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Jon -
1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such
perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25).
So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which
still hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of
assertion of Existential Graphs'.
I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear
tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve;
as b] directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an
individual local interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me -
since it includes the utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all
three categorical modes and - is that clear tri-relative framework,
then, it's the 'perfect sign' and can do everything and anything
semiosic. ..The rheme's individual local interpretation is related to
the legisign's general Thirdness and - and yet- is grounded by that
existential indexical connection to the object.
2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's
statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads
me to make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher
authority?
As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have
claimed that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I
don't keep archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the
symbol - and it is clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action
and Not indexical which involves an existential connection. The symbol
is a 'mental association 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the
fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case,
the sign is a name or symbol". It is a mental act 2.438] . It
requires an interpretant [see 2.304]...
Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a
symbol and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim
that molecules use symbols in their informational interactions?
Because Mind, as law, is involved in chemical composition, does not
mean that this same set of molecules uses its own mental actions to
interpret its own nature.
3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of
the function of that which is being defined.
Edwina
On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, List:
1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position,
not simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential
Graphs"; please explain it to me.
2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of
the universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric
rhetoric"? Again, please explain it to me, rather than just
asserting it. Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a
brain" (CP 4.551; 1906), why should we treat any of the ten Sign
classes as confined to human conceptual semiosis?
3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis,
rather than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example)
ably practices, and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such
differences are precisely why collaboration is such an important
aspect of the List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and
learn from each other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our
pre-established views. I am actually very interested in exploring
the nature and function of perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within
concrete semiosis, but for me, coming up with clear definitions of
those terms is the first step.
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon, list
1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its
qualities that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect
sign' cannot fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential
graphs.
2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or
'argument' in this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the
ten classes of signs. I consider his use here as mere metaphoric
rhetoric and not as a semiotic analysis of the Universe.
If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within
semiosis, you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual
construct, it refers to "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a
law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause
the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object" 2.249.
And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an
intellectual construct.[see 2.251-3].
Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and
not to physic-chemical or biological semiosis.
3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is
that they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words;
i.e., substituting one set of words for another set of words.
I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't
seem interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the
semiosic universe and how and why does it even exist and operate.
And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why
and how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this
aspect.
Edwina
On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
[2] sent:
Edwina, List:
Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking
at Peirce's own words ...
1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion
of Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that
a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of
Existential Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that
position. If not, then a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what
Peirce meant by "perfect sign."
2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of
God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now
every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of
Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these
reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of
course, play in the universe--that Universe being precisely an
argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903). Since Peirce calls the
entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he obviously did not
confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual semiosis. Why
should we?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
list -
I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us
has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'.
Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function
as the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II].
The Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within
that semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a
triadic relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called
its interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the
representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" [1.541].
This relational, dynamic nature must be acknowledged.
Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process,
then, I consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical
Legisign', for, in my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by
Peirce : connection to object [indexical]; aging [within the
legisign]; and local individualism [within the rhematic local
interpretation].
What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the
localization of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic
interaction between Utterer and Interpreter and thus - such an
interaction would have two quasi-minds. I don't see why this
localization of mind, which I see as the quasi-mind, is ALSO a
perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic Indexical Legisign which
is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten classes [includes all
three categorical modes].
In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to
humans but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of
quasi-minds' consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are
'intricately' connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's
view that the quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote]
appears as a Symbol and Argument - which would confine it to human
conceptual semiosis.
I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from
some posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a
quasi-mind and a perfect sign.
Edwina
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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