Edwina, List:
1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your point
about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken. With
that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for Peirce's
statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of
assertion of Existential Graphs."
- A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the Sheet of
Assertion is an example.
- A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but
there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
- Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other kinds
of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but there are
other kinds of Quasi-minds.
I am sorry that you do not find my identification and exploration of these
options enlightening.
2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few days
ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has the capacity
for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is what distinguishes
it from a brute Thing, a strictly *material *reacting substance whose
habits have become *inveterate, like a mere "set of molecules*." It is
also a perfect Sign that constitutes an aggregate or complex of all
previous Signs that have determined it, which are so connected together as
to produce one Interpretant; this is the sense in which it "stores" the
Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which serve as its
Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants, which serve as
its Habits of Interpretation.
As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an indispensable ingredient
for any semiosis to occur. For *natural *Signs, there is no utterer, but
the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For *genuine *Signs, the utterer is a
Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their overlap--where they
are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a Quasi-mind. This is
illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the Quasi-mind where the Graphist
and Interpreter are at one--not only in the Signs that they proceed to
scribe on it, but also in everything that is tacitly taken for granted
between them from the outset of their discussion, when the sheet itself is
still *blank*. As always, these two Quasi-minds can be different temporal
versions of the *same* Quasi-mind.
As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the universe
a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was presenting it
as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by "determination."
CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do
good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric
of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical
concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without
metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a
community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles ...
(EP 2:392; 1906)
3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages of
this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve
analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the
vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams upon
touching a hot burner. The bird, the person who sees the vase, and the
child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds.
I do not expect you to say anything further about any of this.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
> Jon -
>
> 1. All I can say is that your definitions are circular. You repeat that 'a
> perfect mind= a quasi-mind= the sheet of assertion of the EG. This,
> frankly, is not an argument; it is not enlightening; it doesn't MEAN
> anything. I must even wonder why, if you are correct - Peirce provided all
> these terms for the SAME thing.
>
> I'm not going to repeat my interpretation of the Rhemetic Indexical
> Legisign - since we won't get anywhere with that.
>
> 2. I also disagree with your view of the Quasi-mind...You don't provide a
> definition of WHAT it does; you merely tell us all the synonyms for it. I
> understand it as a local emergence of Mind, emerging within a semiosic
> interaction between an 'utterer and an interpreter' [which could be between
> two chemicals, between two insects, between two people or in one person].
> The point is - it's a LOCAL and dialogic interaction of, so to speak, the
> Universal Mind, and is thus - as local - a 'Quasi-Mind'.
>
> So- yes, a 'mere set of molecules' qualifies as a Quasi-mind when in
> interaction. After all Peirce provided such an example of molecules as an
> example of a quasi-mind.
>
> 3. You don't propose a definition; you simply copy words from Peirce;
> collate them; use them as synonyms - but - the function of what these terms
> stand for - is ignored. So- I don't see the point of this discussion and
> won't continue.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 21/02/18 11:52 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward pair of
> sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever else it might be,
> is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of Assertion of Existential
> Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know, from various other quotes, that
> the Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic Sheet) is a Quasi-mind. My current
> hypothesis is that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same,
> but Gary F. has challenged this; and if he (or anyone else) provides a
> clear counterexample, I will abandon it accordingly and be grateful for the
> correction. The alternative, as I see it, is that a perfect Sign and the
> Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but there are also other kinds
> of Quasi-minds.
>
> In CP 4.550-553, Peirce characterized both Mind ("in one of the narrowest
> and most concrete of its logical meanings") and the Phemic
> Sheet ("representing the Mind" and "being the Quasi-mind") as "a Seme of
> the Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality"; so in that sense,
> the Sheet of Assertion is indeed a Rheme. However, he went on to say that
> it is, " at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for
> granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their
> discussion"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also a
> Dicisign. He also stated, "We are to imagine that two parties collaborate
> in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this so as to develop a
> Delome"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion is also an Argument.
> The reason why it can be all three Sign classes simultaneously is because
> every
> Argument involves Dicisigns, and every Dicisign involves Rhemes.
>
> Since the Sheet of Assertion is both an Argument and a perfect Sign, it
> obviously cannot be the case that what Peirce means by "perfect Sign" is a
> Rhematic Indexical Legisign. Furthermore, "perfect" in this context does
> not necessarily imply the ability to "do everything and anything semiosic,"
> although I find it noteworthy that an Argument is the only class of Sign
> that involves all of the others. Again, I strongly suspect that
> "perfect" is instead related to Entelechy, especially in light of
> Peirce's statement elsewhere that "We may adopt the word to mean the very
> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
> denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904).
>
> 2. I obviously cannot read your mind and do not have your experience, so
> the only way for me to see how you justify your position--that CP 5.119
> is "mere metaphoric rhetoric"--is if you provide an explanation. Since
> "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551) and "matter
> is effete mind" (CP 6.25), "mental association" is not confined to human
> conceptual semiosis; it can (and does) occur in any Quasi-mind. I am
> certainly not claiming that a mere "set of molecules" qualifies as a
> Quasi-mind; are you?
>
> 3. What we are pursuing here is, like all thought, a dialogic process of
> inquiry. We propose a definition (Retroduction), explicate its
> implications (Deduction), test it against experience (Induction), and
> revise/repeat as needed.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon -
>>
>> 1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such perfect
>> sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"
>> (EP 2:545n25).
>>
>> So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which still
>> hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of assertion of
>> Existential Graphs'.
>>
>> I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear
>> tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve; as b]
>> directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an individual local
>> interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me - since it includes the
>> utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all three categorical modes and -
>> is that clear tri-relative framework, then, it's the 'perfect sign' and
>> can do everything and anything semiosic. ..The rheme's individual
>> local interpretation is related to the legisign's general Thirdness and -
>> and yet- is grounded by that existential indexical connection to the object.
>>
>> 2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's
>> statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads me to
>> make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher authority?
>>
>> As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have claimed
>> that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I don't keep
>> archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the symbol - and it is
>> clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action and Not indexical which
>> involves an existential connection. The symbol is a 'mental association
>> 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the fact that the mind associates
>> the sign with its object; in that case, the sign is a name or symbol". It
>> is a mental act 2.438] . It requires an interpretant [see 2.304]...
>>
>> Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a symbol
>> and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim that molecules
>> use symbols in their informational interactions? Because Mind, as law, is
>> involved in chemical composition, does not mean that this same set of
>> molecules uses its own mental actions to interpret its own nature.
>>
>> 3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of the
>> function of that which is being defined.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> 1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position, not
>> simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic Indexical
>> Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs"; please
>> explain
>> it to me.
>>
>> 2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of the
>> universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric rhetoric"?
>> Again, please explain it to me, rather than just asserting it. Since
>> "thought is not necessarily connected with a brain" (CP 4.551; 1906), why
>> should we treat any of the ten Sign classes as confined to human
>> conceptual semiosis?
>>
>> 3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis, rather
>> than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example) ably practices,
>> and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such differences are
>> precisely why collaboration is such an important aspect of the
>> List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and learn from each
>> other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our pre-established views. I
>> am actually very interested in exploring the nature and function of
>> perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within concrete semiosis, but for me, coming
>> up with clear definitions of those terms is the first step.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list
>>>
>>> 1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its qualities
>>> that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect sign' cannot
>>> fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential graphs.
>>>
>>> 2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or 'argument'
>>> in this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the ten classes of
>>> signs. I consider his use here as mere metaphoric rhetoric and not as a
>>> semiotic analysis of the Universe.
>>>
>>> If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within semiosis,
>>> you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual construct, it refers to
>>> "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of
>>> general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as
>>> referring to that Object" 2.249.
>>>
>>> And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an intellectual
>>> construct.[see 2.251-3].
>>>
>>> Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and not to
>>> physic-chemical or biological semiosis.
>>>
>>> 3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is that
>>> they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words; i.e.,
>>> substituting one set of words for another set of words.
>>>
>>> I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't
>>> seem interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the semiosic
>>> universe and how and why does it even exist and operate.
>>>
>>> And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why and
>>> how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this aspect.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking at
>>> Peirce's own words ...
>>>
>>> 1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
>>> Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that a
>>> Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of Existential
>>> Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that position. If not, then
>>> a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what Peirce meant by "perfect
>>> sign."
>>>
>>> 2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
>>> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
>>> must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its
>>> Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities
>>> play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe--that
>>> Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903).
>>> Since Peirce calls the entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he
>>> obviously did not confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual
>>> semiosis. Why should we?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> list -
>>>>
>>>> I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us has
>>>> different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'.
>>>>
>>>> Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function as
>>>> the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II]. The
>>>> Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within that
>>>> semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a triadic
>>>> relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its
>>>> interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the representamen
>>>> determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the
>>>> same object for some interpretant" [1.541]. This relational, dynamic nature
>>>> must be acknowledged.
>>>>
>>>> Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process, then, I
>>>> consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical Legisign', for, in
>>>> my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by Peirce : connection to
>>>> object [indexical]; aging [within the legisign]; and local individualism
>>>> [within the rhematic local interpretation].
>>>>
>>>> What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the localization
>>>> of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic interaction between Utterer
>>>> and Interpreter and thus - such an interaction would have two quasi-minds.
>>>> I don't see why this localization of mind, which I see as the quasi-mind,
>>>> is ALSO a perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic Indexical Legisign
>>>> which is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten classes [includes all
>>>> three categorical modes].
>>>>
>>>> In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to humans
>>>> but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of quasi-minds'
>>>> consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are 'intricately'
>>>> connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's view that the
>>>> quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote] appears as a Symbol and
>>>> Argument - which would confine it to human conceptual semiosis.
>>>>
>>>> I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from some
>>>> posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a quasi-mind
>>>> and a perfect sign.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>
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