Jon AS and Gary R,
JAS
Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection
with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a
Normative Science?
To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy
of CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that Peirce placed formal logic under
mathematics and logic under normative science. That is two mentions.
He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application
under mathematics. Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities.
When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter
where its variables refer to actualities. In such an application, it
would serve to evaluate truth or falsity.
In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines. But he did
not mention them in his 1903 classifications. If he had, he would
then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering.
That would make three mentions. In general, there is no limit to
the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics
-- including practical science (engineering).
JFS
I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since
every perception involves signs.
GR
While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted,
signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.
That's a critical distinction. Semiotic, the general theory of
signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal.
As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities.
Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception
and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments.
It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program.
To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative
value judgment. But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like
Buddhist meditation. That is phenomenology prior to any
intentionality.
As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that
does some useful work. That would be an application of semiotic
under some branch of engineering.
John
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