Jon, list:
Say what? Sometimes, what people say is so abstruse, I can’t figure out their meaning. And by abstruse, I mean, “..place of abduction in Peirce's 3-o of inference types… As far as the rubrics of goal orientation, planning, and problem solving go there is an extra dimension, or a variant symmetry involved, though it may get flattened out in the Flatland of Spectator Philosophies.” But perhaps I don’t mean abstruse in this case, for abstrusity implies a relation with a healthy state and I don’t find what you said to be healthy at all. I suppose the same accusation ought to be leveled against me when I refer to CP 5.189. For what is clear to me is not similarly obvious to you. For example, is it obvious that one can apply the following operation of thought through CP 5.189? “I mean this: suppose for example that A inheres in C and B is intermediate between them, but between B and A there are other middles, and between these again fresh middles; can these proceed to infinity or can they not? This is the equivalent of inquiring, do demonstrations proceed to infinity, i.e. is everything demonstrable? Or do ultimate subject and primary attribute limit one another?” ~Post. An. I-19 That is, is it obvious that one is aiming at truth through CP 5.189 and that we are being guided by real connexions between subjects and attributes? Best, Jerry R PS. 42… haha! I like it! one two three... myriad creatures On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 3:08 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry, > > In my snarkier days I might've just > answered your “5.189” with “42” but > I'll give it 1 more old college try. > > As far as the place of abduction in > Peirce's 3-o of inference types the > best I can say I have already said > back when you first asked about it. > Here is the link to my blog rehash: > > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/14/definition-and-determination-12/ > > As far as the rubrics of goal orientation, > planning, and problem solving go there is > an extra dimension, or a variant symmetry > involved, though it may get flattened out > in the Flatland of Spectator Philosophies. > So I'll make an attempt to flesh that out > later today, or more like later this week. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 3/6/2017 3:16 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > >> But is this not simply >> >> *The surprising fact C is observed;... * >> >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> CP 5.189 >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 2:04 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Ben, Jon, List, >>> >>> One way to characterize the double aspect of inquiry is >>> by contrasting a “Surprise” that demands an Explanation >>> with a “Problem” that demands a Plan of Action. Here is >>> how I compared them in my work on Inquiry Driven Systems: >>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Sys >>> tems_:_Part_1#1.3.5._Discussion_of_Formalization_:_Specific_Objects >>> >>> <QUOTE> >>> >>> I recognize inquiry as beginning with a surprising phenomenon or >>> a problematic situation, more briefly described as a surprise or >>> a problem, respectively. These are the kinds of moments that try >>> our souls, the instances of events that instigate inquiry as an >>> effort to achieve their own resolution. Surprises and problems >>> are experienced as afflicted with an irritating uncertainty or >>> a compelling difficulty, one that calls for a response on the >>> part of the agent in question: >>> >>> 1. A surprise calls for an explanation to resolve the uncertainty >>> that is present in it. This uncertainty is associated with a >>> difference between observations and expectations. >>> >>> 2. A problem calls for a plan of action to resolve the difficulty >>> that is present in it. This difficulty is associated with a >>> difference between observations and intentions. >>> >>> To express this diversity in a unified formula, both types of inquiry >>> begin with a delta (∆), a compact symbol that admits a spectrum of >>> expansions: debt, difference, difficulty, discrepancy, dispersion, >>> distribution, doubt, duplicity, or duty. >>> >>> Expressed another way, inquiry begins with a doubt about one's object, >>> whether this means what is true of a case, an object, or a world, what >>> to do about reaching a goal, or whether the hoped-for goal is really >>> good for oneself — with all that these questions lead to in essence, >>> in action, or in fact. >>> >>> </QUOTE> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On 3/2/2017 12:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >>> >>> Yes, and I remember years ago when researching for the "Abductive >>>> reasoning" article at Wikipedia, I found papers >>>> treating abduction as a way to infer how one might achieve a >>>> pre-designated goal or end, as opposed to inferring how >>>> nature or people did arrive at an observed outcome or phenomenon. >>>> >>>> On 3/2/2017 8:45 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >>>> >>>> Jon, >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for the reply. >>>>> >>>>> When it comes to the complementarity between thought and conduct, >>>>> information and control, it is often forgotten — and indeed it was >>>>> only by coincidence or synchronicity that a discussion elsewhere on >>>>> the web brought it back to mind — the same double aspect is already >>>>> evident in Aristotle's original formulation of apagoge or abduction, >>>>> where he gives two cases (1) a problem of description or explanation >>>>> and (2) a problem of construction or invention, as geometers call it. >>>>> >>>>> Here is a place where I discussed this before: >>>>> >>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/02/17/abduction-deductio >>>>> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-3/ >>>>> >>>>> Aristotle’s apagoge, variously translated as abduction, reduction, or >>>>> retroduction, is a form of reasoning common to two types of situations. >>>>> It may be (1) the operation by which a phenomenon (a fact to grasp, to >>>>> understand) is factored through an explanatory hypothesis, or (2) the >>>>> operation by which a problem (a fact to make, to accomplish) is >>>>> factored >>>>> through an intermediate construction. Aristotle gives one example of >>>>> each >>>>> type in Prior Analytics 2.25. I give some discussion here: >>>>> >>>>> Aristotle’s “Apagogy” : Abductive Reasoning as Problem Reduction >>>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_: >>>>> _Inquiry_and_Analogy#1.4._Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy >>>>> .E2.80.9D_:_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> > -- > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
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