Gary F., List: I am posting this separately because it does not bear directly on anything that we have been discussing so far under the thread topic. You used the quote from Peirce that I retained below to set the table for explaining how Cuts are not as iconic and analytical as Peirce initially believed; I am going to take it as an opportunity to suggest that my recently introduced Propositional Graphs (PGs) *improve *on EGs with respect to *all three criteria* that he spelled out under his stated purpose for them, which was *representing propositions*.
1. PGs are *simpler *than EGs in that every Point for a subject always has a single connection, rather than there being Spots for "discrete" predicates that have multiple Pegs. 2. PGs are *more iconic* than EGs in that Indices (labeled Points) represent the indexical parts of a proposition (subjects) and an Icon (branching Line of Relation) represents the iconic part (continuous predicate). 3. PGs are *more analytical* than EGs in that they reflect what Peirce called "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885; 1908), which carries the analysis of a proposition "to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908). However, as I have conceded previously, PGs are *unlikely *to improve on EGs when it comes to *representing reasoning*, since the transformation rules are essentially unchanged. Last night I came across another late manuscript in which Peirce briefly endorsed representing a continuous predicate (though not calling it that) by a Spot, in this case labeled "stands," with multiple Pegs--three for a dyadic relation or four for a triadic relation (R 669:17[15]; 1911 May 30). Earlier in the same text, he suggested a particular convention for arranging the Pegs, similar to the one that I have proposed and consistent with the idea that syntax ought to embody "the flow of causation" (R 664:11-13; 1910 Nov 27). CSP: A heavy dot before a verb will denote the perfectly indefinite subject of the verb. A similar dot after the verb will denote with the same indefiniteness its direct object; and such a dot close under the verb will usually denote the dative indirect object. But such conventions must yield to convenience. Similarly, places about other words may be appropriated, each to denote “something” in a particular relation to that which the word signifies. Any such heavy dot may be prolonged into a heavy line; and when this is done the whole line continues to denote the same identical individual. If such line joins another, the junction asserts the identity of two “somethings”.(R 669:5[3]; 1911 May 25) Accordingly, a heavy dot close *above *the verb "stands" will denote the hypostatically abstracted relation. It turns out that this approach improves EGs in the *very same ways* that PGs do--*only *the continuous predicate has multiple Pegs, which iconically represent its *valency*, consistent with the analysis that throws everything possible into the *subject*--but the results remain recognizable as EGs, rather than calling for a different name and interpretation. Consequently, I am now inclined to stick with this alternative going forward, instead of advocating something new--which would probably be in vain anyway. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 10:37 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > Peirce’s most complete draft of “The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism” ( > http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm) includes a long section beginning on p. > {31} about the problems with *Selectives* as components of the system of > Existential Graphs. *Selectives* were introduced in the 1906 *Prolegomena* > at http://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4561 to deal with notational > problems arising from a Line of Identity (or Ligature) crossing a cut (or > another Ligature). But as Peirce explained in “Bedrock”: > > [[ Selectives violate the essential idea, or {33} purpose of The System, > Existential Graphs, as it is stated in the *Prolegomena*; namely, to > afford a method (1) as *simple* as possible (that is to say, with as > small a number of arbitrary conventions as possible), for representing > propositions (2) as *iconically*, or diagrammatically and (3) as > *analytically* as possible. … These three essential aims of the system > are, every one of them, missed by Selectives. ]] >
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