Jon - I think this debate won't go far, as it's not really a debate but two
opposing views.
I have never endorsed YOUR model of semiosis, which to me, is reductionist and
mechanical and sees everything as individual units [which is why I see you as
nominalist] and ignores the necessarily interrelated, correlated, dynamic,
evolutionary, adaptable format of the Peircean semiosis.
I disagree with you that the Representamen can be, all alone, 'the Sign'. The
Representamen doesn't exist per se, and Peirce has himself written that [i
don't have the time to dig up the reference].
Equally, the Object - Dynamic or not - does NOT exist, all alone, but is
existent as that Dynamic Object ONLY within semiosic interactions when it
becomes that Dynamic Object in the interaction!
Same with the Interpretant; it doesn't exist all on its individual own but only
within the semiosic interaction.
Your semiosis is a mechanical one, where each entity exists 'per se', on its
isolate own, and enters into interactions with other separate entities. This,
to me, is not Peircean.
So- two views. There's really nothing to debate.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
Edwina, List:
I agree that we should not rehash our past debates; I am simply offering my
own alternative views.
I have never endorsed your model of semiosis, with its emphasis on data
input/output, because my personal opinion is that it is not authentically
Peircean. In particular, I have consistently maintained that the Sign is the
Representamen, which has relations with its Object and Interpretant; the latter
are not parts of the Sign itself. As such, a Sign is triadic, but not a triad.
It is not merely according to me that the Dynamic Object of a Legisign must
also be in a mode of 3ns; that is what Peirce himself wrote to Lady Welby in
1908 (EP 2:481). As I have suggested before, you seem to embrace the 1903
taxonomy with its three trichotomies and ten Sign classes, and reject the later
versions that had six or ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 Sign classes. What
would be an example of a Legisign--not an instantiated replica thereof, which
is a Sinsign--with a Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns?
Note that I am talking about the mode of the Dynamic Object itself, not its
relation with the Sign; the latter is the Icon/Index/Symbol distinction. Hence
an Argument is not the only Sign class whose relation with its Object is in a
mode of 3ns; all Symbols fall under that description, including Rhematic
Symbols (terms) and Dicent Symbols (propositions). However, an Argument is the
only Sign class whose relation with its Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns.
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 7:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon - I have told myself that I wouldn't enter into debates with you but
will make one try. You are missing the point of semiosis which is that there is
no such thing as a singular 'point' or node that exists all by itself; Peircean
semiosis and therefore reality is triadic. There are three nodes/three
relations acting 'as one'. You didn't read my post:
...."my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to the
Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs
that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of
Thirdness."
Again, the TERM 'legisign' refers only to the Representamen
relation-in-itself. Not to the whole triad.
And think about it. What pragmatic function would there be for the
MEDIATION action of the Representamen...which is, as a Legisign, operating in
Thirdness, and therefore providing normative rules by which to interpret the
incoming data from that Dynamic Object.....what pragmatic function would there
be if that same Representamen was confined as you think, NOT to mediate and
'mould' that incoming data by applying its normative rules...but..could
only..what...pass along the set of rules from that Dynamic Object..which
according to you, MUST also be in a mode of Thirdness?
What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad? Useless,
just a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation.
The whole strength of the semiosic triad is that mediative process where
Rules are applied to incoming data from the Dynamic Object...and that incoming
data can be in a mode of Firstness....and the Representamen as a Legisign will
constrain, mould, 'normalize' that haphazard free data into a coherent
Interpretant, i.e, an Iconic legisign or a rhematic indexical legisign....
Furthermore, the only triad where the Object Relation is in a mode of
Thirdness is in the pure Argument - which is a strictly mental process.
Again, the semiosic Sign is a triad. The 'parts' of it don't exist on their
own; the whole thing is a dynamic relation.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky ; cl...@lextek.com
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:38 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
Edwina, Clark, List:
ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as
a general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a manner that
it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the Legisign in this
triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten
trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten,
respectively--is that a legisign, as a legisign, cannot refer to an Existent
(2ns); it can only refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When it is instantiated, it
is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign (3ns); this is, of
course, the familiar type/token distinction. An indexical legisign thus can
only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its object, but the relation between the
sign and its object is nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns."
CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law,
however established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected
by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object. Each
Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind. The
Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents it as an Iconic
Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small measure. (CP 2.259,
EP 2:294; 1903)
The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example. The
object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily general, because it
can refer to anything. It can only refer to something in particular--something
actual--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a specific context. At that point, it
is obviously not a concept--and my contention remains that all objects of
concepts are general to some degree. Is there an example of a concept whose
object is absolutely singular--determinate in every respect?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only
to the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of
Signs that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of
Thirdness.
For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative
pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode of
Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the representamen-Interpretant is
in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of
Thirdness.
As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however
established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected by its
Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" [2.259 my
emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a
general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a manner that it
is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. So, the Legisign in this triad
refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and
that’s what I think you’re talking about.
Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot
represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.
Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned
about building up signs out of subsigns.
My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to
semantics. That is there’s an element of equivocation in play.
If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the
general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s
semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist
debate doesn’t matter as much as some think)
I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later.
Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.
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