Jon S, Gary f, Jeff, Edwina, list,
Jon, I'm entering this discussion rather late for reasons I offered last
week, for at least that reason I'm finding it difficult to find a 'place'
to enter it. For me your hypothesis regarding quasi-Mind is not yet
confirmed but is quite interesting and well-worth framing thought
experiments around should we first get some agreement on the abstract part
of the inquiry.
I personally think that it might have been better for the inquiry had we
first worked through the concept of Quasi-mind--say, by taking up in
chronological order two or three (at a time) of the quotations on
Quasi-mind presented in roughly that order that you offed a couple of days
ago--before getting into the matter of a perfect Sign even if they are, at
least in your thinking, deeply related. I still think that slower approach
might be worth considering. I know your mind is very agile and wants to
move quickly into a collaborative after *you*'ve become more or less
content with the concepts involved. But I don't see anything approaching
agreement here on either the Quasi-mind or the perfect Sign (or both of
them together).
Be that as it may, I'll offer a few thoughts on your recent post. I feel
like I've been absorbing some of the thinking of Gary f, Jeff, and Edwina
in this response, but I certainly don't want to burden them in any way with
the errors of my interpretation so I won't informally cite them within this
post. Suffice it to say for now that I agree with some but not all of
their--and your--thinking on the matters being considered. You wrote:
JAS: 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your
point about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken.
With that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for
Peirce's statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of
assertion of Existential Graphs."
- A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the Sheet of
Assertion is an example.
- A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but
there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
- Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other
kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but there
are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
Again, I think you may be leaping ahead rather too quickly--at least for
me!--in equating a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind ("A perfect Sign and a
Quasi-mind are one and the same"). I can readily agree that the Sheet of
Assertion is an example of a Quasi-mind and that there are other kinds of
Quasi-minds. But your introduction of the perfect Sign into your hypothesis
at this state of the inquiry is highly problematic for me.
You begin by stating above that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and
the same, then conclude by stating that there are other kinds of
Quasi-minds than a perfect Sign. I find this, well, confusing if not
exactly circular. But, again, I'm not at the moment interested in
discussing the perfect Sign, but only the Quasi-mind which, personally, I
considered to be the semeiotically more important concept (not that the
concept of the perfect Sign shouldn't be analyzed). I don't recall many of
those several quotations you, Gary f, and I have offered on the Quasi-mind
connecting it to the perfect Sign.
Looking at the beginning of the 2nd of the chronological quotations on
Quasi-mind that you offered
CSP: 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical,
Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less,
partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some
of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in
doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to
these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind."
. . . I couldn't help but think that this must a fortiori be the case not
only for Mind, but for Quasi-mind as well so that it will be important to
distinguish the various logical, metaphysical, and psychological meanings
of Quasi-sign. If may be that your hypothesis regarding the perfect Sign
applies to the logical but, say, not to the psychological or metaphysical
meanings of Quasi-mind. Right now I have no idea whether or not that is the
case.
JAS: 2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few
days ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has the
capacity for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is what
distinguishes it from a brute Thing, a strictly *material *reacting
substance whose habits have become *inveterate, like a mere "set of
molecules*." It is also a perfect Sign that constitutes an aggregate or
complex of all previous Signs that have determined it, which are so
connected together as to produce one Interpretant; this is the sense in
which it "stores" the Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which
serve as its Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants,
which serve as its Habits of Interpretation.
Again, I find your equating Quasi-mind and perfect Sign problematic
although I can agree with some of what you state concerning the Quasi-mind,
some concerning the perfect Sign. But as I reread your quote above, I still
am perplexed by what I am seeing as your possibly conflating the two.
Again, you may be correct; but you haven't yet produced enough evidence nor
a strong enough argument to have convinced me that the two are one. Again,
this is why I think it might be helpful to have a clear understanding of
Quasi-mind before leaping to that conflating (or equating, or whatever it
is).
JAS (2, continued): As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an
indispensable ingredient for any semiosis to occur. For *natural *Signs,
there is no utterer, but the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For *genuine *Signs,
the utterer is a Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their
overlap--where they are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a
Quasi-mind. This is illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the
Quasi-mind where the Graphist and Interpreter are at one--not only in the
Signs that they proceed to scribe on it, but also in everything that is
tacitly taken for granted between them from the outset of their discussion,
when the sheet itself is still *blank*. As always, these two Quasi-minds
can be different temporal versions of the *same* Quasi-mind.
I don't see why Nature cannot be an utterer and I think Peirce somewhere
says as much (but I haven't been able to find that passage yet). As for
your trio of Quasi-minds for genuine signs, I'll have to think about that.
Certainly this may be the case for the Graphist and Interpreter of a Phemic
sheet, but I don't know how far one ought generalize this *most* logical
example. I agree, however, that "two Quasi-mind can be different temporal
versions of the same Quasi-mind." My principal thought experiments
regarding the Quasi-mind has for years been my own thought process, that
dialogue with oneself which Peirce once illustrated with the (then)
commonplace expression, "So I says to myself. . ."; also, the way one
"catches" the thought of another, or she of you, etc.
JAS (2. concluded):
As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the universe
a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was presenting it
as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by "determination."
CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do
good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric
of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical
concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without
metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a
community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles ...
(EP 2:392; 1906)
I agree: the example of molecules is explicitly given as a metaphor.
JAS: 3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages
of this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve
analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the
vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams upon
touching a hot burner. The bird, the person who sees the vase, and the
child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds.
I would be interested in moving from the abstract to the concrete stage of
this inquiry, but only after we have settled a bit more firmly on what a
Quasi-mind is; then on what a perfect Sign is; then if the two really are
one. Once we have some agreement on *that* perhaps we can move on to a more
concrete experiment.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your point
> about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken. With
> that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for Peirce's
> statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of
> assertion of Existential Graphs."
>
> - A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the Sheet
> of Assertion is an example.
> - A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but
> there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
> - Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other
> kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but there
> are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
>
> I am sorry that you do not find my identification and exploration of these
> options enlightening.
>
> 2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few days
> ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has the capacity
> for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is what distinguishes
> it from a brute Thing, a strictly *material *reacting substance whose
> habits have become *inveterate, like a mere "set of molecules*." It is
> also a perfect Sign that constitutes an aggregate or complex of all
> previous Signs that have determined it, which are so connected together as
> to produce one Interpretant; this is the sense in which it "stores" the
> Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which serve as its
> Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants, which serve as
> its Habits of Interpretation.
>
> As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an indispensable ingredient
> for any semiosis to occur. For *natural *Signs, there is no utterer, but
> the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For *genuine *Signs, the utterer is a
> Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their overlap--where they
> are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a Quasi-mind. This is
> illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the Quasi-mind where the Graphist
> and Interpreter are at one--not only in the Signs that they proceed to
> scribe on it, but also in everything that is tacitly taken for granted
> between them from the outset of their discussion, when the sheet itself is
> still *blank*. As always, these two Quasi-minds can be different
> temporal versions of the *same* Quasi-mind.
>
> As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the
> universe a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was
> presenting it as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by
> "determination."
>
> CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do
> good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric
> of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical
> concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without
> metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a
> community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles ...
> (EP 2:392; 1906)
>
>
> 3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages of
> this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve
> analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the
> vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams
> upon touching a hot burner. The bird, the person who sees the vase, and
> the child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds.
>
> I do not expect you to say anything further about any of this.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon -
>>
>> 1. All I can say is that your definitions are circular. You repeat that
>> 'a perfect mind= a quasi-mind= the sheet of assertion of the EG. This,
>> frankly, is not an argument; it is not enlightening; it doesn't MEAN
>> anything. I must even wonder why, if you are correct - Peirce provided all
>> these terms for the SAME thing.
>>
>> I'm not going to repeat my interpretation of the Rhemetic Indexical
>> Legisign - since we won't get anywhere with that.
>>
>> 2. I also disagree with your view of the Quasi-mind...You don't provide a
>> definition of WHAT it does; you merely tell us all the synonyms for it. I
>> understand it as a local emergence of Mind, emerging within a semiosic
>> interaction between an 'utterer and an interpreter' [which could be between
>> two chemicals, between two insects, between two people or in one person].
>> The point is - it's a LOCAL and dialogic interaction of, so to speak, the
>> Universal Mind, and is thus - as local - a 'Quasi-Mind'.
>>
>> So- yes, a 'mere set of molecules' qualifies as a Quasi-mind when in
>> interaction. After all Peirce provided such an example of molecules as an
>> example of a quasi-mind.
>>
>> 3. You don't propose a definition; you simply copy words from Peirce;
>> collate them; use them as synonyms - but - the function of what these terms
>> stand for - is ignored. So- I don't see the point of this discussion and
>> won't continue.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Wed 21/02/18 11:52 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
>> sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> 1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward pair of
>> sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever else it might be,
>> is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of Assertion of Existential
>> Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know, from various other quotes, that
>> the Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic Sheet) is a Quasi-mind. My current
>> hypothesis is that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same,
>> but Gary F. has challenged this; and if he (or anyone else) provides a
>> clear counterexample, I will abandon it accordingly and be grateful for the
>> correction. The alternative, as I see it, is that a perfect Sign and the
>> Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but there are also other kinds
>> of Quasi-minds.
>>
>> In CP 4.550-553, Peirce characterized both Mind ("in one of the narrowest
>> and most concrete of its logical meanings") and the Phemic
>> Sheet ("representing the Mind" and "being the Quasi-mind") as "a Seme of
>> the Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality"; so in that sense,
>> the Sheet of Assertion is indeed a Rheme. However, he went on to say that
>> it is, " at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for
>> granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their
>> discussion"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also a
>> Dicisign. He also stated, "We are to imagine that two parties collaborate
>> in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a
>> Delome"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also an Argument.
>> The reason why it can be all three Sign classes simultaneously is because
>> every
>> Argument involves Dicisigns, and every Dicisign involves Rhemes.
>>
>> Since the Sheet of Assertion is both an Argument and a perfect Sign, it
>> obviously cannot be the case that what Peirce means by "perfect Sign" is a
>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign. Furthermore, "perfect" in this context does
>> not necessarily imply the ability to "do everything and anything semiosic,"
>> although I find it noteworthy that an Argument is the only class of Sign
>> that involves all of the others. Again, I strongly suspect that
>> "perfect" is instead related to Entelechy, especially in light of
>> Peirce's statement elsewhere that "We may adopt the word to mean the very
>> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
>> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
>> denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904).
>>
>> 2. I obviously cannot read your mind and do not have your experience, so
>> the only way for me to see how you justify your position--that CP 5.119
>> is "mere metaphoric rhetoric"--is if you provide an explanation. Since
>> "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551) and "matter
>> is effete mind" (CP 6.25), "mental association" is not confined to human
>> conceptual semiosis; it can (and does) occur in any Quasi-mind. I am
>> certainly not claiming that a mere "set of molecules" qualifies as a
>> Quasi-mind; are you?
>>
>> 3. What we are pursuing here is, like all thought, a dialogic process of
>> inquiry. We propose a definition (Retroduction), explicate its
>> implications (Deduction), test it against experience (Induction), and
>> revise/repeat as needed.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon -
>>>
>>> 1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such perfect
>>> sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"
>>> (EP 2:545n25).
>>>
>>> So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which
>>> still hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of
>>> assertion of Existential Graphs'.
>>>
>>> I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear
>>> tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve; as b]
>>> directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an individual local
>>> interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me - since it includes the
>>> utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all three categorical modes and -
>>> is that clear tri-relative framework, then, it's the 'perfect sign' and
>>> can do everything and anything semiosic. ..The rheme's individual
>>> local interpretation is related to the legisign's general Thirdness and -
>>> and yet- is grounded by that existential indexical connection to the object.
>>>
>>> 2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's
>>> statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads me to
>>> make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher authority?
>>>
>>> As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have claimed
>>> that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I don't keep
>>> archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the symbol - and it is
>>> clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action and Not indexical which
>>> involves an existential connection. The symbol is a 'mental association
>>> 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates
>>> the sign with its object; in that case, the sign is a name or symbol". It
>>> is a mental act 2.438] . It requires an interpretant [see 2.304]...
>>>
>>> Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a symbol
>>> and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim that molecules
>>> use symbols in their informational interactions? Because Mind, as law, is
>>> involved in chemical composition, does not mean that this same set of
>>> molecules uses its own mental actions to interpret its own nature.
>>>
>>> 3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of the
>>> function of that which is being defined.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> 1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position, not
>>> simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic Indexical
>>> Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"; please
>>> explain
>>> it to me.
>>>
>>> 2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of
>>> the universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric
>>> rhetoric"? Again, please explain it to me, rather than just asserting it.
>>> Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551; 1906),
>>> why should we treat any of the ten Sign classes as confined to human
>>> conceptual semiosis?
>>>
>>> 3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis, rather
>>> than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example) ably practices,
>>> and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such differences are
>>> precisely why collaboration is such an important aspect of the
>>> List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and learn from each
>>> other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our pre-established views. I
>>> am actually very interested in exploring the nature and function of
>>> perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within concrete semiosis, but for me, coming
>>> up with clear definitions of those terms is the first step.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, list
>>>>
>>>> 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its
>>>> qualities that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign'
>>>> cannot fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential graphs.
>>>>
>>>> 2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or 'argument'
>>>> in this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the ten classes of
>>>> signs. I consider his use here as mere metaphoric rhetoric and not as a
>>>> semiotic analysis of the Universe.
>>>>
>>>> If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within semiosis,
>>>> you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual construct, it refers to
>>>> "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of
>>>> general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as
>>>> referring to that Object" 2.249.
>>>>
>>>> And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an intellectual
>>>> construct.[see 2.251-3].
>>>>
>>>> Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and not
>>>> to physic-chemical or biological semiosis.
>>>>
>>>> 3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is that
>>>> they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words; i.e.,
>>>> substituting one set of words for another set of words.
>>>>
>>>> I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't
>>>> seem interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the semiosic
>>>> universe and how and why does it even exist and operate.
>>>>
>>>> And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why and
>>>> how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this aspect.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
>>>> sent:
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking at
>>>> Peirce's own words ...
>>>>
>>>> 1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
>>>> Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that a
>>>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of Existential
>>>> Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that position. If not, then
>>>> a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what Peirce meant by "perfect
>>>> sign."
>>>>
>>>> 2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
>>>> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
>>>> must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its
>>>> Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities
>>>> play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe--that
>>>> Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903).
>>>> Since Peirce calls the entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he
>>>> obviously did not confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual
>>>> semiosis. Why should we?
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> list -
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us
>>>>> has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'.
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function as
>>>>> the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II]. The
>>>>> Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within that
>>>>> semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a triadic
>>>>> relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its
>>>>> interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the representamen
>>>>> determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the
>>>>> same object for some interpretant" [1.541]. This relational, dynamic
>>>>> nature
>>>>> must be acknowledged.
>>>>>
>>>>> Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process, then,
>>>>> I consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical Legisign', for,
>>>>> in my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by Peirce : connection to
>>>>> object [indexical]; aging [within the legisign]; and local individualism
>>>>> [within the rhematic local interpretation].
>>>>>
>>>>> What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the
>>>>> localization of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic interaction
>>>>> between Utterer and Interpreter and thus - such an interaction would have
>>>>> two quasi-minds. I don't see why this localization of mind, which I see as
>>>>> the quasi-mind, is ALSO a perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic
>>>>> Indexical Legisign which is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten
>>>>> classes [includes all three categorical modes].
>>>>>
>>>>> In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to humans
>>>>> but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of quasi-minds'
>>>>> consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are 'intricately'
>>>>> connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's view that the
>>>>> quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote] appears as a Symbol and
>>>>> Argument - which would confine it to human conceptual semiosis.
>>>>>
>>>>> I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from some
>>>>> posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a
>>>>> quasi-mind
>>>>> and a perfect sign.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
