Edwina, List: ET: And no, to describe your outline as mechanical, reductionist, is hardly perjorative.
In the context of a Peirce list, those labels--as well as the others that you used--are *definitely *pejorative. ET: The DO doesn't exist as a DO until and unless it functions as such within a triad. I would say rather that the Dynamic Object does not exist as a Dynamic Object until and unless it functions as such in a *triadic relation* with a Sign and an Interpretant. I would also say that the Dynamic Object does not exist (2ns) *at all*, strictly speaking, if it is a Possible (1ns) or a Necessitant (3ns). ET: Your model posits the Representamen, the Object and the Interpretant as each separate and existential, [three subjects] when in my analysis, they aren't such agential subjects. No--the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are not "separate" if by that you mean "disconnected" or "independent," since obviously they must be in the triadic relation of "____ stands for ____ to ____" in order to qualify for those designations. Furthermore, in Peirce's logic, subjects are not necessarily "existential," if by that you mean "operating in a mode of 2ns"; a subject can also be a general (3ns) or a hypostatic abstraction of a quality (1ns). I have no idea what you mean here by "agential subjects." ET: You also seem to see the Representamen as having some kind of primary nature and since it only exists within exisentiality - I don't see this. Not all Signs "exist within existentiality," if by that you mean "operate in a mode of 2ns." Neither Qualisigns/Marks (1ns) nor Legisigns/Types (3ns) *exist *as such, although they can be embodied as Sinsigns/Tokens (2ns). I have no idea what you mean here by "some kind of primary nature." ET: Look - we have very different interpretations of Peirce, and as i said, we'll just have to leave it at that. Okay, but I am still looking for an example of a concept or other Legisign/Type whose Dynamic Object is a Possible (1ns) or an Existent (2ns). Of course, I do not expect you or anyone else to be able to provide one, since Peirce held that *all *Objects of Legisigns/Types (including concepts) are Necessitants (3ns); i.e., *generals*. Again, your previous attempt confused the modality of the Dynamic Object itself with that of its relation to the Sign. Regards, Jon On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 5:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon- one last time. And no, to describe your outline as mechanical, > reductionist, is hardly perjorative. > > There is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'itself'; no such thing as a > Representamen 'itself'; no such thing as an Interpretant 'itself'. Each > 'exists' as such, in that role, only within the triadic interaction. The DO > doesn't exist as a DO until and unless it functions as such within a triad. > > Your model posits the Representamen, the Object and the Interpretant as > each separate and existential, [three subjects] when in my analysis, they > aren't such agential subjects. They have their functions as Object, > Interpretant etc only within the triadic semiosic act. That Interpretant > can be a DO in the next interaction. You also seem to see the Representamen > as having some kind of primary nature and since it only exists within > exisentiality - I don't see this. > > Look - we have very different interpretations of Peirce, and as i said, > we'll just have to leave it at that. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 5:39 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > Edwina, List: > > We each call it as we see it, but you routinely toss off pejorative > labels---i.e., engage in name-calling--while I try to make a good-faith > effort to identify and address the substance of our differences. > > You think that my approach to semeiotic is somehow "reductionist," > "mechanical," "individual," "nominalist," and "isolate." I think that your > model treats the Sign as *a single triadic entity* that consists of a > Representamen, its Object and Interpretant, and their relations with each > other; in your own words, "There are three nodes/three relations acting 'as > one'." By contrast, my model treats the Sign as a Representamen that has *a > single triadic relation* with its Object and Interpretant. In logical > terms, you posit one triadic subject that includes three relations within > it, while I posit three subjects that are involved in one triadic relation > (____ stands for ____ to ____). Notice that the latter formulation is > perfectly consistent with Peirce's doctrine of valency (cf. CP 3.471, 1897; > CP 5.469, 1907), as well as how he defined "Sign" throughout his > philosophical career (e.g., CP 7.355, 1873; CP 1.339, c. 1893-1895; EP > 2:13, 1895; CP 2.228, 1897; CP 1.346, 1903; EP 2:544, c. 1906; EP 2:410, > 1907; CP 8.343, 1908). > > As for your answer to my question--according to Peirce, it is flatly > incorrect. For an Iconic Legisign, it is not the the Dynamic Object *itself > *that is in a mode of 1ns, it is the *relation *between the Sign and the > Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 1ns. For a Rhematic Indexical Legisign > or a Dicent Indexical Legisign, it is not the Dynamic Object *itself *that > is in a mode of 2ns, it is the *relation *between the Sign and the > Dynamic Object that is in a mode of 2ns. This is Semeiotic 101, even if we > only go by the 1903 taxonomy--three trichotomies, ten Sign classes--and > Peirce's earlier writings; so frankly I am stunned that you are making such > an obvious and fundamental mistake. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon- again, you misunderstand me. I do NOT talk about 'entities' but >> about Relations. >> My view is that nothing exists 'per se' isolate from other 'things'; >> everything is interactive, even a grain of sand. That grain of sand is both >> a Dynamic Object, and Immediate Object, carries within it the habits of a >> Representamen, and is also an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant....in >> interaction as it is with the water, more grains of sand and so on. >> >> A Dynamic Interpretant is the existential result of the semiosic >> relations. >> >> As for your question >> can anyone identify an example of a concept or other Legisign (not >> embodied as a Sinsign) whose Dynamic Object is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns? >> >> The answer is: an Iconic Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Firstness]; a >> Rhematic Indexical Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Secondness]; a Dicent >> Indexical Legisign [the DO is in a mode of Secondness] . >> >> We'll have to end it there. Our views are totally different. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 2:48 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >> Particular//Singular/Individual >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> "Reductionist," "mechanical," "individual," "nominalist," and "isolate" >> are all *your *pejorative labels for my views, and I am not convinced >> that they are accurate. I see the primary difference between us as triadic >> *relations >> *(my view) vs. triadic *entities* (your view). Something is not a >> Representamen unless it has a triadic *relation *with an Object and an >> Interpretant. Objects can exist without necessarily serving as Dynamic >> Objects for Signs, and many Dynamic Objects are not Existents (2ns) at >> all--they are Possibles (1ns) or Necessitants (3ns). Interpretants, by >> definition, can only come about as results of semeiosis; but only Dynamic >> Interpretants *exist *as something actual--Immediate Interpretants are >> real possibilities, and Final Interpretants are real habits. >> >> To repeat my question below and (hopefully) get us back on topic--can >> anyone identify an example of a concept or other Legisign (not embodied as >> a Sinsign) whose Dynamic Object is in a mode of 1ns or 2ns? If not, then >> my contention would seem to be correct that all objects of concepts are >> generals (3ns); and since some objects of concepts are real, it must be the >> case that some generals are real. Furthermore, since everything that is >> real can (in principle) be the object of a concept, everything that is real >> must be general (to some degree). The nominalist alternative is to claim >> that no objects of concepts are real, or at least that there are some real >> things that cannot be the objects of concepts and thus are incognizable. >> Of course, Peirce flatly rejected such an approach as blocking the way of >> inquiry. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - I think this debate won't go far, as it's not really a debate but >>> two opposing views. >>> >>> I have never endorsed YOUR model of semiosis, which to me, is >>> reductionist and mechanical and sees everything as individual units [which >>> is why I see you as nominalist] and ignores the necessarily interrelated, >>> correlated, dynamic, evolutionary, adaptable format of the Peircean >>> semiosis. >>> >>> I disagree with you that the Representamen can be, all alone, 'the >>> Sign'. The Representamen doesn't exist per se, and Peirce has himself >>> written that [i don't have the time to dig up the reference]. >>> Equally, the Object - Dynamic or not - does NOT exist, all alone, but is >>> existent as that Dynamic Object ONLY within semiosic interactions when it >>> becomes that Dynamic Object *in the interaction!* >>> Same with the Interpretant; it doesn't exist all on its individual own >>> but only within the semiosic interaction. >>> >>> Your semiosis is a mechanical one, where each entity exists 'per se', on >>> its isolate own, and enters into interactions with other separate entities. >>> This, to me, is not Peircean. >>> >>> So- two views. There's really nothing to debate. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >>> Particular//Singular/Individual >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I agree that we should not rehash our past debates; I am simply offering >>> my own alternative views. >>> >>> I have never endorsed your model of semiosis, with its emphasis on data >>> input/output, because my personal opinion is that it is not authentically >>> Peircean. In particular, I have consistently maintained that the Sign *is >>> *the Representamen, which *has *relations with its Object and >>> Interpretant; the latter are not *parts* of the Sign itself. As such, >>> a Sign is *triadic*, but not a triad. >>> >>> It is not merely according to *me *that the Dynamic Object of a >>> Legisign *must* also be in a mode of 3ns; that is what Peirce *himself >>> *wrote >>> to Lady Welby in 1908 (EP 2:481). As I have suggested before, you seem to >>> embrace the 1903 taxonomy with its three trichotomies and ten Sign classes, >>> and reject the later versions that had six or ten trichotomies and 28 or 66 >>> Sign classes. What would be an example of a Legisign--not an instantiated >>> replica thereof, which is a Sinsign--with a Dynamic Object that is in a >>> mode of 1ns or 2ns? >>> >>> Note that I am talking about the mode of the Dynamic Object itself, not >>> its relation with the Sign; the latter is the Icon/Index/Symbol >>> distinction. Hence an Argument is *not *the only Sign class whose >>> relation with its *Object *is in a mode of 3ns; *all *Symbols fall >>> under that description, including Rhematic Symbols (terms) and Dicent >>> Symbols (propositions). However, an Argument *is *the only Sign class >>> whose relation with its *Interpretant *is in a mode of 3ns. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 7:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon - I have told myself that I wouldn't enter into debates with you >>>> but will make one try. You are missing the point of semiosis which is that >>>> there is no such thing as a singular 'point' or node that exists all by >>>> itself; Peircean semiosis and therefore reality is triadic. There are three >>>> nodes/three relations acting 'as one'. You didn't read my post: >>>> >>>> ...."my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to >>>> the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. >>>> Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of >>>> Signs that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a >>>> 'Legisign'. >>>> But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of >>>> Thirdness." >>>> >>>> Again, the TERM 'legisign' refers only to the Representamen >>>> relation-in-itself. Not to the whole triad. >>>> >>>> And think about it. What pragmatic function would there be for the >>>> MEDIATION action of the Representamen...which is, as a Legisign, operating >>>> in Thirdness, and therefore providing normative rules by which to interpret >>>> the incoming data from that Dynamic Object.....what pragmatic function >>>> would there be if that same Representamen was confined as you think, NOT to >>>> mediate and 'mould' that incoming data by applying its normative >>>> rules...but..could only..what...pass along the set of rules from that >>>> Dynamic Object..which according to you, MUST also be in a mode of >>>> Thirdness? >>>> >>>> What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad? >>>> Useless, just a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation. >>>> >>>> The whole strength of the semiosic triad is that mediative process >>>> where Rules are applied to incoming data from the Dynamic Object...and that >>>> incoming data can be in a mode of Firstness....and the Representamen as a >>>> Legisign will constrain, mould, 'normalize' that haphazard free data into a >>>> coherent Interpretant, i.e, an Iconic legisign or a rhematic indexical >>>> legisign.... >>>> >>>> Furthermore, the only triad where the Object Relation is in a mode of >>>> Thirdness is in the pure Argument - which is a strictly mental process. >>>> >>>> >>>> Again, the semiosic Sign is a triad. The 'parts' of it don't exist on >>>> their own; the whole thing is a dynamic relation. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> ; cl...@lextek.com >>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:38 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >>>> Particular//Singular/Individual >>>> >>>> Edwina, Clark, List: >>>> >>>> ET: That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as >>>> a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated *in such a >>>> manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the >>>> Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of >>>> Secondness]. >>>> >>>> >>>> My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten >>>> trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten, >>>> respectively--is that a legisign, *as *a legisign, *cannot *refer to >>>> an Existent (2ns); it can *only *refer to a Necessitant (3ns). When >>>> it is instantiated, it is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a >>>> legisign (3ns); this is, of course, the familiar type/token distinction. >>>> An indexical legisign thus can only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its >>>> object, but the *relation *between the sign and its object is >>>> nevertheless "in a mode of 2ns." >>>> >>>> CSP: Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law, >>>> however established, which requires each instance of it to be really >>>> affected by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that >>>> Object. Each Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a >>>> peculiar kind. The Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents >>>> it as an Iconic Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small >>>> measure. (CP 2.259, EP 2:294; 1903) >>>> >>>> >>>> The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example. The >>>> object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily *general*, >>>> because it can refer to *anything*. It can only refer to something *in >>>> particular*--something *actual*--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a >>>> specific context. At that point, it is obviously not a *concept*--and >>>> my contention remains that all objects of concepts are general to some >>>> degree. Is there an example of a concept whose object is absolutely >>>> singular--determinate in every respect? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers >>>>> only to the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness. >>>>> >>>>> Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of >>>>> Signs that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a >>>>> 'Legisign'. >>>>> >>>>> But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode >>>>> of Thirdness. >>>>> >>>>> For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative >>>>> pronoun]. Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a >>>>> mode >>>>> of Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the >>>>> representamen-Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The >>>>> Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of Thirdness. >>>>> >>>>> As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however >>>>> established, which requires each instance of it to be *really >>>>> affected* by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention >>>>> to that Object" [2.259 my emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical >>>>> Legisign, in itself operating as a general type, nevertheless requires >>>>> being *instantiated* in such a manner that it is indexically 'really >>>>> affected by its Object'. So, the Legisign in this triad refers to an >>>>> existent Object [in a mode of Secondness]. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>>> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM >>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and >>>>> Particular//Singular/Individual >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s >>>>> what I think you’re talking about. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot >>>>> represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant. >>>>> >>>>> Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned >>>>> about building up signs out of subsigns. >>>>> >>>>> My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. >>>>> That is there’s an element of equivocation in play. >>>>> >>>>> If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the >>>>> general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with >>>>> Peirce’s >>>>> semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. >>>>> realist >>>>> debate doesn’t matter as much as some think) >>>>> >>>>> I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. >>>>> Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is. >>>>> >>>>>
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