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to >> > THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad >> > as operational in*A* quality and in*A* fact. So- 1-1-1, >> > a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of Firstness; it >> > is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a >> > /thoroughly genuine triad/' which involves generality or >> > Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a >> > total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is >> > not the same as a /thoroughly genuine triad/ which >> > involves generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in >> > a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce, >> > belong in 'the Third universe'; there is _no >> > generality_. Firstness has no capacity to 'make >> > connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature >> > of Firstness - its isolate vividness. >> > So- we disagree in our readings. >> > >> > As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I >> > maintain that it remains your interpretation and that >> > Peirce's view of Mind and creation - is quite different >> > from yours. >> > >> > Edwina >> > >> > ----- Original Message ----- >> > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM >> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> > >> > Edwina, List: >> > >> > I try to be careful about only attributing to >> > Peirce, rather than myself, those things that strike >> > me as incontrovertibly clear in his writings--things >> > that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize >> > to be HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I >> > do not subscribe to the approach that all >> > interpretations are equally valid; while there can >> > certainly be legitimate differences, there are also >> > objectively /incorrect/ readings, assuming (as Gary >> > F. once put it) that Peirce said what he meant and >> > meant what he said. Of course, I am (very) >> > fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in >> > some cases. I even conceded in my last post, "We >> > might quibble about these particular assignments of >> > the labels, which are just off the top of my head." >> > The overall point remains--Peirce /did not/ limit >> > the categories to semeiosis, as you apparently do. >> > If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong >> > about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it. >> > >> > There seems to be a particular terminological >> > difficulty with the word "mode." I did not say >> > "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness >> > [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a >> > /mode/ of representation," I said that a thoroughly >> > genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a >> > qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of >> > Experience, as something "whose being consists in >> > active power to establish connections between >> > different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts, >> > the categories do correspond to modes, such as >> > possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In any >> > case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what >> > Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I >> > indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if >> > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in >> > that of fact ... But a /thoroughly/ genuine triad is >> > separated entirely from those worlds and exists in >> > the universe of /representations/." So I am not the >> > only one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the >> > third Universe"--Peirce did, as well. If I am wrong >> > about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it. >> > >> > Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to >> > whether Peirce believed in the Reality of God as >> > /Ens necessarium/ and Creator of all three Universes >> > of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I >> > am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong >> > about it. >> > >> > Regards, >> > >> > Jon >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky >> > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > __ >> > Jon, you wrote: >> > >> > "For Peirce, the categories do not /only >> > /function within the O-R-I triad--for one thing, >> > they are /everywhere /in his architectonic >> > arrangement of the sciences!" >> > >> > PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the >> > sole interpreter of Peirce. Therefore, please >> > write something like: ' _In my [Jon Alan >> > Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of >> > Peirce do not only function within the O-R-I >> > triad...etc etc._ >> > >> > Do you see the difference? I am always careful >> > to make it clear that what I write is MY >> > interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I >> > had the direct or correct view of Peirce. >> > >> > Now - to your points - >> > >> > 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a >> > pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness >> > [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a >> > mode of representation - and representation >> > suggests Thirdness or the use of some symbolic >> > mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim >> > that "it belongs primarily to the Third >> > Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean >> > to Thirdness]?? >> > >> > Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if >> > genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in >> > that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or >> > regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - >> > I cannot find this quote at 1.515. >> > >> > However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is >> > an essential part of Thirdness...and Firstness >> > is an essential element of both Secondness and >> > Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that >> > the three categories are a complex embedded >> > function. >> > >> > 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning >> > various sciences with the categories. I don't >> > think that his differentiation of the various >> > sciences etc has any real relationship to the >> > categories. The categories, as I read Peirce, >> > refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of >> > all that is in any way or in any sense present >> > to the mind quite regardless of whether it >> > corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284 >> > >> > Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, >> > mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as >> > Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; " >> > >> > I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified >> > the various fields of studies - but not within >> > the categories. Mathematics, which refers to >> > 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to >> > actual facts? >> > >> > But he certainly classified fields of study into >> > 'threes'. - and one can see that some of the >> > descriptions of the modal categories can be >> > loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed >> > have an element of 'feeling, quality, freedom'; >> > and induction does have an element of actual >> > fact; and deduction does have an element of >> > necessity. But I think this is a loose >> > description for all three are, after all, >> > aspects of reasoning [Thirdness]. >> > >> > 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a >> > pre-existent creator. >> > "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say >> > that there would have come something, by the >> > principle of Firstness, which we may call a >> > flash. Then by the principle of habit there >> > would have been a second flash. Thought time >> > would not yet have been, this second flash was >> > in some sense after the first, because resulting >> > from it" 1.412. >> > >> > Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need >> > a prior 'ens necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of >> > your view of genesis and god, since you have >> > provided your supportive quotations from the >> > Bible - which sees god as an agential creator - >> > but - I don't see that this Agential Force is >> > accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the >> > agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open >> > force - and a part of matter - i.e., not >> > separate from matter- and therefore not prior to >> > time or matter. [see his discussion in the >> > Reality of God - 6.489 .... >> > >> > Edwina >> > >> > ----- Original Message ----- >> > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard >> > <mailto:[email protected]> ; Peirce-L >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> > *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM >> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> > >> > Edwina, List: >> > >> > ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' >> > triads where the Relations between the >> > Object-Representamen-Interpretant are >> > all of one mode; all in the mode of >> > Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. >> > >> > >> > I do not believe that Jeff's post was >> > referring to the O-R-I relations >> > specifically, but rather to triadic >> > relations in general, since that is what >> > Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In >> > other words, O-R-I is not the /only kind/ of >> > triad, even though it is probably the >> > /paradigmatic example /of a triad. >> > >> > In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly >> > that all /genuine /triads belong to the >> > world of representation, and not to the >> > world of quality or the world of fact. >> > These are undoubtedly what he later called >> > the three Universes of Experience--quality >> > corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute >> > Actuality, and representation to Signs. >> > However, this is not to say that all signs >> > are in the /mode /of Thirdness; i.e., >> > Necessitants. Even a qualisign, which must >> > be iconic and rhematic in its relations to >> > its object and interpretant, and thus is >> > classified entirely in the mode of >> > Firstness, belongs primarily to the third >> > Universe--its "being consists in active >> > power to establish connections between >> > different objects." However, specifically >> > as a /quali/sign--a quality that is a >> > sign--it also, in some sense, belongs to the >> > first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs >> > to both the third Universe as a sign and the >> > second Universe as an existent. I am still >> > thinking through how all of this works, >> > including how the R-O and R-I relations fit >> > into the picture, so I would welcome input >> > from others on it. >> > >> > ET: As such the categories only >> > function within the triad - the O-R-I triad. >> > >> > >> > Perhaps this is our fundamental >> > disagreement, at least when it comes to this >> > subject. For Peirce, the categories do not >> > /only /function within the O-R-I triad--for >> > one thing, they are /everywhere /in his >> > architectonic arrangement of the sciences! >> > For sciences of discovery, mathematics as >> > Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and >> > special sciences as Thirdness; for >> > philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as >> > Firstness, normative sciences as Secondness, >> > and metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative >> > sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as >> > Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness. >> > Within mathematics, the categories manifest >> > as monads, dyads, and triads; within >> > phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and >> > representation; within metaphysics, as >> > possibility, actuality, and necessity >> > (habituality); within logic, as speculative >> > grammar, critic, and methodeutic. We might >> > quibble about these particular assignments >> > of the labels, which are just off the top of >> > my head, but the point is that restricting >> > the categories to semeiosis is decidedly >> > contrary to Peirce's own approach. >> > >> > ET: I don't see either that the 'pure >> > or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic >> > Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens >> > necessarium' because I consider that our >> > universe requires both Firstness and >> > Secondness and I therefore reject such a >> > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all >> > three modes or universes'. >> > >> > >> > No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine >> > Thirdness" is identical to an Argument; this >> > thread concerns metaphysics in general, and >> > cosmology in particular, rather than >> > semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now] >> > requires both Firstness and Secondness," >> > this does not /entail /that they were also >> > required "before" our actual universe came >> > into being. While you "reject such a >> > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three >> > modes or universes," Peirce quite explicitly >> > believed in just such a Creator, and I >> > honestly do not see how any /legitimate/ >> > reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny this. >> > >> > CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" >> > (as we Americans say), is /the >> > /definable proper name, signifying /Ens >> > necessarium/; in my belief Really >> > creator of all three Universes of >> > Experience. (CP 6.452) >> > >> > >> > Regards, >> > >> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, >> > Lutheran Layman >> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> >> > - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina >> > Taborsky <[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> > >> > __ >> > Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the >> > three 'pure' triads where the Relations >> > between the >> > Object-Representamen-Interpretant are >> > all of one mode; all in the mode of >> > Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. >> > These are only three of the ten - and >> > the function of the non-genuine or >> > degenerate modes is, in my view, to >> > provide the capacity for evolution, >> > adaptation and change. That is, >> > Firstness linked to Secondness and >> > Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad >> > of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - >> > introduces novelty to actuality to >> > habit. That's quite something. >> > >> > My point is that the modal categories >> > have no 'per se' reality [Jon considers >> > that both Firstness and Thirdness have >> > such a reality] but are modes of >> > organization and experience of >> > matter/concepts within ongoing events, >> > i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such >> > the categories only function within the >> > triad - the O-R-I triad. >> > >> > I don't see either that the 'pure or >> > genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic >> > Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens >> > necessarium' because I consider that our >> > universe requires both Firstness and >> > Secondness and I therefore reject such a >> > pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all >> > three modes or universes'. That is - >> > I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of >> > Peirce also within his belief in Genesis >> > and God - but I can't see this same view >> > within the writings of Peirce. >> > >> > Edwina >> > >> > >> > >> > ----------------------------- >> > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >> > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To >> > UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to >> > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the line >> > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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