Gary R., List: I honestly did try to pause at a couple of points--after posting the initial list of quotes, and then after posting my own summaries of them--to give others a chance to comment, but my eagerness to put my ideas out there and get feedback on them eventually got the best of me. I agree that Quasi-mind is "the semeiotically more important concept," and thus am not at all opposed to focusing specifically on that for a while, then later reexamining its relationship to the concept of perfect Sign.
However, I do need to correct one apparent misunderstanding on your part--my three bullet points, which you reproduced below, are *not *two premisses and the conclusion of an argument. Instead, they are three *alternative *interpretations of Peirce's *only *statement that directly connects the concepts of perfect Sign and Quasi-mind with each other--"Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"--given in order from most to least restrictive (also presumably most to least controversial). That is why the third bullet *contradicts *the first one--in fact, only *one *of the three can be correct, and we can leave which one as an open question for the time being. My thesis that a genuine Sign requires three Quasi-minds--two distinct ones, the utterer and the interpreter, and their "welding" in the Sign itself--comes directly from CP 4.551. This is followed, of course, by the conventions for the Existential Graphs--including the Phemic Sheet as "the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one," as well as "a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion" (CP 4.553). I just noticed an interesting parallel with another relevant passage, likewise written in the spring of 1906. CSP: ... that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place ... may be called the *commens*. It consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function. (EP 2:478) As for whether nature can be an utterer, it looks to me like Peirce actually *denied *such a possibility, *defining *a "natural Sign" precisely as one that has *no *utterer. CSP: But why argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I mean such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc. (EP 2:404; 1907) CSP: [There are] two incompatible ways of conceiving of a weathercock: as a natural sign, and therefore as having no utterer; and as a human contrivance to show the direction of the wind, and as such, uttered by its original inventor (for I speak of the weathercock,--the type, not the single instance). (EP 2:406; 1907) CSP: ... the question may arise whether I ought not to have recognized a division according as the sign is a *natural sign*, which has no party to the dialogue as its author, or whether it be an *uttered sign*, and in the latter case, is the very sign that is getting uttered or another. But it seems to me that this division turns upon the question of whether or not the sign uttered is a sign of a sign as its Object. For must not every sign, in order to become a sign, get uttered? (EP 2:484; 1908) CSP: But it appears to me that all symptoms of disease, signs of weather, etc., have no utterer. For I do not think we can properly say that God *utters *any sign when He is the Creator of all things. (CP 8.185, EP 2:496; 1909) The first two quotes are yet again from "Pragmatism," where Peirce also suggested that Signs without *interpreters *might likewise be possible--giving as examples the cards for a Jacquard loom, model ships, and the books of a bank. This would be consistent with the principle that a *possible *(Immediate) Interpretant is sufficient for a Sign, such that an *actual* (Dynamic) Interpretant is not strictly necessary. However, in another draft, he called a Jacquard loom a "quasi-sign," because "it seems to me convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a 'sign'" (CP 5.473). In any case, Peirce embarked on a lengthy quest for "some ingredient of the utterer [especially] and some ingredient of the interpreter which not only are so essential, but are even more characteristic of signs than the utterer and the interpreter themselves," eventually identifying them as the Object and the Interpretant--the latter as a "would-be" when there is no interpreter (EP 2:404-410). He concluded the exercise with what Mats Bergman, in *Peirce's Philosophy of Communication* (which I just finished reading), called "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions." CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP 2:410; 1907) This nicely ties in with Jeff Downard's suggestion that "determined" in this context simply means "made more determinate." Is this moving us any closer to settling on what a Quasi-mind is, or muddying the waters further? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 3:51 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Gary f, Jeff, Edwina, list, > > Jon, I'm entering this discussion rather late for reasons I offered last > week, for at least that reason I'm finding it difficult to find a 'place' > to enter it. For me your hypothesis regarding quasi-Mind is not yet > confirmed but is quite interesting and well-worth framing thought > experiments around should we first get some agreement on the abstract part > of the inquiry. > > I personally think that it might have been better for the inquiry had we > first worked through the concept of Quasi-mind--say, by taking up in > chronological order two or three (at a time) of the quotations on > Quasi-mind presented in roughly that order that you offed a couple of days > ago--before getting into the matter of a perfect Sign even if they are, at > least in your thinking, deeply related. I still think that slower approach > might be worth considering. I know your mind is very agile and wants to > move quickly into a collaborative after *you*'ve become more or less > content with the concepts involved. But I don't see anything approaching > agreement here on either the Quasi-mind or the perfect Sign (or both of > them together). > > Be that as it may, I'll offer a few thoughts on your recent post. I feel > like I've been absorbing some of the thinking of Gary f, Jeff, and Edwina > in this response, but I certainly don't want to burden them in any way with > the errors of my interpretation so I won't informally cite them within this > post. Suffice it to say for now that I agree with some but not all of > their--and your--thinking on the matters being considered. You wrote: > > JAS: 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your > point about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken. > With that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for > Peirce's statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of > assertion of Existential Graphs." > > > - A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the Sheet > of Assertion is an example. > - A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, > but there are other kinds of Quasi-minds. > - Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other > kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but > there > are other kinds of Quasi-minds. > > Again, I think you may be leaping ahead rather too quickly--at least for > me!--in equating a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind ("A perfect Sign and a > Quasi-mind are one and the same"). I can readily agree that the Sheet of > Assertion is an example of a Quasi-mind and that there are other kinds of > Quasi-minds. But your introduction of the perfect Sign into your hypothesis > at this state of the inquiry is highly problematic for me. > > You begin by stating above that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one > and the same, then conclude by stating that there are other kinds of > Quasi-minds than a perfect Sign. I find this, well, confusing if not > exactly circular. But, again, I'm not at the moment interested in > discussing the perfect Sign, but only the Quasi-mind which, personally, I > considered to be the semeiotically more important concept (not that the > concept of the perfect Sign shouldn't be analyzed). I don't recall many of > those several quotations you, Gary f, and I have offered on the Quasi-mind > connecting it to the perfect Sign. > > Looking at the beginning of the 2nd of the chronological quotations on > Quasi-mind that you offered > > CSP: 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, > Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, > partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some > of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in > doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to > these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." > > > . . . I couldn't help but think that this must a fortiori be the case not > only for Mind, but for Quasi-mind as well so that it will be important to > distinguish the various logical, metaphysical, and psychological meanings > of Quasi-sign. If may be that your hypothesis regarding the perfect Sign > applies to the logical but, say, not to the psychological or metaphysical > meanings of Quasi-mind. Right now I have no idea whether or not that is the > case. > > JAS: 2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few > days ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has the > capacity for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is what > distinguishes it from a brute Thing, a strictly *material *reacting > substance whose habits have become *inveterate, like a mere "set of > molecules*." It is also a perfect Sign that constitutes an aggregate or > complex of all previous Signs that have determined it, which are so > connected together as to produce one Interpretant; this is the sense in > which it "stores" the Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which > serve as its Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants, > which serve as its Habits of Interpretation. > > > Again, I find your equating Quasi-mind and perfect Sign problematic > although I can agree with some of what you state concerning the Quasi-mind, > some concerning the perfect Sign. But as I reread your quote above, I still > am perplexed by what I am seeing as your possibly conflating the two. > Again, you may be correct; but you haven't yet produced enough evidence nor > a strong enough argument to have convinced me that the two are one. Again, > this is why I think it might be helpful to have a clear understanding of > Quasi-mind before leaping to that conflating (or equating, or whatever it > is). > > JAS (2, continued): As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an > indispensable ingredient for any semiosis to occur. For *natural *Signs, > there is no utterer, but the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For *genuine > *Signs, > the utterer is a Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their > overlap--where they are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a > Quasi-mind. This is illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the > Quasi-mind where the Graphist and Interpreter are at one--not only in the > Signs that they proceed to scribe on it, but also in everything that is > tacitly taken for granted between them from the outset of their discussion, > when the sheet itself is still *blank*. As always, these two Quasi-minds > can be different temporal versions of the *same* Quasi-mind. > > > I don't see why Nature cannot be an utterer and I think Peirce somewhere > says as much (but I haven't been able to find that passage yet). As for > your trio of Quasi-minds for genuine signs, I'll have to think about that. > Certainly this may be the case for the Graphist and Interpreter of a Phemic > sheet, but I don't know how far one ought generalize this *most* logical > example. I agree, however, that "two Quasi-mind can be different temporal > versions of the same Quasi-mind." My principal thought experiments > regarding the Quasi-mind has for years been my own thought process, that > dialogue with oneself which Peirce once illustrated with the (then) > commonplace expression, "So I says to myself. . ."; also, the way one > "catches" the thought of another, or she of you, etc. > > JAS (2. concluded): > As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the > universe a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was > presenting it as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by > "determination." > > CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do > good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric > of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical > concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without > metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a > community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles ... > (EP 2:392; 1906) > > > I agree: the example of molecules is explicitly given as a metaphor. > > > JAS: 3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages > of this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve > analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the > vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams > upon touching a hot burner. The bird, the person who sees the vase, and > the child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds. > > > I would be interested in moving from the abstract to the concrete stage > of this inquiry, but only after we have settled a bit more firmly on what a > Quasi-mind is; then on what a perfect Sign is; then if the two really are > one. Once we have some agreement on *that* perhaps we can move on to a > more concrete experiment. > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
