Jerry,
In my snarkier days I might've just
answered your “5.189” with “42” but
I'll give it 1 more old college try.
As far as the place of abduction in
Peirce's 3-o of inference types the
best I can say I have already said
back when you first asked about it.
Here is the link to my blog rehash:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/14/definition-and-determination-12/
As far as the rubrics of goal orientation,
planning, and problem solving go there is
an extra dimension, or a variant symmetry
involved, though it may get flattened out
in the Flatland of Spectator Philosophies.
So I'll make an attempt to flesh that out
later today, or more like later this week.
Regards,
Jon
On 3/6/2017 3:16 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
But is this not simply
*The surprising fact C is observed;... *
Best,
Jerry R
CP 5.189
On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:04 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Ben, Jon, List,
One way to characterize the double aspect of inquiry is
by contrasting a “Surprise” that demands an Explanation
with a “Problem” that demands a Plan of Action. Here is
how I compared them in my work on Inquiry Driven Systems:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Sys
tems_:_Part_1#1.3.5._Discussion_of_Formalization_:_Specific_Objects
<QUOTE>
I recognize inquiry as beginning with a surprising phenomenon or
a problematic situation, more briefly described as a surprise or
a problem, respectively. These are the kinds of moments that try
our souls, the instances of events that instigate inquiry as an
effort to achieve their own resolution. Surprises and problems
are experienced as afflicted with an irritating uncertainty or
a compelling difficulty, one that calls for a response on the
part of the agent in question:
1. A surprise calls for an explanation to resolve the uncertainty
that is present in it. This uncertainty is associated with a
difference between observations and expectations.
2. A problem calls for a plan of action to resolve the difficulty
that is present in it. This difficulty is associated with a
difference between observations and intentions.
To express this diversity in a unified formula, both types of inquiry
begin with a delta (∆), a compact symbol that admits a spectrum of
expansions: debt, difference, difficulty, discrepancy, dispersion,
distribution, doubt, duplicity, or duty.
Expressed another way, inquiry begins with a doubt about one's object,
whether this means what is true of a case, an object, or a world, what
to do about reaching a goal, or whether the hoped-for goal is really
good for oneself — with all that these questions lead to in essence,
in action, or in fact.
</QUOTE>
Regards,
Jon
On 3/2/2017 12:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Yes, and I remember years ago when researching for the "Abductive
reasoning" article at Wikipedia, I found papers
treating abduction as a way to infer how one might achieve a
pre-designated goal or end, as opposed to inferring how
nature or people did arrive at an observed outcome or phenomenon.
On 3/2/2017 8:45 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Jon,
Thanks for the reply.
When it comes to the complementarity between thought and conduct,
information and control, it is often forgotten — and indeed it was
only by coincidence or synchronicity that a discussion elsewhere on
the web brought it back to mind — the same double aspect is already
evident in Aristotle's original formulation of apagoge or abduction,
where he gives two cases (1) a problem of description or explanation
and (2) a problem of construction or invention, as geometers call it.
Here is a place where I discussed this before:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/02/17/abduction-deductio
n-induction-analogy-inquiry-3/
Aristotle’s apagoge, variously translated as abduction, reduction, or
retroduction, is a form of reasoning common to two types of situations.
It may be (1) the operation by which a phenomenon (a fact to grasp, to
understand) is factored through an explanatory hypothesis, or (2) the
operation by which a problem (a fact to make, to accomplish) is factored
through an intermediate construction. Aristotle gives one example of
each
type in Prior Analytics 2.25. I give some discussion here:
Aristotle’s “Apagogy” : Abductive Reasoning as Problem Reduction
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:
_Inquiry_and_Analogy#1.4._Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy
.E2.80.9D_:_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction
Regards,
Jon
--
inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
