Edwina, List: We each call it as we see it, but you routinely toss off pejorative labels---i.e., engage in name-calling--while I try to make a good-faith effort to identify and address the substance of our differences.
You think that my approach to semeiotic is somehow "reductionist," "mechanical," "individual," "nominalist," and "isolate." I think that your model treats the Sign as *a single triadic entity* that consists of a Representamen, its Object and Interpretant, and their relations with each other; in your own words, "There are three nodes/three relations acting 'as one'." By contrast, my model treats the Sign as a Representamen that has *a single triadic relation* with its Object and Interpretant. In logical terms, you posit one triadic subject that includes three relations within it, while I posit three subjects that are involved in one triadic relation (____ stands for ____ to ____). Notice that the latter formulation is perfectly consistent with Peirce's doctrine of valency (cf. CP 3.471, 1897; CP 5.469, 1907), as well as how he defined "Sign" throughout his philosophical career (e.g., CP 7.355, 1873; CP 1.339, c. 1893-1895; EP 2:13, 1895; CP 2.228, 1897; CP 1.346, 1903; EP 2:544, c. 1906; EP 2:410, 1907; CP 8.343, 1908). As for your answer to my question--according to Peirce, it is flatly incorrect. For an Iconic Legisign, it is not the the Dynamic Object *itself *that is in a mode of 1ns, it is the *relation *between the Sign and the Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 1ns. For a Rhematic Indexical Legisign or a Dicent Indexical Legisign, it is not the Dynamic Object *itself *that is in a mode of 2ns, it is the *relation *between the Sign and the Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 2ns. This is Semeiotic 101, even if we only go by the 1903 taxonomy--three trichotomies, ten Sign classes--and Peirce's earlier writings; so frankly I am stunned that you are making such an obvious and fundamental mistake. Regards, Jon On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon- again, you misunderstand me. I do NOT talk about 'entities' but > about Relations. > My view is that nothing exists 'per se' isolate from other 'things'; > everything is interactive, even a grain of sand. That grain of sand is both > a Dynamic Object, and Immediate Object, carries within it the habits of a > Representamen, and is also an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant....in > interaction as it is with the water, more grains of sand and so on. > > A Dynamic Interpretant is the existential result of the semiosic relations. > > As for your question > can anyone identify an example of a concept or other Legisign (not > embodied as a Sinsign) whose Dynamic Object is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns? > > The answer is: an Iconic Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Firstness]; a > Rhematic Indexical Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Secondness]; a Dicent > Indexical Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Secondness] . > > We'll have to end it there. Our views are totally different. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 2:48 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > Edwina, List: > > "Reductionist," "mechanical," "individual," "nominalist," and "isolate" > are all *your *pejorative labels for my views, and I am not convinced > that they are accurate. I see the primary difference between us as triadic > *relations > *(my view) vs. triadic *entities* (your view). Something is not a > Representamen unless it has a triadic *relation *with an Object and an > Interpretant. Objects can exist without necessarily serving as Dynamic > Objects for Signs, and many Dynamic Objects are not Existents (2ns) at > all--they are Possibles (1ns) or Necessitants (3ns). Interpretants, by > definition, can only come about as results of semeiosis; but only Dynamic > Interpretants *exist *as something actual--Immediate Interpretants are > real possibilities, and Final Interpretants are real habits. > > To repeat my question below and (hopefully) get us back on topic--can > anyone identify an example of a concept or other Legisign (not embodied as > a Sinsign) whose Dynamic Object is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns? If not, then > my contention would seem to be correct that all objects of concepts are > generals (3ns); and since some objects of concepts are real, it must be the > case that some generals are real. Furthermore, since everything that is > real can (in principle) be the object of a concept, everything that is real > must be general (to some degree). The nominalist alternative is to claim > that no objects of concepts are real, or at least that there are some real > things that cannot be the objects of concepts and thus are incognizable. > Of course, Peirce flatly rejected such an approach as blocking the way of > inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - I think this debate won't go far, as it's not really a debate but >> two opposing views. >> >> I have never endorsed YOUR model of semiosis, which to me, is >> reductionist and mechanical and sees everything as individual units [which >> is why I see you as nominalist] and ignores the necessarily interrelated, >> correlated, dynamic, evolutionary, adaptable format of the Peircean >> semiosis. >> >> I disagree with you that the Representamen can be, all alone, 'the >> Sign'. The Representamen doesn't exist per se, and Peirce has himself >> written that [i don't have the time to dig up the reference]. >> Equally, the Object - Dynamic or not - does NOT exist, all alone, but is >> existent as that Dynamic Object ONLY within semiosic interactions when it >> becomes that Dynamic Object *in the interaction!* >> Same with the Interpretant; it doesn't exist all on its individual own >> but only within the semiosic interaction. >> >> Your semiosis is a mechanical one, where each entity exists 'per se', on >> its isolate own, and enters into interactions with other separate entities. >> This, to me, is not Peircean. >> >> So- two views. There's really nothing to debate. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >> Particular//Singular/Individual >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> I agree that we should not rehash our past debates; I am simply offering >> my own alternative views. >> >> I have never endorsed your model of semiosis, with its emphasis on data >> input/output, because my personal opinion is that it is not authentically >> Peircean. In particular, I have consistently maintained that the Sign *is >> *the Representamen, which *has *relations with its Object and >> Interpretant; the latter are not *parts* of the Sign itself. As such, a >> Sign is *triadic*, but not a triad. >> >> It is not merely according to *me *that the Dynamic Object of a Legisign >> *must* also be in a mode of 3ns; that is what Peirce *himself *wrote to >> Lady Welby in 1908 (EP 2:481). As I have suggested before, you seem to >> embrace the 1903 taxonomy with its three trichotomies and ten Sign classes, >> and reject the later versions that had six or ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 >> Sign classes. What would be an example of a Legisign--not an instantiated >> replica thereof, which is a Sinsign--with a Dynamic Object that is in a >> mode of 1ns or 2ns? >> >> Note that I am talking about the mode of the Dynamic Object itself, not >> its relation with the Sign; the latter is the Icon/Index/Symbol >> distinction. Hence an Argument is *not *the only Sign class whose >> relation with its *Object *is in a mode of 3ns; *all *Symbols fall under >> that description, including Rhematic Symbols (terms) and Dicent Symbols >> (propositions). However, an Argument *is *the only Sign class whose >> relation with its *Interpretant *is in a mode of 3ns. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 7:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - I have told myself that I wouldn't enter into debates with you but >>> will make one try. You are missing the point of semiosis which is that >>> there is no such thing as a singular 'point' or node that exists all by >>> itself; Peircean semiosis and therefore reality is triadic. There are three >>> nodes/three relations acting 'as one'. You didn't read my post: >>> >>> ...."my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to >>> the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. >>> Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs >>> that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'. >>> But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of >>> Thirdness." >>> >>> Again, the TERM 'legisign' refers only to the Representamen >>> relation-in-itself. Not to the whole triad. >>> >>> And think about it. What pragmatic function would there be for the >>> MEDIATION action of the Representamen...which is, as a Legisign, operating >>> in Thirdness, and therefore providing normative rules by which to interpret >>> the incoming data from that Dynamic Object.....what pragmatic function >>> would there be if that same Representamen was confined as you think, NOT to >>> mediate and 'mould' that incoming data by applying its normative >>> rules...but..could only..what...pass along the set of rules from that >>> Dynamic Object..which according to you, MUST also be in a mode of Thirdness? >>> >>> What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad? >>> Useless, just a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation. >>> >>> The whole strength of the semiosic triad is that mediative process where >>> Rules are applied to incoming data from the Dynamic Object...and that >>> incoming data can be in a mode of Firstness....and the Representamen as a >>> Legisign will constrain, mould, 'normalize' that haphazard free data into a >>> coherent Interpretant, i.e, an Iconic legisign or a rhematic indexical >>> legisign.... >>> >>> Furthermore, the only triad where the Object Relation is in a mode of >>> Thirdness is in the pure Argument - which is a strictly mental process. >>> >>> >>> Again, the semiosic Sign is a triad. The 'parts' of it don't exist on >>> their own; the whole thing is a dynamic relation. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> ; cl...@lextek.com >>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:38 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >>> Particular//Singular/Individual >>> >>> Edwina, Clark, List: >>> >>> ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a >>> general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated *in such a >>> manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the >>> Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of >>> Secondness]. >>> >>> >>> My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten >>> trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten, >>> respectively--is that a legisign, *as *a legisign, *cannot *refer to an >>> Existent (2ns); it can *only *refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When it is >>> instantiated, it is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign >>> (3ns); this is, of course, the familiar type/token distinction. An >>> indexical legisign thus can only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its >>> object, but the *relation *between the sign and its object is >>> nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns." >>> >>> CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law, >>> however established, which requires each instance of it to be really >>> affected by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that >>> Object. Each Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a >>> peculiar kind. The Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents >>> it as an Iconic Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small >>> measure. (CP 2.259, EP 2:294; 1903) >>> >>> >>> The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example. The >>> object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily *general*, >>> because it can refer to *anything*. It can only refer to something *in >>> particular*--something *actual*--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a >>> specific context. At that point, it is obviously not a *concept*--and >>> my contention remains that all objects of concepts are general to some >>> degree. Is there an example of a concept whose object is absolutely >>> singular--determinate in every respect? >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers >>>> only to the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. >>>> >>>> Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of >>>> Signs that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a >>>> 'Legisign'. >>>> >>>> But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of >>>> Thirdness. >>>> >>>> For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative >>>> pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode >>>> of Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the >>>> representamen-Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The >>>> Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of Thirdness. >>>> >>>> As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however >>>> established, which requires each instance of it to be *really affected* >>>> by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" >>>> [2.259 my emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself >>>> operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated* >>>> in such a manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. >>>> So, the Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of >>>> Secondness]. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >>>> Particular//Singular/Individual >>>> >>>> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what >>>> I think you’re talking about. >>>> >>>> >>>> Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot >>>> represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant. >>>> >>>> Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned >>>> about building up signs out of subsigns. >>>> >>>> My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. >>>> That is there’s an element of equivocation in play. >>>> >>>> If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the >>>> general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s >>>> semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist >>>> debate doesn’t matter as much as some think) >>>> >>>> I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. >>>> Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is. >>>> >>>>
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