Dear list,
Speaking of the person who sees the vase, who happens to be a Quasi-mind: *5.6 * *The limits of my language** mean the limits of my world.* *5.61* Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, *that* there is not. For *that* would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. What we cannot think, *that* we cannot think: we cannot therefore *say* what we cannot think. *5.62* *This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth.* In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but it shows itself. That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (*the* language which I understand) mean the limits of *my* world. *5.63* I am the world. (The microcosm.) *5.633* *Where in* the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do *not* really see the eye. And from nothing *in the field of sight* can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye. *5.6331* For the field of sight has not a form like this: http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/f56331.gif *5.64* *Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism*. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. *There is in the dictionary a word, solipsism, meaning the belief that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego**.* Hth, Jerry R On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 1:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your point > about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken. With > that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for Peirce's > statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of > assertion of Existential Graphs." > > - A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the Sheet > of Assertion is an example. > - A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but > there are other kinds of Quasi-minds. > - Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other > kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but there > are other kinds of Quasi-minds. > > I am sorry that you do not find my identification and exploration of these > options enlightening. > > 2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few days > ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has the capacity > for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is what distinguishes > it from a brute Thing, a strictly *material *reacting substance whose > habits have become *inveterate, like a mere "set of molecules*." It is > also a perfect Sign that constitutes an aggregate or complex of all > previous Signs that have determined it, which are so connected together as > to produce one Interpretant; this is the sense in which it "stores" the > Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which serve as its > Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants, which serve as > its Habits of Interpretation. > > As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an indispensable ingredient > for any semiosis to occur. For *natural *Signs, there is no utterer, but > the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For *genuine *Signs, the utterer is a > Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their overlap--where they > are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a Quasi-mind. This is > illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the Quasi-mind where the Graphist > and Interpreter are at one--not only in the Signs that they proceed to > scribe on it, but also in everything that is tacitly taken for granted > between them from the outset of their discussion, when the sheet itself is > still *blank*. As always, these two Quasi-minds can be different > temporal versions of the *same* Quasi-mind. > > As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the > universe a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was > presenting it as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by > "determination." > > CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do > good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric > of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical > concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without > metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a > community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles ... > (EP 2:392; 1906) > > > 3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages of > this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve > analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the > vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams > upon touching a hot burner. The bird, the person who sees the vase, and > the child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds. > > I do not expect you to say anything further about any of this. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon - >> >> 1. All I can say is that your definitions are circular. You repeat that >> 'a perfect mind= a quasi-mind= the sheet of assertion of the EG. This, >> frankly, is not an argument; it is not enlightening; it doesn't MEAN >> anything. I must even wonder why, if you are correct - Peirce provided all >> these terms for the SAME thing. >> >> I'm not going to repeat my interpretation of the Rhemetic Indexical >> Legisign - since we won't get anywhere with that. >> >> 2. I also disagree with your view of the Quasi-mind...You don't provide a >> definition of WHAT it does; you merely tell us all the synonyms for it. I >> understand it as a local emergence of Mind, emerging within a semiosic >> interaction between an 'utterer and an interpreter' [which could be between >> two chemicals, between two insects, between two people or in one person]. >> The point is - it's a LOCAL and dialogic interaction of, so to speak, the >> Universal Mind, and is thus - as local - a 'Quasi-Mind'. >> >> So- yes, a 'mere set of molecules' qualifies as a Quasi-mind when in >> interaction. After all Peirce provided such an example of molecules as an >> example of a quasi-mind. >> >> 3. You don't propose a definition; you simply copy words from Peirce; >> collate them; use them as synonyms - but - the function of what these terms >> stand for - is ignored. So- I don't see the point of this discussion and >> won't continue. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Wed 21/02/18 11:52 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> 1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward pair of >> sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever else it might be, >> is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of Assertion of Existential >> Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know, from various other quotes, that >> the Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic Sheet) is a Quasi-mind. My current >> hypothesis is that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, >> but Gary F. has challenged this; and if he (or anyone else) provides a >> clear counterexample, I will abandon it accordingly and be grateful for the >> correction. The alternative, as I see it, is that a perfect Sign and the >> Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but there are also other kinds >> of Quasi-minds. >> >> In CP 4.550-553, Peirce characterized both Mind ("in one of the narrowest >> and most concrete of its logical meanings") and the Phemic >> Sheet ("representing the Mind" and "being the Quasi-mind") as "a Seme of >> the Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality"; so in that sense, >> the Sheet of Assertion is indeed a Rheme. However, he went on to say that >> it is, " at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for >> granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their >> discussion"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also a >> Dicisign. He also stated, "We are to imagine that two parties collaborate >> in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a >> Delome"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also an Argument. >> The reason why it can be all three Sign classes simultaneously is because >> every >> Argument involves Dicisigns, and every Dicisign involves Rhemes. >> >> Since the Sheet of Assertion is both an Argument and a perfect Sign, it >> obviously cannot be the case that what Peirce means by "perfect Sign" is a >> Rhematic Indexical Legisign. Furthermore, "perfect" in this context does >> not necessarily imply the ability to "do everything and anything semiosic," >> although I find it noteworthy that an Argument is the only class of Sign >> that involves all of the others. Again, I strongly suspect that >> "perfect" is instead related to Entelechy, especially in light of >> Peirce's statement elsewhere that "We may adopt the word to mean the very >> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so >> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter >> denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904). >> >> 2. I obviously cannot read your mind and do not have your experience, so >> the only way for me to see how you justify your position--that CP 5.119 >> is "mere metaphoric rhetoric"--is if you provide an explanation. Since >> "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551) and "matter >> is effete mind" (CP 6.25), "mental association" is not confined to human >> conceptual semiosis; it can (and does) occur in any Quasi-mind. I am >> certainly not claiming that a mere "set of molecules" qualifies as a >> Quasi-mind; are you? >> >> 3. What we are pursuing here is, like all thought, a dialogic process of >> inquiry. We propose a definition (Retroduction), explicate its >> implications (Deduction), test it against experience (Induction), and >> revise/repeat as needed. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - >>> >>> 1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such perfect >>> sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs" >>> (EP 2:545n25). >>> >>> So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which >>> still hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of >>> assertion of Existential Graphs'. >>> >>> I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear >>> tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve; as b] >>> directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an individual local >>> interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me - since it includes the >>> utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all three categorical modes and - >>> is that clear tri-relative framework, then, it's the 'perfect sign' and >>> can do everything and anything semiosic. ..The rheme's individual >>> local interpretation is related to the legisign's general Thirdness and - >>> and yet- is grounded by that existential indexical connection to the object. >>> >>> 2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's >>> statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads me to >>> make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher authority? >>> >>> As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have claimed >>> that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I don't keep >>> archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the symbol - and it is >>> clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action and Not indexical which >>> involves an existential connection. The symbol is a 'mental association >>> 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates >>> the sign with its object; in that case, the sign is a name or symbol". It >>> is a mental act 2.438] . It requires an interpretant [see 2.304]... >>> >>> Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a symbol >>> and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim that molecules >>> use symbols in their informational interactions? Because Mind, as law, is >>> involved in chemical composition, does not mean that this same set of >>> molecules uses its own mental actions to interpret its own nature. >>> >>> 3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of the >>> function of that which is being defined. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> 1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position, not >>> simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic Indexical >>> Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"; please >>> explain >>> it to me. >>> >>> 2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of >>> the universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric >>> rhetoric"? Again, please explain it to me, rather than just asserting it. >>> Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551; 1906), >>> why should we treat any of the ten Sign classes as confined to human >>> conceptual semiosis? >>> >>> 3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis, rather >>> than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example) ably practices, >>> and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such differences are >>> precisely why collaboration is such an important aspect of the >>> List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and learn from each >>> other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our pre-established views. I >>> am actually very interested in exploring the nature and function of >>> perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within concrete semiosis, but for me, coming >>> up with clear definitions of those terms is the first step. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, list >>>> >>>> 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its >>>> qualities that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign' >>>> cannot fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential graphs. >>>> >>>> 2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or 'argument' >>>> in this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the ten classes of >>>> signs. I consider his use here as mere metaphoric rhetoric and not as a >>>> semiotic analysis of the Universe. >>>> >>>> If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within semiosis, >>>> you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual construct, it refers to >>>> "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of >>>> general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as >>>> referring to that Object" 2.249. >>>> >>>> And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an intellectual >>>> construct.[see 2.251-3]. >>>> >>>> Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and not >>>> to physic-chemical or biological semiosis. >>>> >>>> 3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is that >>>> they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words; i.e., >>>> substituting one set of words for another set of words. >>>> >>>> I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't >>>> seem interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the semiosic >>>> universe and how and why does it even exist and operate. >>>> >>>> And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why and >>>> how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this aspect. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking at >>>> Peirce's own words ... >>>> >>>> 1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of >>>> Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that a >>>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of Existential >>>> Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that position. If not, then >>>> a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what Peirce meant by "perfect >>>> sign." >>>> >>>> 2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's >>>> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol >>>> must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its >>>> Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities >>>> play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe--that >>>> Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903). >>>> Since Peirce calls the entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he >>>> obviously did not confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual >>>> semiosis. Why should we? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> list - >>>>> >>>>> I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us >>>>> has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'. >>>>> >>>>> Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function as >>>>> the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II]. The >>>>> Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within that >>>>> semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a triadic >>>>> relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its >>>>> interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the representamen >>>>> determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the >>>>> same object for some interpretant" [1.541]. This relational, dynamic >>>>> nature >>>>> must be acknowledged. >>>>> >>>>> Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process, then, >>>>> I consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical Legisign', for, >>>>> in my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by Peirce : connection to >>>>> object [indexical]; aging [within the legisign]; and local individualism >>>>> [within the rhematic local interpretation]. >>>>> >>>>> What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the >>>>> localization of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic interaction >>>>> between Utterer and Interpreter and thus - such an interaction would have >>>>> two quasi-minds. I don't see why this localization of mind, which I see as >>>>> the quasi-mind, is ALSO a perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic >>>>> Indexical Legisign which is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten >>>>> classes [includes all three categorical modes]. >>>>> >>>>> In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to humans >>>>> but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of quasi-minds' >>>>> consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are 'intricately' >>>>> connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's view that the >>>>> quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote] appears as a Symbol and >>>>> Argument - which would confine it to human conceptual semiosis. >>>>> >>>>> I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from some >>>>> posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a >>>>> quasi-mind >>>>> and a perfect sign. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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