Gary R, list, To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an immediate object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is pointless, for reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance of context, but mostly because taking either side in the debate presupposes a fixed opinion about what an immediate object is. The real question for inquiry, in my view, is What is an immediate object? — taking that to be a technical term, and an important one, in Peircean semiotic. As Jeff has suggested, one fruitful approach to that inquiry is to ask Why did Peirce find it necessary in 1904 to make an explicit distinction between the dynamic and immediate objects of a sign? That is the approach Bellucci has taken, and so has Stjernfelt in Natural Propositions, 3.13 (p. 96 ff.) That is the passage you (Gary) asked me to point to where Stjernfelt deals with immediate objects. (There may be others, but I know you have a copy of the book, and that passage will do nicely.)
You ask whether I agree “with Bellucci's characterization of Peirce's dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung (reference) and his immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn (sense)”. That of course is the interpretation that Bellucci is arguing against in his paper; and I do accept that characterization of “the Fregean interpretation,” and take it to be equivalent with the position you and Jon are taking in the debate that I don’t want to engage in. You may find, if you download and read the paper, that it differs from your position in some respects. I just used it as a convenient label for your position, that’s all — one that you would recognize if you’ve read Bellucci on this issue. Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote (from the Syllabus) which I think could throw some light on the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition of the rheme: [[ A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” are interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are not. The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a sign must have an actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as well as intension. The reason that a rheme is not interpreted as affording information is that it is not interpreted as directing attention to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by definition. This point is closely related to one that Peirce makes in the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces graphs of graphs: [[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a proposition that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to be true. But to say that it is true implies that it really is affected by its object; and in order that this object should have a real effect upon it, this object must be a subject of force, which is an individual. Consequently, an adequate interpretant of a graph must represent it as a sign of an individual. How, then, can there be a graph of a graph, considering that a graph is a legisign, or sign which has the mode of being of a general type, just as any word is a general type, and not a single individual object in a single definite place at a single instant. The answer is that a graph can only have a graph for its object indirectly. Directly, it can only refer to a graph replica. But it can assert what it asserts of any graph-replica you please so long as it be equivalent to a given graph replica. ]R 470 CSP 126-8] The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being really affected by its object, but only “understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object by making it a part of a dicisign, and it will afford the depth component of the information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the absence of some part of the sign indicating what that information is about, it can’t be interpreted as informational. I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of the “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for that purpose is, of course, up to you. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Sent: 23-Jun-18 15:37 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary F, Jon S, list, I will respect your wish, Gary, not to engage in what you consider not to be an inquiry concerning the status of the immediate object in Peirce's various sign classes but a mere debate, and even though I don't think the matter is at all settled. You have also stated that you have nothing to add to what you've already written and that I should at least read Bellucci's Chapter 8 in order to defend my position ("If you feel that your position needs defending against Bellucci’s) whereas I think Bellucci's/your position is the one which needs defending. For the record, I have read Chapter 8 of Bellucci's book and am clearly not as swayed in this matter by it as you clearly are. On the other hand, I began by reading the Peirce quotations in that chapter out of context before re-reading them in the context of Bellucci's discussion, and there is a great deal to be learned there, especially in consideration of Peirce passages not readily available. May I ask you a couple of questions even if you decline to inquire together on this topic (including, I would imagine, further explicating your/Bellucci's position)? You and Bellucci claim that Stjernfeld holds your position that only the Dicisign has an Immediate Object. Can you point to a passage where Stjernfeld explicitly states that? The snippet at the conclusion of your post today addressed to Jon S seems to be making a more general statement about the DO and the IO. In any event, do you agree with that Stjernfeld quote? Belluci (on "that confusion between the object and the interpretant of a sign against which Peirce warned us): As far as I know, the only Peirce scholar who has fully recognized that the immediate object of a sign has nothing to do with its “meaning” is Frederik Stjernfelt: “neither the Immediate Object nor the Dynamic Object is concerned with descriptive characters — this is left to the meaning categories. Both deal with the identity of reference" (2014, 98). Also, do you agree, Gary, with Bellucci's characterization of Peirce's dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung (reference) and his immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn (sense) as expressed in the Abstract of Bellucci's paper "Exploring Peirce's speculative grammar: The immediate object of a sign?" That he has "exposed" what he seems to suggest is a misunderstanding of the nature of the two Objects? The paper argues against what I call the “Fregean interpretation” of Peirce’s distinction between the immediate and the dynamic object of a sign, according to which Peirce’s dynamic object is akin to Frege’s Bedeutung, while Peirce’s immediate object is akin to Frege’s Sinn. After having exposed the Fregean interpretation, I briefly reconstruct the genesis of Peirce’s notion of immediate object in his semiotic writings of the years 1904–1909 and defend the view that, according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects Best, Gary R
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