Gary F., List: Where did you get that idea? Again, Semeiotic is a generalization of Normative Logic, not formal/mathematical logic. The latter is limited to necessary reasoning (*logica utens*) from ideal hypotheses, and thus lacks the "hard dualism" of the former.
CSP: Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He does not in the least care whether they are correct or not. (CP 3.559; 1898) Accordingly, I would classify the quote below as Normative Logic (Semeiotic), not formal/mathematical logic. It is an outcome of studying reasoning itself (*logica docens*), not simply drawing necessary conclusions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 11:33 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > So there is a *Formal Logic as Semeiotic* as well as a *Normative Logic > as Semeiotic*. I was unaware of that. > > Peirce says that “the normative sciences are thoroughly infused with > duality” (EP2:385). Is *Formal Logic as Semeiotic*, or any other aspect > of Semeiotic, free of this “hard dualism” (EP2:376)? For instance, how > would you classify the following statement from “Bedrock”: “on the > principle that logicians call ‘the *Nota notae*’ that the sign of a sign > of anything, X, is itself a sign of the very same X, the Phemic Sheet, in > representing the field of attention, represents the general object of that > attention, the Universe of Discourse.” > > Normative Logic? Formal? Neither? Or both? > > Gary f. >
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