Nice response -- here's mine Do not pretend to know my name
The words I use are weak and lame They cannot tell from whence they came They don’t pretend to know my name + There is no reason to say more I do not know what this is for There is no why there’s no wherefore Why is there reason to say more + I have an inkling that is all Our weather changes spring to fall Still no one know’s what’s past time’s wall save for an inkling that is all amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 5:38 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Helmut, > > > > You said, > > All that is a reflection in another mirror, a bit further away. Solipsism > is assuming an endless series of mirrors behind mirrors. Sounds like hell. > Can you show a way out.. > > > > I would presume based on our past experiences that you wouldn’t care for > me to show you a way out, but rather, for me to say how Peirce would show a > way out. > > > > I am not sure what the following means but it is in *Some Consequences*, > and many scholars, pragmatists, pragamticists, have already spoken on its > connected themes. > > > I suppose one could argue that whether they had anything relevant to say > would depend on whether the reader makes any effort to follow their > argument, rather than being satisfied that he can work it out on his own by > reflecting on the issues, himself, in isolation. To help matters, though, > Peirce did follow up with *Man's Glassy Essence, *'tho it adds to the > amount of things one has to think about.. > > In any case, here it is: > > > The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by > ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and > from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man, > > > ". . . proud man, > Most ignorant of what he's most assured, > His glassy essence." > > > > As for Peirce, he also says this, of course: > > > > The apostle of Humanism says that professional philosophists “have > rendered philosophy like unto themselves, abstruse, arid, abstract, and > abhorrent.” But I conceive that some branches of science are *not* in a > healthy state if they are not abstruse, arid, and abstract, in which > case, like the Aristotelianism which is this gentleman’s particular bête > noire, it will be as Shakespeare said (*of it*, remember) > > > > “Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose, > > But musical as is Apollo’s lute,” etc. > > > > I hope I have led you to a way out, > > Jerry R > > > On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jerry, >> when a mirror appears in the field of sight, then the eye can see itself. >> Its owner may ask him/herself: What is behind that mirror? But the mirror >> is there, so behind it is also what is behind the eye. But the world too. >> So it is the (eye-owner´s) world, and the owner of the world, being a part >> of it. All that is a reflection in another mirror, a bit further away. >> Solipsism is assuming an endless series of mirrors behind mirrors. Sounds >> like hell. Can you show a way out, for Quasimodo of Notre-Dame, and us all? >> Something like transcendence or what ever? >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 21. Februar 2018 um 20:53 Uhr >> *Von:* "Jerry Rhee" <[email protected]> >> >> >> Dear list, >> >> >> >> Speaking of the person who sees the vase, who happens to be a Quasi-mind: >> >> >> >> *5.6 * >> >> *The limits of my language** mean the limits of my world.* >> >> >> >> *5.61* >> >> Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. >> >> We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, >> *that* there is not. >> >> >> >> For *that* would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain >> possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get >> outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits >> from the other side also. >> >> >> >> What we cannot think, *that* we cannot think: we cannot therefore *say* what >> we cannot think. >> >> >> >> *5.62* >> >> *This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is >> a truth.* >> >> In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be >> *said*, but it shows itself. >> >> That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits >> of the language (*the* language which I understand) mean the limits of >> *my* world. >> >> >> >> *5.63* >> >> I am the world. (The microcosm.) >> >> >> >> *5.633* >> >> *Where in* the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? >> >> You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field >> of sight. But you do *not* really see the eye. >> >> And from nothing *in the field of sight* can it be concluded that it is >> seen from an eye. >> >> >> >> *5.6331* >> >> For the field of sight has not a form like this: >> >> http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/f56331.gif >> >> >> >> *5.64* >> >> *Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure >> realism*. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there >> remains the reality co-ordinated with it. >> >> >> >> *There is in the dictionary a word, solipsism, meaning >> the belief that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to >> adopt such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when >> a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of >> their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical >> theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego**.* >> >> >> >> Hth, >> >> Jerry R >> >> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 1:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your point >>> about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken. With >>> that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for Peirce's >>> statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of >>> assertion of Existential Graphs." >>> >>> - A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the >>> Sheet of Assertion is an example. >>> - A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, >>> but there are other kinds of Quasi-minds. >>> - Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other >>> kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but there >>> are other kinds of Quasi-minds. >>> >>> I am sorry that you do not find my identification and exploration of >>> these options enlightening. >>> >>> 2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few days >>> ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has the >>> capacity for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is what >>> distinguishes it from a brute Thing, a strictly *material *reacting >>> substance whose habits have become *inveterate, like a mere "set of >>> molecules*." It is also a perfect Sign that constitutes an aggregate >>> or complex of all previous Signs that have determined it, which are so >>> connected together as to produce one Interpretant; this is the sense in >>> which it "stores" the Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which >>> serve as its Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants, >>> which serve as its Habits of Interpretation. >>> >>> As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an indispensable ingredient >>> for any semiosis to occur. For *natural *Signs, there is no utterer, >>> but the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For *genuine *Signs, the utterer >>> is a Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their overlap--where >>> they are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a Quasi-mind. This >>> is illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the Quasi-mind where the >>> Graphist and Interpreter are at one--not only in the Signs that they >>> proceed to scribe on it, but also in everything that is tacitly taken for >>> granted between them from the outset of their discussion, when the sheet >>> itself is still *blank*. As always, these two Quasi-minds can be >>> different temporal versions of the *same* Quasi-mind. >>> >>> As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the >>> universe a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was >>> presenting it as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by >>> "determination." >>> >>> >>> CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will >>> do good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a >>> fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and >>> phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure >>> idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a >>> peel. Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of >>> bottles ... (EP 2:392; 1906) >>> >>> >>> 3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages of >>> this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve >>> analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the >>> vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams >>> upon touching a hot burner. The bird, the person who sees the vase, and >>> the child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds. >>> >>> I do not expect you to say anything further about any of this. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Jon - >>>> >>>> 1. All I can say is that your definitions are circular. You repeat that >>>> 'a perfect mind= a quasi-mind= the sheet of assertion of the EG. This, >>>> frankly, is not an argument; it is not enlightening; it doesn't MEAN >>>> anything. I must even wonder why, if you are correct - Peirce provided all >>>> these terms for the SAME thing. >>>> >>>> I'm not going to repeat my interpretation of the Rhemetic Indexical >>>> Legisign - since we won't get anywhere with that. >>>> >>>> 2. I also disagree with your view of the Quasi-mind...You don't provide >>>> a definition of WHAT it does; you merely tell us all the synonyms for it. I >>>> understand it as a local emergence of Mind, emerging within a semiosic >>>> interaction between an 'utterer and an interpreter' [which could be between >>>> two chemicals, between two insects, between two people or in one person]. >>>> The point is - it's a LOCAL and dialogic interaction of, so to speak, the >>>> Universal Mind, and is thus - as local - a 'Quasi-Mind'. >>>> >>>> So- yes, a 'mere set of molecules' qualifies as a Quasi-mind when in >>>> interaction. After all Peirce provided such an example of molecules as an >>>> example of a quasi-mind. >>>> >>>> 3. You don't propose a definition; you simply copy words from Peirce; >>>> collate them; use them as synonyms - but - the function of what these terms >>>> stand for - is ignored. So- I don't see the point of this discussion and >>>> won't continue. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Wed 21/02/18 11:52 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> 1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward pair >>>> of sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever else it might >>>> be, is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of Assertion of Existential >>>> Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know, from various other quotes, that >>>> the Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic Sheet) is a Quasi-mind. My current >>>> hypothesis is that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, >>>> but Gary F. has challenged this; and if he (or anyone else) provides a >>>> clear counterexample, I will abandon it accordingly and be grateful for the >>>> correction. The alternative, as I see it, is that a perfect Sign and the >>>> Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but there are also other kinds >>>> of Quasi-minds. >>>> >>>> In CP 4.550-553, Peirce characterized both Mind ("in one of the >>>> narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings") and the Phemic >>>> Sheet ("representing the Mind" and "being the Quasi-mind") as "a Seme of >>>> the Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality"; so in that sense, >>>> the Sheet of Assertion is indeed a Rheme. However, he went on to say that >>>> it is, " at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for >>>> granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their >>>> discussion"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also a >>>> Dicisign. He also stated, "We are to imagine that two parties collaborate >>>> in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a >>>> Delome"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also an >>>> Argument. The reason why it can be all three Sign classes simultaneously >>>> is because every Argument involves Dicisigns, and every Dicisign involves >>>> Rhemes. >>>> >>>> Since the Sheet of Assertion is both an Argument and a perfect Sign, it >>>> obviously cannot be the case that what Peirce means by "perfect Sign" is a >>>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign. Furthermore, "perfect" in this context does >>>> not necessarily imply the ability to "do everything and anything semiosic," >>>> although I find it noteworthy that an Argument is the only class of >>>> Sign that involves all of the others. Again, I strongly suspect that >>>> "perfect" is instead related to Entelechy, especially in light of >>>> Peirce's statement elsewhere that "We may adopt the word to mean the very >>>> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so >>>> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter >>>> denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904). >>>> >>>> 2. I obviously cannot read your mind and do not have your experience, >>>> so the only way for me to see how you justify your position--that CP >>>> 5.119 is "mere metaphoric rhetoric"--is if you provide an >>>> explanation. Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP >>>> 4.551) and "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), "mental association" is not >>>> confined to human conceptual semiosis; it can (and does) occur in any >>>> Quasi-mind. >>>> I am certainly not claiming that a mere "set of molecules" qualifies as a >>>> Quasi-mind; are you? >>>> >>>> 3. What we are pursuing here is, like all thought, a dialogic process >>>> of inquiry. We propose a definition (Retroduction), explicate its >>>> implications (Deduction), test it against experience (Induction), and >>>> revise/repeat as needed. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon S. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Jon - >>>>> >>>>> 1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such perfect >>>>> sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs" >>>>> (EP 2:545n25). >>>>> >>>>> So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which >>>>> still hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of >>>>> assertion of Existential Graphs'. >>>>> >>>>> I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear >>>>> tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve; as b] >>>>> directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an individual local >>>>> interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me - since it includes the >>>>> utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all three categorical modes and >>>>> - >>>>> is that clear tri-relative framework, then, it's the 'perfect sign' and >>>>> can do everything and anything semiosic. ..The rheme's individual >>>>> local interpretation is related to the legisign's general Thirdness and - >>>>> and yet- is grounded by that existential indexical connection to the >>>>> object. >>>>> >>>>> 2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's >>>>> statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads me >>>>> to >>>>> make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher authority? >>>>> >>>>> As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have >>>>> claimed that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I don't >>>>> keep archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the symbol - and it >>>>> is clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action and Not indexical >>>>> which involves an existential connection. The symbol is a 'mental >>>>> association 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the fact that the mind >>>>> associates the sign with its object; in that case, the sign is a name or >>>>> symbol". It is a mental act 2.438] . It requires an interpretant [see >>>>> 2.304]... >>>>> >>>>> Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a >>>>> symbol and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim that >>>>> molecules use symbols in their informational interactions? Because Mind, >>>>> as >>>>> law, is involved in chemical composition, does not mean that this same set >>>>> of molecules uses its own mental actions to interpret its own nature. >>>>> >>>>> 3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of >>>>> the function of that which is being defined. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>>>> sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position, >>>>> not simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic >>>>> Indexical Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential >>>>> Graphs"; please explain it to me. >>>>> >>>>> 2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of >>>>> the universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric >>>>> rhetoric"? Again, please explain it to me, rather than just asserting >>>>> it. Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP >>>>> 4.551; 1906), why should we treat any of the ten Sign classes as >>>>> confined to human conceptual semiosis? >>>>> >>>>> 3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis, rather >>>>> than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example) ably practices, >>>>> and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such differences are >>>>> precisely why collaboration is such an important aspect of the >>>>> List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and learn from >>>>> each other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our pre-established >>>>> views. I am actually very interested in exploring the nature and >>>>> function of perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within concrete semiosis, but >>>>> for >>>>> me, coming up with clear definitions of those terms is the first step. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, >>>>> >>>>> Jon S. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon, list >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its >>>>>> qualities that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign' >>>>>> cannot fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential graphs. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or >>>>>> 'argument' in this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the ten >>>>>> classes of signs. I consider his use here as mere metaphoric rhetoric and >>>>>> not as a semiotic analysis of the Universe. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within >>>>>> semiosis, you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual construct, it >>>>>> refers to "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an >>>>>> association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be >>>>>> interpreted as referring to that Object" 2.249. >>>>>> >>>>>> And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an >>>>>> intellectual construct.[see 2.251-3]. >>>>>> >>>>>> Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and not >>>>>> to physic-chemical or biological semiosis. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is that >>>>>> they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words; i.e., >>>>>> substituting one set of words for another set of words. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't >>>>>> seem interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the semiosic >>>>>> universe and how and why does it even exist and operate. >>>>>> >>>>>> And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why >>>>>> and how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this >>>>>> aspect. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>>>>> sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking at >>>>>> Peirce's own words ... >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion >>>>>> of Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that a >>>>>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of Existential >>>>>> Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that position. If not, >>>>>> then >>>>>> a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what Peirce meant by >>>>>> "perfect sign." >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of >>>>>> God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every >>>>>> symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions >>>>>> and >>>>>> its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these >>>>>> qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the >>>>>> universe--that Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP >>>>>> 2:193-194; 1903). Since Peirce calls the entire universe a Symbol >>>>>> and an Argument, he obviously did not confine Symbols and Arguments >>>>>> to human conceptual semiosis. Why should we? >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> list - >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us >>>>>>> has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function >>>>>>> as the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II]. The >>>>>>> Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within that >>>>>>> semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a triadic >>>>>>> relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its >>>>>>> interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the representamen >>>>>>> determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the >>>>>>> same object for some interpretant" [1.541]. This relational, dynamic >>>>>>> nature >>>>>>> must be acknowledged. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process, >>>>>>> then, I consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical >>>>>>> Legisign', >>>>>>> for, in my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by Peirce : >>>>>>> connection to object [indexical]; aging [within the legisign]; and local >>>>>>> individualism [within the rhematic local interpretation]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the >>>>>>> localization of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic interaction >>>>>>> between Utterer and Interpreter and thus - such an interaction would >>>>>>> have >>>>>>> two quasi-minds. I don't see why this localization of mind, which I see >>>>>>> as >>>>>>> the quasi-mind, is ALSO a perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic >>>>>>> Indexical Legisign which is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten >>>>>>> classes [includes all three categorical modes]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to >>>>>>> humans but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of >>>>>>> quasi-minds' >>>>>>> consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are 'intricately' >>>>>>> connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's view that the >>>>>>> quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote] appears as a Symbol >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> Argument - which would confine it to human conceptual semiosis. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from >>>>>>> some posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a >>>>>>> quasi-mind and a perfect sign. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >> in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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