Dear list:
Someone previously asked how to know when he is being a nominalist. I forget who. To determine this, we could simply look to its effectiveness for “settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.” “*Questioner*: What, then, is the *raison d’etre *of the doctrine? What advantage is expected from it? *Pragmatist*: It will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish- one word being defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached- or else is downright absurd; so that all such rubbish being swept away, what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences- the truth about which can be reached without the interminable misunderstandings and disputes which have made the highest of the positive sciences a mere amusement for idle intellects, a sort of chess- idle pleasure its purpose, and reading out of a book its method.” ~*What Pragmatism Is* On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon Schmidt: Yes, that's the interpretation I made of your comments [i.e., > Saussurian nominalism]. And no, I won't get into any 'alternative > interpretation' or debate with you as you, in my view, are firmly > operative within that mould [Saussurian nominalism] and tend to remould > Peirce into a strict one-meaning only structure. So - there's no point in > debating with you - as the 'debate' reduces into you asserting your view > and claiming that other views are 'non-Peircean'. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 3:36 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > Edwina, List: > > Are you suggesting, then, that my "analysis" of the quotes that I cited > from "New Elements" is "literal-bound" in that sense? If so, then what > alternative interpretation do you think would result from properly applying > Peircean semeiotic realism instead? > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 2:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the >> example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for >> 'that meaning'. >> >> As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before >> and won't repeat that explanation. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Monday, January 23, 2017 2:46 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> Would you mind clarifying, as well? What exactly do you mean by "a >> 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"? What exactly is "that evolving and >> complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper >> interpretation? As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any such >> thing in his response, so maybe I am just missing something. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving >>> into a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into >>> Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that >>> meaning'. Such a dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e., >>> where interpretation absents itself from that evolving and >>> complex mediating 'law' [as Jerry points out] is the antithesis of >>> Peircean semiosis. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >> ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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