Edwina, Clark, List: ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated *in such a manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten, respectively--is that a legisign, *as *a legisign, *cannot *refer to an Existent (2ns); it can *only *refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When it is instantiated, it is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign (3ns); this is, of course, the familiar type/token distinction. An indexical legisign thus can only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its object, but the *relation *between the sign and its object is nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns." CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law, however established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object. Each Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind. The Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents it as an Iconic Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small measure. (CP 2.259, EP 2:294; 1903) The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example. The object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily *general*, because it can refer to *anything*. It can only refer to something *in particular*--something *actual*--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a specific context. At that point, it is obviously not a *concept*--and my contention remains that all objects of concepts are general to some degree. Is there an example of a concept whose object is absolutely singular--determinate in every respect? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to > the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. > > Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs > that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'. > > But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of > Thirdness. > > For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative > pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode > of Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the > representamen-Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The > Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of Thirdness. > > As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however > established, which requires each instance of it to be *really affected* > by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" > [2.259 my emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself > operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated* > in such a manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. > So, the Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of > Secondness]. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> > *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I > think you’re talking about. > > > Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent > an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant. > > Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned > about building up signs out of subsigns. > > My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. > That is there’s an element of equivocation in play. > > If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the > general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s > semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist > debate doesn’t matter as much as some think) > > I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. > Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is. > >
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