Jon, As I said before, “Fregean interpretation” is Bellucci’s label for your position, which I assumed you were already familiar with. Whether it should be called “pejorative” or not, I don’t know. Here is his note on the subject from Peirce’s Speculative Grammar (p. 350):
[[ Peirce's distinction between the immediate and the dynamic object of a sign has often been taken to account for something similar to the Fregean distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, and accordingly it has been assumed that the immediate object should have something to do with the “meaning” or “sense” of a sign. For a criticism of this interpretation see Bellucci (2015c). Here I can observe that, as Peirce explains to Lady Welby, “signification is only one of the two chief functions of signs; as the elegant and correct John of Salisbury notices, in referring to ‘quod £ere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia, sed universalia significantur’” (RL 463 ISP 148). A sign both denotes and connotes, nominat and significat. It denotes its object and signifies its interpretant. It says something, and also indicates that of which it says what it says. If it is thought that the dynamic object corresponds to what the sign nominat, while the immediate object to what the sign significat — as, for example, Mats Bergman does when he says that the “aspect of saying something about something in some manner is conceptualized as the immediate object in distinction from the dynamical object that encompasses identification and demarcation” (2008, 86) — the result would be precisely that confusion between the object and the interpretant of a sign against which Peirce warned us. As far as I know, the only Peirce scholar who has fully recognized that the immediate object of a sign has nothing to do with its “meaning” is Frederik Stjernfelt: “neither the Immediate Object nor the Dynamic Object is concerned with descriptive characters — this is left to the meaning categories. Both deal with the identity of reference" (2014, 98). ]] And Bellucci 2015 is here: http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02. Since you’ve been arguing against it since it was mentioned on the list some time ago, I mistakenly assumed you had read it. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: 23-Jun-18 12:02 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary F., List: I find it troubling that you are doubling down on your (seemingly pejorative) characterization of the views that Gary R. and I have expressed as "Fregean," rather than interacting with the actual cases that we have made for them as being Peircean. It would be more helpful if you could at least explain what you (and Bellucci) mean by the "Fregean" view, so that we can then evaluate whether we agree that it is an accurate label for what we are advocating--especially since so far we have both denied it. As another data point, Peirce stated--in a context where he was clearly discussing all types of Signs, not just propositions/Dicisigns/Phemes, or even just Symbols--"It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate without, and the Immediate within the Sign" (EP 2:480; 1908). He went on to define Descriptive, Designative, and Copulant Signs accordingly; and two days later, he stated that there are not just Copulative Famisigns--which is how all propositions/Dicisigns/Phemes are classified--but also Denominative Potisigns, Copulative Actisigns, Descriptive Potisigns, Denominative Actisigns, and Copulative Famisigns (EP 2:488). In other words, every Sign is classified according to whether its IO is Possible (for Descriptives), Existent (for Denominatives), or Necessitant (for Copulatives)--which entails that every Sign has an IO. While this inference is derived from "an abstract schema of sign taxonomy," it is Peirce's abstract schema of Sign taxonomy. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sat, Jun 23, 2018 at 7:02 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote: Gary R, Jon, I’m well aware that Jon’s view of the IO, and yours — what Bellucci calls the “Fregean” view — is the most common view among Peirceans. It was my view too, until about a year ago, when I took a closer look at what Peirce was saying in 1904-1908. Bellucci even quotes half a dozen scholars to show that he and Stjernfelt are almost alone in their view of the IO. When I said that the definition I quoted from Jon was his definition, I simply meant that the exact formulation I quoted was Jon’s words and not Peirce’s. When I refer to Peirce’s definitions, I’m referring to the exact formulations found in his writings which tell us what an “immediate object” is, not to a generalized notion of the IO. And every one of Peirce’s formulations occurs in a context. Of course every sign represents its object. That is not an issue. When I say that the immediate object which is part of a sign functions indexically, I’m saying that it does part of the sign’s work in representing its object. The question is which part. I say it’s the part of the sign that helps to direct attention toward the dynamic object, whenever the sign is of such a nature that it has a separate part dedicated to that purpose. Not all signs have that; and this, according to Peirce from the Syllabus on, is precisely what makes the difference between a rheme and a dicisign. Anyway, as I said, I’m not really interested in debating the issue or repeating what I’ve already said. I just want to approach a deeper understanding of what Peirce is driving at in the Peirce texts I’m reading, because I still feel that this entails learning more about how signs enable learning from experience. And I’m still finding that the Peirce texts which are new to me (such as the manuscript material quoted by Bellucci) deepen my understanding of the Peirce texts I’ve read before (such as those I quoted in my book). Where my understanding of the issues appears to differ from others, I’m more interested in reconsidering my formulations (and revising them as needed to get closer to the truth) than I am in defending my past positions. If my formulations represent a minority view, so be it. If you feel that your position needs defending against Bellucci’s, then I think a close reading of Bellucci’s Chapter 8 (if not the whole book) is a prerequisite. Debating the issue based on my formulations is pointless, in my opinion, and does not constitute an “inquiry.” Other than that, I have nothing to add to what I’ve said before. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > Sent: 22-Jun-18 18:52 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >; gary.richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary F, Jon S, list Gary wrote: GF: Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of the Immediate Object — not yours. I do not see anything idiosyncratic about Jon's definition of the IO. It is certainly mine; I've argued along the same lines as Jon in an earlier discussion with you on this matter. In fact, I believe that many if not most Peirce scholars would tend to agree with Jon that (1) there is no sign that can convey all the qualities and characters of the DO and, so (2) the IO conveys just those characters and qualities which *some* sign means to convey. This is the case even for the rheme: 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as they are determined | EP 2:292 A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. [—] Or we may say that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent its Object in its characters merely… GF; The problem I have with [Jon's definition] is that you take it as definitive of the IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the immediate object of any rhematic sign. As Bellucci says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only dicisigns are said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two objects by definition. But Peirce does say--and in several places where the context doesn't involve the dicising whatsoever--that every sign has an IO. In my understanding that must necessarily be so for the reason given just above, viz., that any and every sign must convey something of its DO, and it does so through the IO. So, yes, in the context of speaking of dicisigns Peirce does emphasize the two objects (and it seems likely that the IO plays a peculiar and distinctive role in that sign class), but it seems to me that few insist that only the "dicisign has two objects." GF: Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding becomes the basis of your definition. And it seems to me that you are paying only attention to the quotes by Peirce and arguments by Bellucci which support your view, and that it's a problem when a novel understanding becomes the basis of your definition. GR: Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in which he’s using it. Peirce says that every sign has an Immediate Object many more times than two (see some additional examples below). And how many times does Peirce say definitively that only the DIcisign has two objects? I'd suggest that if he does the, he does it possibly only once. GF: One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 Syllabus (and elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives of these “signs.” We know that that Peirce wrote (confusingly in my opinion) that a sign is not a real thing, but that it must be embodied in, expressed as a real thing, namely, a replica "which is a sinsign" (EP 2.291). In EP 311 (which you refer to below), he states that "A sign is something that exists in replicas." So, as I see it, a Sign (say, two, 2, the vocalization, zwei, deux, etc.) is real, but only exists as some sinsign (replica). And if one is "principally" and "in particular" discussing, say, Propositions (Dicisigns), then those will be ones examples. But to extrapolate from this that such examples suggest that these are the only signs that have IO seems to me to be not warranted. GF: In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has propositional signs in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the Commens entry where that phrase occurs. This interpretation (perhaps correct enough in the particular passage discussed by you in KS) serves your argument. But to extrapolate from that that "For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” brought to my mind the response that for all we know, you may be wrong. GF: After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) is part of his speculative grammar. This generalization about logicians doesn't necessarily apply to Peirce who is, after all, the inventor of modern triadic semiotic. Propositions and arguments are principally the concern of those working in critical logic (critic, "logic as logic"). But I know I need not remind you that Peirce established two other branches of semiotic, speculative grammar and methodeutic. GF: [Peirce] quite naturally and often uses the terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians are traditionally concerned with. He does some times and he doesn't at other timess. Again, it depends on such matters as which of the branches of semeiotic he's working in. Also, some times his "short hand" can lead astray, and this is not uncommon in Peirce. For one famous example, Peirce sometimes uses "exist" or "existent" inter-changeably with 'real', and this has sometimes led to some consideration confusion in the literature. For example, in one of the quotations you offered above to the effect that "a sign is not a real thing," it seems likely that what Peirce actually means is that a sign is not in itself an "existent" thing (but that it *is* real), but exists only in replicas (see the passage stating this below, EP 311) GF: That’s one reason why it’s unwise to ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that only propositions have IOs.” One will certainly agree that is is wise not to ignore the context of Peirce's use of "sign." But when one starts to select just certain contexts, ignoring other, well, that's a problem in my view. And while you've asked Jon to cite occasions where Peirce stated explicitly that "all signs have immediate objects" (which he has, but which quotations haven't satisfied you, apparently), I think that if you can't offer a citation of Peirce explicitly stating that only Dicisigns have IOs, that is at least as problematic. GF: It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you can. I do not agree with your claim that "everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions." It seems strange to me to read that. Here are some counter-examples. 1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | MS [R] 1334:53 …there are two aspects of the object: The object as acting on the sign. That is called the real object The object as represented in the sign, or the immediate object. 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.536 … we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. I don't recall either of these passages being within a context which focuses on the Dicisign exclusively. See also discussions of the Immediate vs the Dynamic Object in, for example, Peirce's letters to Lady Welby (EP 2:477, 2:482). Here I am certain there is no discussion of the proposition or dicisign. GR: Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of symbols, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” must have immediate objects, because the doubleness of object is built into the definition of the dicisign as well as the proposition. I do not see that the fact that propositions and other dicisigns have two objects (even if explicitly in the definition of the dicisign) precludes other signs from having immediate objects. I think you and Bellucci may have made too much of that singular "definition." GF: Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s division of signs according to their immediate objects produces the trichotomy vague/actual/general. This appears in the Logic Notebook for July 7, 1905: “In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is Vagosign if it represents that Obj[ect) as possible, [it is] Actisign [if it represents that Object as] existent, [it is] General [if it represents that Object as] law” (R 339 DDR 247r). But this is prefigured in KS, where Peirce says (EP2:311) that “the distinctions of vague and distinct, general and individual are propositional distinctions.” Now, in KS Peirce ignores the dynamic/immediate object distinction (as well as the the proposition/dicisign distinction); but taking that into account, he is saying that the distinctions pertaining to the sign’s relation to its immediate object “are propositional distinctions.” That’s enough for me, and since you are quite familiar with KS, I don’t see why it wouldn’t be enough for you. Gary, I think that you and Bellucci are concentrating on the specificity of a context while ignoring other contexts. Other contexts contradict this exclusive reading (which, btw, as I see it is not at all "Fregean" as you wrote in an earlier post--on what do you base that?) GF: All of the above is to question your claim that “every sign,” presumably including at least the ten types defined in the Syllabus (if not the notorious 66), “has an immediate object.” If you’re going to stick to that claim, and base your definition of the IO on it, then I’m not interested in prolonging discussion on the matter. And if you are to insist that your (and Bellucci's) interpretation is the only correct one and that a position held my many other scholars--namely, that every sign has two objects), then I don't see why Jon would be interested in prolonging a discussion with you in this matter. Nor, for that matter, would I. GF: I’d prefer to focus on what Peirce actually says about immediate objects, in the contexts where he says these things, rather than argue for or against an abstract schema of sign taxonomy. Just my personal preference, of course. You are claiming that your interpretation (cherry picking the context which supports your view), namely, that only propositions/dicisigns have immediate objects, is "what Peirce actually says about immediate objects," and that Jon has been arguing in the context of "an abstract schema of sign taxonomy" (which I do not see that he has been doing) is ipso facto wrong and not worth considering as clearly not Peirce's view. I find that not helpful in forwarding this particular inquiry. But perhaps you are settled in your opinion and don't wish to carry the inquiry further. Best, Gary R
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
