Jon - I have told myself that I wouldn't enter into debates with you but will
make one try. You are missing the point of semiosis which is that there is no
such thing as a singular 'point' or node that exists all by itself; Peircean
semiosis and therefore reality is triadic. There are three nodes/three
relations acting 'as one'. You didn't read my post:
...."my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to the
Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs that
have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of
Thirdness."
Again, the TERM 'legisign' refers only to the Representamen relation-in-itself.
Not to the whole triad.
And think about it. What pragmatic function would there be for the MEDIATION
action of the Representamen...which is, as a Legisign, operating in Thirdness,
and therefore providing normative rules by which to interpret the incoming data
from that Dynamic Object.....what pragmatic function would there be if that
same Representamen was confined as you think, NOT to mediate and 'mould' that
incoming data by applying its normative rules...but..could only..what...pass
along the set of rules from that Dynamic Object..which according to you, MUST
also be in a mode of Thirdness?
What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad? Useless, just
a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation.
The whole strength of the semiosic triad is that mediative process where Rules
are applied to incoming data from the Dynamic Object...and that incoming data
can be in a mode of Firstness....and the Representamen as a Legisign will
constrain, mould, 'normalize' that haphazard free data into a coherent
Interpretant, i.e, an Iconic legisign or a rhematic indexical legisign....
Furthermore, the only triad where the Object Relation is in a mode of Thirdness
is in the pure Argument - which is a strictly mental process.
Again, the semiosic Sign is a triad. The 'parts' of it don't exist on their
own; the whole thing is a dynamic relation.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky ; cl...@lextek.com
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:38 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
Edwina, Clark, List:
ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a
general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a manner that it
is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the Legisign in this triad
refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten
trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten,
respectively--is that a legisign, as a legisign, cannot refer to an Existent
(2ns); it can only refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When it is instantiated, it
is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign (3ns); this is, of
course, the familiar type/token distinction. An indexical legisign thus can
only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its object, but the relation between the
sign and its object is nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns."
CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law,
however established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected
by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object. Each
Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind. The
Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents it as an Iconic
Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small measure. (CP 2.259,
EP 2:294; 1903)
The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example. The object
of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily general, because it can
refer to anything. It can only refer to something in particular--something
actual--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a specific context. At that point, it
is obviously not a concept--and my contention remains that all objects of
concepts are general to some degree. Is there an example of a concept whose
object is absolutely singular--determinate in every respect?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to
the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs
that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of
Thirdness.
For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative
pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode of
Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the representamen-Interpretant is
in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of
Thirdness.
As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however
established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected by its
Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" [2.259 my
emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a
general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a manner that it
is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. So, the Legisign in this triad
refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
Particular//Singular/Individual
On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s
what I think you’re talking about.
Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot
represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.
Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned
about building up signs out of subsigns.
My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics.
That is there’s an element of equivocation in play.
If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the
general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s
semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist
debate doesn’t matter as much as some think)
I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later.
Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.
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